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Abstract 
 
The thesis of this thesis is that expressivists can and should develop a theory 
of normative propositions that can play an explanatory role in their theory of 
normative thought and discourse. It has been widely assumed that 
expressivists cannot make explanatory appeal to normative propositions 
because propositional content is representational in the following sense: a 
proposition is or determines a way that reality must be when that proposition 
is true. If a normative proposition is or determines a way reality must be when 
that proposition is true, and believing a proposition involves taking that 
proposition to be true, it follows that believing a normative proposition 
involves taking reality to be some particular way. But expressivists deny that 
normative thought represents reality in this way. Rather, normative thought is 
best explained as having some distinctive nonrepresentational function, such 
as motivating our actions and coordinating our attitudes. As such, almost all 
expressivists have rejected the existence of normative propositions, except in a 
deflationary and hence non-explanatory sense. 
However, by rejecting the existence of normative propositions, expressivists 
face a number of serious problems in relation to explaining normative thought 
and discourse. By positing propositions as the objects of our attitudes and 
speech acts, we can provide a straightforward and systematic characterisation 
of our thought and talk in terms of the things we are related to in believing, 
desiring, asserting, denying, and so on. For example, logically complex 
attitudes can be explained in terms of the logical complexity of their 
propositional content. Rational connections between attitudes, such as 
inconsistency and entailment relations between beliefs, can be explained in 
terms of the properties of their propositional objects. Different attitude types 
with the same content can be explained in terms of a subject’s standing in 
different relations to the same proposition. And quantification over attitude 
contents can be explained in terms of a domain of propositional objects over 
which such quantification occurs. By rejecting normative propositions, 
expressivists must provide alternative explanations of these features of 
normative thought and discourse.  
Although a number of philosophers have attempted to provide such an 
alternative, such attempts face a number of serious difficulties. Moreover, even 
supposing some adequate alternative is forthcoming, there is a remaining 
problem of explaining why it is that both normative and non-normative 
thought possess many of the same features but for completely different 
reasons. Problems such as these have more recently led some to suggest that 
expressivists should embrace the existence of normative propositions within 
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their theory of normative thought and discourse. This thesis takes up this idea 
and examines a number of different frameworks in which expressivists might 
develop a theory of normative propositions. 
How could an expressivist ever fully embrace the existence of normative 
propositions? My simple answer is that expressivists should reject the 
assumption that normative propositions are representational. If a normative 
proposition is not or does not determine a way reality must be when it is true, 
then believing that proposition need not involve representing reality as being 
some particular way or other. I explore several different views about 
propositions and argue that they each admit of generalisation such that some 
but not all propositions are representational. I argue that some of these views 
are better than others for the purposes of expressivism. My discussion of 
propositions is also meant to contribute to theorising in the philosophy of mind 
and language about what propositions are. For if you think there might be 
something right about the expressivist idea that normative thought is not 
representational like descriptive thought, then you should think that some 
views of propositions are better than others in light of my arguments about 
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Lay Summary 
 
On the 27 March 2020, the UK Government advisor Dominic Cummings 
travelled with his family from his London home to stay with his parents while 
he and his wife were ill with Covid-19. This trip, purportedly made so that 
their child could receive adequate care if both parents were incapacitated from 
the illness, was made at the height of a government-imposed lockdown that 
forbade all but essential travel. Given his senior role in advising the 
government, especially in relation to their communications strategy during a 
public health crisis, Dominic Cummings’ actions caused widespread debate 
and outrage. Although the trip, or at least certain parts of it, seemed to have 
gone against the spirit and perhaps the letter of the government guidance, he 
has denied any wrongdoing. Many see things otherwise.  
Given the risk of travelling across the country in full knowledge of his wife 
having Covid-19, it has been claimed that he was wrong to take this journey. 
Moreover, it has been claimed that it was unfair for him to make an exception 
of his own circumstances, when others have made far greater sacrifices in order 
to stick to the rules. Further, it has been claimed that he ought to feel some guilt 
or regret about his actions, and that the fact that there seems to be one rule for 
those in charge and another rule for everyone else is a reason to feel indignation. 
And it has also been claimed that we should not believe his version of the events, 
given all the available evidence. (Is it really plausible that he drove his family 
to a tourist hotspot to “test his eyesight” on a day that just so happened to also 
be his wife’s birthday?) These are just some of the issues that are at the time of 
writing being widely discussed in the media and homes of the UK. 
All of these claims are what philosophers call normative claims. They are 
claims about how we ought to act, what feelings and emotions we ought to 
have, and what we ought to believe. Centrally, they are claims that are in some 
way or another about justification. In claiming that one ought to feel 
indignation, one offers a justification for that attitude. In claiming that it was 
wrong to have taken the journey, one asserts that the action lacked justification. 
In answering the big questions about how we should live, we are making 
normative judgments. But they are also the stuff of everyday. (Should I spend 
my evening catching up on work or reading?). However, as well as asking such 
questions and forming answers to them, we can also take a reflective step back 
and ask: What are we doing when we ask normative questions? What are we 
doing when we make normative claims? These are meta-ethical or meta-
normative questions, and they make up the topic of this thesis. 
Contemporary meta-ethical views typically fall into one of two opposing 
camps. According to descriptive views, normative claims describe how things 
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are. On this view, the claim that Dominic’s journey was unjustified is 
fundamentally no different to the claim that the journey took place on 27 
March. Each claim describes the journey as having a certain feature, and in 
making such claims we are asserting that the journey did in fact have those 
features. The difference between the two claims, according to the descriptive 
view, is simply in the features we describe the journey as having. By contrast, 
according to expressive views, normative claims do not describe how things are. 
Instead, they express our attitudes and feelings. So, for example, we might 
think that the claim that Dominic’s journey was unjustified expresses 
disapproval of his journey, in contrast to describing it as having some particular 
feature. 
The expressive view has a lot going for it. For instance, when deliberating 
about whether I ought to perform some action, it seems that I am not simply 
trying to ascertain whether some particular fact is or is not the case. Rather, I 
am trying to settle the practical question of what to do. If normative claims are 
simply descriptions of how things are, as the descriptive view maintains, then 
this feature of normative deliberation looks puzzling. However, if normative 
claims express attitudes for and against various things, then this feature of 
normative deliberation can be explained straightforwardly. Further, if our 
normative claims are descriptions of how things are, then this raises questions 
about the nature of the facts so described. Specifically, it raises the question of 
how to make sense of facts about what is wrong, justified, required, and so on 
within a modern scientific worldview. Indeed, it raises the question of whether 
any such facts really exist. The question arises because the natural sciences tell 
us only about how things are, not how things ought to be, and so ‘normative 
facts’ do not seem to be recognised by the sciences. However, if our normative 
claims do not describe such facts, as the expressive view maintains, then no 
difficult questions arise about the place of such facts within a broader 
worldview. 
But the expressive view has its problems as well. For instance, consider the 
claim that if Dominic’s journey did not hurt anyone, then it was not wrong. 
Assuming the expressive picture, it is unclear what attitude this claim 
expresses. Because the claim about what is wrong appears in what is 
sometimes called an ‘embedded context’, here the consequent of a conditional 
claim, it does not seem to express disapproval (or some other negative 
attitude). In asserting the claim, one only commits to the conditional; unless 
one also accepts the antecedent claim that the journey did not hurt anyone, one 
need not express disapproval of anything. So if, as the expressive view 
maintains, normative claims express our attitudes, then we are owed an 
account of what attitudes are expressed by embedded normative claims. The 
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so-called ‘embedding problem’ gives rise to a number of related but more 
technical problems for the expressive view. 
This thesis examines several theoretical frameworks for addressing these 
problems. Specifically, it aims to develop a theory of normative belief and a 
theory of what normative beliefs are about, or what philosophers call propositions, 
that are compatible with the expressive view. Traditionally, philosophers have 
maintained that belief is a descriptive attitude in the sense that believing some 
claim involves taking some description to be true. For example, this view holds 
that my believing that Dominic’s journey was unjustified involves my taking a 
certain description to be true, namely that the description “was unjustified” is 
true of Dominic’s journey. As such, it has generally been assumed that the 
expressive view must deny that claims about what we ought to do express 
beliefs. However, in this thesis I argue that proponents of the expressive view 
should reject this assumption. I do this by exploring several ‘non-descriptive’ 
ways in which to understand what it is to believe something. I argue that the 
resulting picture provides the most promising version of the expressive view, 
avoiding the problems mentioned above, as well as providing an illuminating 
and interesting theory of what we are doing when we make normative claims. 
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What is the nature of normative thought and discourse, or thought and talk 
about what we ought to do, think, and feel? Traditionally, metaethical 
expressivists have denied that normative thought and discourse is primarily 
about whether particular propositions are true. Instead, they claim, it is about 
influencing each other’s conative and affective attitudes. Accordingly, such a 
view has no place for normative propositions within an explanatory account 
of normative thought and discourse. However, eschewing normative 
propositions creates all sorts of difficulties for expressivists. A straightforward 
way to resolve these difficulties is for expressivists to embrace normative 
propositions. This thesis argues that expressivists can and should develop a 
theory of normative propositions to play an explanatory role in their theory of 
normative thought and discourse. What expressivists need, I argue, is a 
conception of normative propositions consistent with the idea that normative 
discourse is importantly distinctive from descriptive thought and discourse, or 
thought and talk about the way the world is. In this introductory chapter, I lay 
out the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the project. First, I 
motivate the project in the most general terms, situating it within the existing 
metaethical landscape (section 1.1). Next, I outline the theoretical background 
that frames the discussion of the thesis (section 1.2). Then, I explain some of the 
more detailed motivations for positing propositions and the problems that 
result from rejecting them (section 1.3). Finally, I provide a roadmap of the 
remaining chapters (section 1.4). 
 
1.1 Two metaethical pictures 
 
This thesis is about normative thought and discourse. What exactly is this? As 
I am using the term, normative thought and discourse is thought and talk that 
is in some way or another about the justification of our actions, attitudes, and 
beliefs. Suppose I break a promise to a friend in order to help a stranger. Was I 
wrong to do so? Did my reasons to help the stranger outweigh my reasons to 
keep my promise? Given my evidence at the time, should I have believed that 
the stranger needed help? Ought I to feel regret or guilt at my having broken 
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my word? These are all normative questions, and thought and talk concerning 
these questions is normative thought and discourse. 
Contemporary metaethics is dominated by two competing pictures of our 
normative practices. According to the first picture, normative deliberation and 
discussion is just one part of the more general activity of inquiring about the 
world around us. When we make a normative judgment, we represent a way 
that reality might be. What makes normative judgments distinctive, this 
picture claims, is that they concern putative facts about the existence and 
distribution of normative properties and relations. This is in contrast, say, to 
facts about the location of physical objects in an environment or about its 
natural history. Call this the representationalist picture of normative thought 
and discourse.  
Pressure is placed on the representationalist picture when we begin to ask 
about the nature of the facts that normative inquiry aims to discover. 
Specifically, there is a challenge to explain how normative facts, properties, and 
so on fit into the world as described by the natural sciences. Relatedly, there is 
also a challenge to explain how natural beings like ourselves acquire epistemic 
and semantic access to these facts. Further, there is a challenge to explain the 
practical significance of normativity. Normativity is something we care deeply 
about. It guides us in how to live. It matters. But if normative inquiry is just the 
investigation of one kind of fact among others, we are owed an explanation of 
why these facts seem to have a distinctive kind of authority in determining 
how to live.  
Despite these challenges, the representationalist picture remains compelling 
for many philosophers. One of the central tasks for representationalists is to 
answer the challenges in such a way that vindicates our ordinary normative 
practices and beliefs. Many philosophers are optimistic that this task can be 
met, and there are many competing theories that purport to provide such 
vindication. Others, however, remain sceptical. These sceptics can be placed in 
one of two camps. First, there are those who accept the representationalist 
picture. According to this group, our normative judgments are correctly 
understood to be about the existence and distribution of normative properties 
and relations. However, as a matter of fact, there are no normative properties 
or relations, or at least none that are instantiated or obtain. As such, our 
normative practices and beliefs are fundamentally premised on an error. By 
contrast, the other group of sceptics see no such error in our normative 
practices. The error, these sceptics claim, resides in a false philosophical picture 
of the nature of normative thought and discourse. According to these 
philosophers, we need another picture.  
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This leads us to the second prominent picture of normative thought and 
discourse. According to this second picture, normative deliberation and 
discussion should not be understood as part of the more general activity of 
inquiring about the world around us. Rather, at its core, normative deliberation 
and discussion is practical deliberation and discussion about what to do, what 
to think, and what to feel. Our normative judgments aim to settle how to live, 
not simply how things stand in the world. Proponents of this second picture 
argue that it avoids the challenges that beset the representationalist picture. For 
instance, the practical significance of normativity can be explained in terms of 
the practical nature of normative practice itself rather than in terms of the part 
of reality it is about. Moreover, if normative judgments do not aim to represent 
normative facts, no puzzles arise about how such facts fit into our conception 
of the world and our place in it; such facts are simply absent in the explanation 
of normative thought and practice.  
The dominant theoretical position that conforms to this second picture is 
metaethical expressivism (hereafter ‘expressivism’). As I will be using the term, 
expressivism is broad church with a long history. At a general level, 
‘expressivism’ can be used to carve out a cluster of different theories rather 
than any particular thesis or theory.1 I propose to define an expressivist theory 
as any metaethical theory that endorses the following two theses: first, that 
normative thought and talk is fundamentally nonrepresentational; second, that 
normative thought and talk is fundamentally practical.2 I will explicate these 
notions further in the next section. But the general idea should already be clear 
from the picture sketched above. As suggested there, expressivism provides an 
attractive view insofar as it explains the practical significance of normative 
discourse within a broadly naturalistic worldview while dissolving certain 
metaphysical and epistemological puzzles about normativity and avoiding 
error-theory.  
Despite these attractions, many doubt that expressivism can successfully 
explain the semantic and logical properties, broadly construed, of normative 
thought and discourse (more on which below). The problems critics raise tend 
to lie in the details of the particular expressivist theory in question. But the 
general worry might be expressed as follows. Our best account of the semantic 
and logical properties of intentional thought and talk presupposes a 
 
1 Prominent expressivist theories include Blackburn (1984, 1993, 1998), Gibbard (1990, 
2003), Horgan & Timmons (2006), Schroeder (2008), and (Ridge 2014); contemporary 
expressivism is a descendent of emotivist and prescriptivist theories such as Ogden and 
Richards (1923); Barnes (1933); Carnap (1935); Ayer (1936), Stevenson (1937), and Hare 
(1952). 
2 Compare Price’s (2011) formulation of expressivism. 
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representationalist picture of such thought and talk. If we give up this picture, 
we give up our best means of explaining these features of normative thought 
and talk. Thus, any nonrepresentational picture of normative thought and 
discourse is going to have a difficult time explaining these features. 
Traditionally, expressivists have accepted the challenge on its own terms, 
accepting the received explanation of semantic and logical properties in the 
descriptive domain and providing alternative explanations in the normative 
domain. This thesis takes a different tack.  
Rather than accepting the challenge on its own terms, I argue that our best 
account of the semantic and logical properties of intentional thought and 
discourse does not presuppose a representationalist picture. More specifically, 
I argue that a propositionalist account of the semantic and logical properties of 
thought and discourse — one that explains these properties in terms of the 
propositional content of our attitudes and speech acts — does not presuppose 
a representationalist picture. On this approach, what expressivists need is a 
reconceptualization of propositional contents and attitudes that is compatible 
with the expressivist picture. The undertaking of this task is the main project 
of this thesis. In this chapter, I argue that expressivists can in principle embrace 
normative propositions by denying that all propositions are representational 
(in a sense to be explained below). The remainder of the thesis then explores 
several different views about propositional content and argues that they each 
admit of generalisation such that some but not all propositions are 
representational. This, I argue, allows expressivists to embrace a 
propositionalist account of normative thought and discourse. 
 
1.2 Theoretical background 
 
With the basic landscape now sketched, I will now explain the key notions and 
arguments introduced in previous section. First, I will provide a more detailed 
characterisation of expressivism. Second, I will explain what I take to be the 
central theoretical role for propositions in terms of their role in the framework 
of propositional attitude psychology. Third, I will discuss some further issues that 
arise from this framework that will frame and constrain the subsequent 
chapters.  
 
1.2.1 Expressivism characterised 
 
I have defined expressivism as the conjunction of two theses: first, that 
normative thought and discourse is nonrepresentational; second, that 
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normative thought and discourse is practical. I will now say something about 
these two theses. The negative thesis claims that normative thought and 
discourse does not represent or describe normative reality. Here, ‘normative 
reality’ is shorthand for normative facts, properties, relations, states of affairs, 
or whatever else might be included in one’s normative ontology. This thesis 
variously goes by the name nonfactualism, nondescriptivism, and 
nonrepresentationalism.3  
The positive thesis claims that normative thought and discourse has some 
kind of distinctive nonrepresentational function, such as motivating our 
actions and coordinating our affective reactions in various real and imagined 
circumstances. For the purposes of this thesis, I will remain relatively 
noncommittal about how exactly we should cash out the second thesis. This is 
for two reasons. First, it is because I want to be as inclusive as possible as to 
which expressivist theories might benefit from embracing normative 
propositions. Second, it is because, at least at the outset, it will not matter too 
much to the arguments discussed exactly how the second thesis is cashed out. 
So while I will often describe normative thought and discourse as having a 
‘directive’ or ‘practical’ function, I will generally leave it open exactly how 
these notions should be cashed out. That said, I will at times adopt a more 
specific conception of the second thesis for the sake of concreteness in 
developing a theory or argument. 
Throughout this thesis, I will treat ‘factual’, ‘descriptive’, and 
‘representational’ as synonymous, and likewise for their respective cognates. 
Given the ubiquity of these terms in many different contexts, it is important to 
distinguish my use of these terms from other theoretical uses. For example, 
philosophers of mind sometimes debate whether our mental states are 
‘representational’ in the sense that they constitutively involve concrete ‘mental 
representations’, where these are conceived as vehicles of semantic content 
realised in the brain.4 This sense of ‘representational’ is orthogonal to the sense 
employed here. A mental state might be ‘representational’ in both, one, or 
neither senses. Second, philosophers of language sometimes debate whether 
denoting expressions are ‘descriptive’ in the sense that their denotation is fixed 
 
3 Throughout the thesis, I will often characterise the negative thesis in terms of normative 
properties and relations. This is because opponents of expressivism typically think in such 
terms. However, it’s worth highlighting that the rejection of normative properties and 
relations as such is not what’s at issue. As Devitt (2010: 139) points out, a nominalist might 
deny that normative claims are about the existence or distribution of normative properties, 
but this does not necessarily make her a nonfactualist in the relevant sense. So I take it that 
there is some reading of ‘describing normative reality’ available to the nominalist cum 
factualist that would put her in disagreement with the nonfactualist. 
4 See, for instance, Egan (2014) for a discussion of this kind of terminology. 
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by an associated description, rather than referring directly or by some other 
means. As I will be using the term, any expression whose meaning is explained 
in terms of its reference is descriptive.5 Third, as I will be using the term, a 
‘factualist’ view need not be cashed out in terms of an ontology of facts, rather 
than some other kind of ontology (e.g. objects or tropes). Rather than opt for a 
unified nomenclature, I will make use of each family of terms throughout. This 
is partly to avoid tedious repetition. But it is also because there is no agreed 
use of terminology in the literature and I will be engaging at different points 
with theorists who employ each kind of terminology.6 
A further qualification about the negative thesis is that it should be 
understood as a theoretical claim about whether normative thought and 
discourse should be explained in terms of representing normative reality. This 
is because expressivists can coherently accept talk of ‘representing’ or 
‘describing’ normative ‘facts’ as first-order claims within normative discourse, 
as opposed to meta-normative claims about normative discourse. This is 
possible insofar as the expressivist can provide deflationary interpretations of 
these notions. For example, a deflationary reading of ‘fact’ might claim that 
asserting [it is a fact that p] is more or less equivalent to asserting [p]. Such a 
view might claim that the utility of factual vocabulary in first-order discourse 
is its expressive power (e.g. in generalisations such as “everything she said was 
a fact”). Where ‘p’ is a normative claim, if (i) asserting [it is a fact that p] and 
asserting [p] are equivalent, and (ii) asserting [p] expresses a 
nonrepresentational state of mind, it follows that (iii) asserting [it is a fact that 
p] also expresses a nonrepresentational state of mind.7 In this way, the 
expressivist can give a nonfactualist explanation of normative ‘fact’-talk and 
similar notions. 
 
5 Thus, for instance, the ‘nondescriptive’ ideationalist theory of meaning proposed by 
Davis (2003) is still a descriptivist theory in the sense that the thoughts expressed by 
sentences have world-characterising truth-conditions. 
6 However, I do wish to avoid characterising expressivism in terms of the ‘cognitive’-
‘noncognitive’ distinction. This terminology is strongly associated with the notion of belief, 
where metaethical noncognitivism is the denial that there are normative beliefs. Because 
most contemporary expressivists hold that normative statements express beliefs in some 
sense or other, the noncognitivist label seems inappropriate (it would also exclude 
‘cognitivist expressivist’ theories such as Horgan and Timmons [2006]). Moreover, a 
central theme of this thesis will be that expressivists can claim that normative statements 
express beliefs in propositions in exactly the same sense as descriptive statements express 
beliefs in propositions. Further, the term ‘cognitive’ is employed in chapter 2 in a broader 
sense of ‘mental’ or ‘intentional’.  
7 Compare Blackburn’s (1998: 78) metaphor of Ramsey’s ladder.  
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This is somewhat oversimplified, and I don’t mean to suggest that providing 
adequate deflationary interpretations is a trivial task. But if something like this 
is right, then expressivists should have no problem accommodating talk of 
normative facts at a first-order level. More generally, the task of 
accommodating the realist-sounding features of normative discourse is known 
as quasi-realism (see Blackburn 1993). It is perfectly consistent with this to claim 
that representational or factual notions play no explanatory role in accounting 
for normative thought and discourse. The point here is not to defend quasi-
realism, but to get clearer on the commitments of the negative thesis, that 
normative thought and discourse is fundamentally nonrepresentational. 
Finally, although this should already be clear, it is worth emphasising that 
my use of ‘expressivism’ differs to philosophers who define the term more 
narrowly. For example, Mark Kalderon defines expressivism as the thesis that 
“The content of a moral sentence wholly consists in the noncognitive attitude 
it conveys.” (2007: 53) And Ralph Wedgwood defines it as the thesis that “the 
fundamental explanation of the meaning of normative statements […] is given 
in terms of the type of mental state that the statements made by uttering those 
sentences express.” (2007: 35) As I am using the term, expressivism is not 
committed to either thesis. (I will talk about the significance of language in 
relation to expressivism below.) Although throughout the thesis I will examine 
particular expressivist theories, the general investigation will not be guided by 
any single conception of how expressivism should be developed. Moreover, 
although certain theories of propositions might lend themselves more 
naturally to certain expressivist theories, I hope that the resources developed 
in the proceeding chapters can be utilised by a wide variety of expressivist 
theories. 
 
1.2.2 Propositional attitude psychology 
 
As it is used throughout this thesis, ‘proposition’ is a theoretical term of art. To 
understand it, we need to know what theoretical role the notion answers to. As 
I will be using the term, propositions are first and foremost the objects of 
attitudes. But what exactly is it to be the object of an attitude? I propose to 
understand this notion in terms of the broader framework of propositional 
attitude psychology. I will now say something about this broader framework and 
how this gives content to the notion of being the object of an attitude. Although 
metaethical debates often emphasise the theoretical importance of 
propositions, they rarely spell out in any detail what they take the role of 
propositions to be, and so it will be worth dwelling on this question in some 
detail. 
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Many philosophers believe that we can provide a systematic 
characterisation of a large subset of our mental states, speech acts, and actions 
by relating agents in various ways to entities called ‘propositions’ or 
‘propositional contents’. According to this approach, where V is a propositional 





In other words, S stands in relation V to p. For example, suppose James believes 
that veganism is morally required. On the current approach, we can 
understand this attribution to involve ascribing a relation (believing) between a 
subject (James) and a proposition (that veganism is morally required), or: 
 
 Believing(James, [that veganism is morally required]) 
 
(I’ll use the square bracket notation ‘[…]’ throughout to indicate that the 
sentence or sentence variable within the brackets denotes a proposition.) 
Believing is a kind of propositional attitude, where propositional attitudes are 
those mental states that can be individuated by relating a subject to a 
proposition. Similarly, propositional acts are those cognitive or behavioural 
acts that can be individuated by relating subjects to a proposition, such as 
judging [that veganism is morally required] or asserting [that veganism is 
morally required].  
As well as providing a systematic way of categorising our thoughts and 
speech acts, propositional attitude psychology has further explanatory aims. 
Specifically, it aims to explain the characteristic ways in which our attitudes 
stand to each other and interact. For example, suppose that A is the attitude of 
believing [that veganism is morally required] and B is the attitude of believing 
[that veganism is not morally required]. Propositional attitude psychology 
explains the relations between A and B in terms of the proposition that is the 
object of each attitude and the relation taken towards it. One such relation that 
needs explaining is the fact that A and B are inconsistent. Propositional attitude 
psychology explains this fact in terms of: (a) the more general fact that it is 
inconsistent to believe incompatible propositions; (b) the fact that A and B are 
beliefs; and (c) the fact that the proposition [that veganism is morally required] 
is incompatible with the proposition [that veganism is not morally required]. 
Further, propositional attitude psychology can appeal to (a)-(c) to explain why 
subjects who have both A and B will tend to revise their attitudes when this 
inconsistency is brought to light. Not only this, but the attitudes we attribute 
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to subjects will provide the basis for rationalising their actions more generally. 
These explanations are somewhat programmatic as they employ various 
notions that are in need of further elucidation. But they nonetheless form the 
basis of an explanation.  
As I am using the term, ‘propositional attitude psychology’ is any approach 
to theorising about the mind that individuates and identifies mental states and 
speech acts by relating subjects to propositions. As with expressivism, this 
characterisation is deliberately vague and may be fleshed out in many different 
ways. For instance, we have said nothing yet about the nature of the relevant 
relations between subjects and propositions, the nature of propositions, or the 
nature of the subjects of propositional attitudes. We have said nothing about 
the empirical nature of our actual propositional attitudes and little about their 
metaphysical nature, other than that they are subject to the kind of 
individuation conditions given above. We have said little of the explanatory 
ambitions of propositional attitude psychology other than its aim to provide a 
systematic characterisation of certain aspects of our mental and behavioural 
lives. We have said nothing about the relation between the things we believe 
and the meanings of our words and sentences. And we have said nothing about 
the relation between propositional attitude psychology and our folk 
psychological practices. As a general framework, propositional attitude 
psychology is compatible with a number of different answers to these 
questions. The important point is simply that we can provide a systematic 
explanation of a large part of what we think, say, and do by relating subjects 
to propositions in appropriate ways. 
What, then, must propositions be like in order to play the object of attitude 
role in propositional attitude psychology? Despite the many differences 
between different conceptions of propositions, there are a number of features 
of propositions that almost all theories agree on. First, propositions are taken 
to be abstract objects, in the sense that they do not inhabit a spatial or temporal 
location. Second, propositions are taken to be mind-independent, in the sense 
that a proposition can exist even if no one has ever believed it or taken any 
other attitude towards it. Third, propositions are taken to be language-
independent, in the sense that two speakers might assert the same proposition 
using two different languages. And fourth, propositions have their truth-
conditions essentially, in the sense that it is necessary that the proposition [p] 
is true just in case p and false just in case not-p. I will assume throughout that 
any theory of propositions will accommodate these features. 
A widespread assumption about what propositions must be like that I do 
wish to challenge is what might be called the representationalist assumption 
about propositions. This terminology is offered as part and parcel of the 
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terminology described in the previous subsection. We can give a more precise 
characterisation of what it is for a proposition to be representational as follows: 
a proposition is or determines a way that reality must be when that proposition 
is true.8 As before, I will use ‘representational’, ‘descriptive’, and ‘factual’ 
interchangeably, treating them as synonymous. And again, it is important to 
distinguish these uses from other uses of these terms as applied to 
propositions. For example, in certain debates about the metaphysics of 
propositions, the question of whether a proposition is ‘representational’ 
concerns whether it has its truth-conditions in virtue of its intrinsic 
representational properties, or whether it simply is or determines its truth-
conditions without inherently representing anything.9 This is not the sense of 
‘representational’ in play here. As I will use the term, any proposition that 
determines world-characterising truth-conditions is representational, 
regardless of how it does so. 
If the representationalist assumption is correct, then one might argue for the 
incompatibility of expressivism and normative propositions as follows. If a 
normative proposition determines a way reality must be when that proposition 
is true, and believing a proposition involves (inter alia) taking that proposition 
to be true, it follows that believing a normative proposition involves taking 
reality to be some particular way. But this contradicts the expressivist’s 
negative thesis that normative thought does not represent or describe 
normative reality. So, the argument concludes, expressivists cannot appeal to 
normative propositions. Arguably, historic and widespread acceptance of the 
representationalist assumption explains why expressivists and their opponents 
have taken expressivism to entail a rejection of normative propositions (other 
than in a deflationary and hence non-explanatory sense).10 However, this 
argument is sound only if we accept the representationalist assumption. If we 
reject the assumption, then it is open to expressivists to embrace normative 
 
8 Schroeder (2015: 2) frames in the issue in terms of whether propositions determine their 
own truth-conditions. If by ‘truth-conditions’ we mean something like substantive or world-
characterising truth-conditions, then I think this is equivalent to the present framing. 
However, one might also mean something like minimal or deflationary truth-conditions, 
which all propositions plausibly do determine. Given a deflationary reading, an 
expressivist theory of propositions can respect the claim that propositions have their truth-
conditions essentially. 
9 Examples of what might be called the inherent representation view include Hanks and 
Soames’ respective views of propositions, discussed in the next chapter. For an example of 
the denial of the inherent representation view that is still ‘representational’ in the sense 
employed throughout this thesis, see Stalnaker (2012). 
10 Schroeder (2013: 86ff) offers some further explanations for the pervasiveness of the 
representationalist assumption. 
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propositions. Of course, if propositions are not representational, then we are 
owed an account of what they are like. More specifically, we are owed an 
account of what they are like such that they can realise the object of attitude 
role. Nonetheless, in principle, there is no reason why the expressivist cannot 
reject the assumption.  
Some philosophers might object here. Isn’t it a conceptual truth about 
propositions that they represent reality? One way to respond to this worry 
would be to provide counterexamples, i.e. to provide candidate examples of 
propositions that do not represent reality. Providing such examples will be a 
main objective of this thesis. However, we can also quickly say something more 
general in response to the worry. As I am using the term, ‘proposition’ is a 
theoretical term that is defined functionally.11 Specifically, it is defined as 
whatever realises the object-of-attitude role in propositional attitude 
psychology. The constraints placed on the kind of entity that propositions can 
be will therefore be determined by the particular role that propositions play in 
one’s overall theory. The significance of this is that if the expressivist denies 
that certain attitudes are representational in the relevant sense, but accepts that 
there are good grounds to individuate these attitudes in terms of their 
distinctive contents (more on this below), then we would not expect the appeal 
to propositions in and of itself to commit her to the representationalist 
assumption.  
In fact, the above argument against the compatibility of expressivism and 
normative propositions can be resisted without rejecting the 
representationalist assumption about propositions. In other words, it is 
perfectly coherent to hold a nonrepresentationalist view of normative thought 
and discourse and a representationalist view of normative propositions. This 
is because even if one accepts that normative propositions correspond to 
distinctions in reality, one might deny believing a normative proposition 
consists in taking that proposition to be true. This is, in essence, the view of 
Kalderon (2007), who argues that accepting a moral proposition consists in 
having a noncognitive attitude towards that proposition. I will discuss some 
more specific reasons for rejecting this view in the next chapter, but I think that 
rejecting the representational assumption is a generally more attractive 
approach. So although a representationalist cum expressivist theory of 
normative propositions is possible, throughout this thesis I will take ‘an 
expressivist theory of propositions’ to refer only to nonrepresentationalist 
theory of propositions. 
In this thesis, I explore, develop, critique, and defend a number of different 
frameworks that expressivists might utilise to develop a theory of normative 
 
11 Compare Yalcin (2014: 19). 
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propositional content. I will argue that certain approaches have serious 
limitations and that other approaches are more promising. In both cases, 
however, the inquiry will show that the range of options available to 
expressivists to develop a theory of normative propositions is far wider than 
one might expect. The approach of this thesis will not be to comprehensively 
survey all possible approaches, but to focus on a few promising approaches 
and see how far we can develop these theories. So my discussion of 
propositions is also meant to contribute to theorising in the philosophy of mind 
and language about what propositions are. In the end, I will argue that 
developing an expressivist theory of propositions requires us to rethink not 
just the nature of propositional content but also the nature of propositional 
attitudes more generally. So while the project undertaken in this thesis is 
primarily in the service of expressivism, if correct the view defended here has 
wide-reaching consequences for how we think about what we think, say, and 
do in general. Before examining the motivations for this approach, I want to 
highlight some further issues that will shape the discussion to come. 
 
1.2.3 Further issues 
 
Now that I’ve provided an initial characterisation of expressivism and the 
theoretical role of propositions in propositional attitude psychology, I want to 
highlight a number of further issues that arise from these characterisations that 
will shape the subsequent discussion.  
 
Thought and language 
 
The first issue concerns the relation between thought and language. The 
current investigation is intended primarily as a contribution to theorising 
about thought and mental content. It is not intended, at least in the first 
instance, as a contribution to theorising about language and linguistic 
meaning. This has implications for how to think about propositions as well as 
how to think about expressivism. 
Recall that propositional attitude psychology posits propositions as the 
objects of propositional attitude and acts, including speech acts. Many theorists 
believe that the same entities should also play the role of the meanings or 
semantic values of sentences (in context). However, although I say nothing to 
rule out this possibility, I will not make any assumptions about the relation 
between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an assertion that deploys 
that sentence. For in any case, there are a number of reasons for thinking that 
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the object of attitude role and the semantic value of sentences in context role serve 
different theoretical purposes and as such are subject to different constraints.  
To name just one, it is not clear that propositional contents are compositional 
in the same way as semantic values are compositional (see, for example, 
Dummett 1973; Lewis 1980; Stanley 1997; Ninan 2010; Rabern 2012; Yalcin 
2014). For example, consider the two sentences (from Rabern 2012): 
 
(1) “It is raining.” 
(2) “It is raining now.” 
 
Plausibly, asserting these two sentences say the same thing relative to the same 
context, i.e., they have the same propositional content. Similarly, if I believe 
[that it is raining], and I believe [that it is raining now], plausibly these come to 
one and the same belief. However, embedding (1) and (2) in more complex 
sentences shows that they have different meanings relative to the same context. 
For example: 
 
(3) “It has been the case that it is raining.” 
(4) “It has been the case that it is raining now.” 
 
Relative to the same context of utterance, these sentences might have different 
truth-values. Whereas the truth-value of (3) depends on what has happened 
before the time of utterance, the truth-value of (4) depends on what is 
happening at the time of utterance. However, if two sentences have the same 
meaning, then substituting each sentence should preserve truth-conditions. 
Thus, while (1) and (2) express the same proposition relative to the same 
context, they have different semantic values. Similar examples abound.12  
The point I want to make here is simply that a theory of propositions need 
not be a theory of sentence meanings (in context). These are two distinct 
notions answering to different theoretical demands. Of course, a 
comprehensive theory of normative thought and discourse will include a 
theory of the meanings of normative terms and sentences as well as the objects 
of normative beliefs and assertions. It will also provide a ‘postsemantics’ that 
explains the connection between the theory of meaning and the theory of 
content. For example, a straightforward view might be that the meaning of a 
sentence in context determines the proposition expressed by its utterance, 
where ‘determines’ expresses some relation other than identity (e.g. Lewis 
 
12 See especially Yalcin (2014: 23ff) for further conceptual and empirical reasons against the 
identification of belief content and compositional semantic value. 
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1980). However, answering such questions is beyond the purview of this 
thesis.13  
Given my focus on expressivism, it might initially seem surprising that I will 
not focus on language, since expressivism is often characterised primarily as a 
thesis about normative language. For example, it is often characterised as the 
view that the meaning of a normative term or sentence is explained in terms of 
the nonrepresentational state of mind it conventionally expresses (the 
canonical statement is Gibbard [2003: 7]; see also the passages quoted above 
from Kalderon and Wedgwood). However, I think that it is a mistake to see 
metaethical expressivism primarily as a view about normative language. 
Although expressivists often motivate their theory from observations about 
normative language, the explanations that expressivists aim to provide are 
fundamentally psychological rather than linguistic. When expressivists offer 
explanations of the practical significance of normative discourse in our lives, 
or of how to dissolve metaphysical and epistemological puzzles about 
normativity, they do so by offering explanations of what it is to think normative 
thoughts and to have normative attitudes. Thus, expressivists ultimately 
address metaethical problems with psychological explanations, not linguistic 
ones.  
This is not to deny that we live much of our normative lives through 
language. Indeed, I find it plausible that language possession is a necessary 
condition for the capacity for normative thought. But the psychological 
explanations that expressivists appeal to in order to solve the problems of 
metaethics are compatible with a range of different approaches to theorising 
about the semantics of normative language. Traditionally, expressivism has 
been characterised in terms of its commitment to a psychologistic semantics in 
which the meanings of sentences are explained in terms of the mental states 
they conventionally express (e.g. Rosen 1998: 387; Kalderon 2007: 54; 
Wedgwood 2007: 35f; Schroeder 2008: 33). More recently, however, a number 
of philosophers have sought to reconcile expressivism with orthodox truth-
conditional semantics (e.g. Yalcin 2012, 2018a; Silk 2013, 2015; Charlow 2014; 
Ridge 2014; Chrisman 2016; Köhler 2018). And a number of others think that 
expressivists should endorse an increasingly popular ‘dynamic semantic’ 
approach (e.g. Charlow 2015; Starr 2016; Willer 2017).  
So while expressivists will need some satisfactory semantics for normative 
expressions at the end of the day, I don’t take this to be the central task for 
expressivism. At the very least, for the reasons suggested above, we should 
 
13 Sentential theories of belief according to which beliefs are relations to sentences (whether 
in a public language or a language of thought) might collapse this distinction. I will briefly 
say something about such theories below. 
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expect there to be a division of labour in providing an expressivist theory of 
normative thought and an expressivist theory of normative language. More 
generally, I think a focus on psychological rather than linguistic explanations 
is supported by the plausible idea that thought is explanatorily prior to 
language.14 This is in contrast to the view that language is explanatorily prior 
to thought (e.g. Dummett 1973) and the view that neither has priority (e.g. 
Davidson 1975). Nonetheless, throughout the thesis it will at times be 
convenient to formulate certain arguments or views in terms of what is 
expressed by certain sentences or statements. However, such formulations are 
primarily heuristic and should not be understood as semantic claims that 
specify the meanings of sentences. 
 
Propositional attitude psychology as a theoretical enterprise 
 
As I have explicated the term, ‘propositional attitude psychology’ describes a 
theoretical approach to explaining our cognitive lives. Another important 
preliminary, therefore, concerns the relation between propositional attitude 
psychology on the one hand and ordinary language attitude attributions and 
folk psychological practice more generally on the other. For there are a number 
of different ways one might understand the relation between our theoretical 
and folk views. Ultimately, I think my approach in this thesis is compatible 
with any number of views, so I won’t here take a stand on how we should 
conceive of this relation. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some of the 
differences to get a sense of the different ways in which one might understand 
propositional attitude psychology. 
The most straightforward view of the relation between propositional 
attitude psychology and folk psychology would be that propositional attitude 
psychology is just an explicit articulation of (some subset of) folk psychology. 
On such a view, the ‘that’-clauses in ordinary language attitude attributions 
would denote propositions, and a theory of propositions provides an account 
of what we refer to in ordinary language. A distinct though nearby view is that 
propositional attitude psychology provides reforming definitions for folk 
psychological terms and concepts. Perhaps our ordinary practices are too 
messy, vague, indeterminate, and context-dependent to be straightforwardly 
identified with propositional attitude psychology. But perhaps the latter 
captures in a more precise and determinate way what we need from folk 
 
14 This is compatible with language possession being a necessary condition for the 
possession of certain kinds of thoughts — see Peacocke (1996). Additionally, I take it that 
‘language’ here means public language, as presumably one can accept the priority of 
thought while also accepting the language of thought of hypothesis.  
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psychology in order to explain our attitudes in a systematic fashion and 
perhaps vindicate our folk psychological practices. 
Another view of the relation between folk psychology and propositional 
attitude psychology might be that the latter provides an explanatory model of 
(certain aspects of) folk psychology in the following sense (Godfrey-Smith 
2005: 2f; see also Yalcin 2018c: 353): 
 
A model-builder’s usual goal is to construct and describe various hypothetical 
structures. These structures are used to help us understand some actual target 
system or systems. Generally, the understanding is supposed to be achieved 
via a resemblance relation between hypothetical and real systems. But both the 
degree and kind of resemblance that is sought are adjustable. So a model itself 
does not contain commitments about what the target system is like, or even 
which system is the target. A model and its application are two different 
things. 
 
Thought of in this way, the structures described by propositional attitude 
psychological provide indirect representations or idealised structures that shed 
light on our attitudes, behaviour, or whatever exactly we are appealing to 
propositional attitude psychology to explain. On this view, we can provide an 
explanation of our thought and discourse in terms of relating subjects to 
propositions without necessarily saying that the attitudes attributed in folk 
psychology are (approximately) constituted by such relations. There is a 
difficult philosophical question of how exactly to understand the explanatory 
relation between models and the phenomena they target (for discussion, see 
the essays collected in Morrison and Morgan 1999). However, explanatory 
models are commonplace and widely accepted across a wide variety of 
scientific disciplines. So the difficulty in explaining precisely how such a model 
could be explanatory is not itself an objection to such a view. 
 
Propositional attitude psychology and the metaphysics of mind 
 
I will argue later in the thesis that an adequate metaphysics of propositional 
content needs to be grounded in a suitable metaphysics of propositional 
attitudes. But it’s worth highlighting that the framework of propositional 
attitude psychology itself is relatively noncommittal with respect to the nature 
of propositional attitudes. This is so for a number of reasons. Most obviously, 
if we understand propositional attitude psychology as providing a model, as 
was suggested above, then strictly speaking propositional attitude psychology 
itself makes no commitments about the nature of what it is used to model. It is 
in the application of the model that it says something about the target 
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phenomena, but this application may be more or less precise in what it says 
about the nature of the target phenomena. Further, even if we take 
propositional attitude psychology to be an explicit articulation of folk 
psychology, certain meta-theoretical views of folk psychology will give rise to 
similar positions. For example, Godfrey-Smith (2005) argues that our folk 
psychological capacities themselves should be understood as a kind of model-
based understanding.  
Putting aside the idea of propositional attitude psychology as a modelling 
enterprise, at the very least it might seem that the approach is committed to a 
relational view of attitudes, according to which propositional attitudes are 
essentially relations between agents and propositions. Strictly speaking, 
however, the relational view is not entailed by propositional attitude 
psychology. This is because propositional attitude psychology first and 
foremost provides a relational view of attitude attributions. To see how these 
come apart, consider the following analogy with temperature. For example, 
consider: 
 
(5) The room is 20°C.  
 
This claim attributes a certain temperature to the room. A natural reading of 
this claim is that it involves relating to the room to a certain abstract object. The 
logical form of this attribution might be thought to be one of the following: 
 
(5¢) R(room, 20) 
(5¢¢) R*(room, 20°C) 
 
According (5¢), the attribution states that the temperature in °C relation obtains 
between the room and the real number 20. According to (5¢¢) the attribution 
states that the temperature relation obtains between the room and the number 
20 on the degrees Celsius scale. The differences between (5¢) and (5¢¢) do not 
matter here. The relevant point is that in both cases, temperature attributions 
seem to relational in much the same way as attitude attributions. However, it 
is highly plausible that temperature is a non-relational intrinsic property. That 
the room is 20°C is plausibly a fact about the physical state of the room itself, 
and not a fact about the room’s relation to something else. So from the fact that 
certain kinds of attributions are relational, it does not necessarily follow that 
what is attributed is itself relational. 
Instead, the idea is that relating the room to an abstract object is a way of 
measuring an intrinsic state of the room. This is possible because the empirical 
structure of the room’s temperature bears an isomorphism or homomorphism 
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to the structure of the real numbers. This structural similarity allows us to 
“surrogatively reason” about certain physical magnitudes by using an abstract 
representational domain (Matthews 2007: 133ff). Returning to propositional 
attitudes, a number of philosophers have suggested that propositional attitude 
attributions might be thought of as a tool for measuring intrinsic properties of 
subjects, such as behavioural aptitudes. This suggestion has been developed in 
detail by Robert Matthews (2007), but has also been suggested by Churchland 
(1981: 70f), Stalnaker (1987: 9f), and Dennett (1987e: 123ff), among others. The 
idea is that the empirical structure of our attitudes bears a homomorphism to 
the logical structure of the domain of propositional contents, and so we can use 
the latter to “surrogatively reason” about the former. On this view, there is a 
sense in which we literally measure each other’s attitudes in our attitude 
ascriptions.  
I mention this view not to endorse it but rather to illustrate the way in which 
propositional attitude psychology is compatible with a range of views about 
the metaphysics of attitudes. If we accept a measurement-theoretic view of 
attitude attributions, then we still need a theory of the abstract representational 
domain by which we measure our attitudes. Among other things, this will 
involve providing a theory of the abstract relata of attributions. In other words, 
a measurement-theoretic account needs a theory of propositions no less than a 
view according to which propositional attitudes are essentially relations to 
propositions. The measurement-theoretic account will simply say that 
standing in relations to propositions is not part of the metaphysical essence of 
our attitudes.15  
The modelling and measurement views notwithstanding, the most 
straightforward explanation of the relational form of attitude attributions is 
simply that the attitudes attributed are themselves relational. Even here, 
however, it’s worth highlighting that there remains considerable scope about 
how best to understand the metaphysical nature of such relational attitudes. 
One question is whether the relevant relations are conceptually or 
metaphysically reducible to naturalistic relations (e.g. Loar 1981; Stalnaker 
1987) or whether propositional attitude psychology provides non-reductive 
autonomous intentional explanations (e.g. Dennett 1987a). In Chapter 5, I will 
 
15 See also Hanks (2015: 2f). Crane (1990) argues that the measurement analogy breaks 
down because intentional states are essentially characterised by their content, whereas it is 
arbitrary what scale we use to measure physical magnitudes like temperature. However, 
against this, one might question whether there is a uniquely correct notion of belief or belief 
content rather than different explications serving different theoretical purposes (compare 
Moore 1999). 
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endorse a non-reductive approach, but either approach is compatible with the 
general project undertaken in this thesis. It’s also worth pointing out that all of 
the views discussed above are compatible with a wide range of views about 
how propositional attitudes are empirically realised in human beings or other 
creatures.  
 
Sententialism about propositional attitudes 
 
Propositional attitude psychology explains our mental states by relating 
subjects to abstract entities. This propositionalist approach is often contrasted 
to a sententialist approach according to which beliefs and other attitudes are 
essentially relations to sentences. Historically, the sententialist approach has 
been motivated by scepticism about propositions (e.g. because of a 
thoroughgoing physicalist ontology or because of worries about identity 
conditions for propositions). As such, it is often presented as a rival to the 
propositionalist approach. As I am simply assuming a propositionalist 
approach to explaining intentional thought and discourse, then insofar as the 
sententialist approach is a genuine rival to the propositionalist approach, it 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the former in any depth. 
Moreover, I take the arguments discussed in the next section to most 
straightforwardly motivate a propositionalist approach rather than a 
sententialist approach. However, putting aside general scepticism about 
propositions, I think that the sententialist and propositionalist approaches are 
in fact compatible and might even be complementary.  
Indeed, a natural way to develop the sententialist approach appeals to 
propositions, or at least something closely analogous such as meanings. To see 
how, consider that it is highly plausible that two subjects who speak different 
languages can believe the same thing. A straightforward way to explain this 
given a sentential approach would be to provide the following kind of analysis: 
a subject S stands in the believing relation to a proposition p in virtue of standing 
in the believing* relation to a sentence s that means p (compare Field 1978), 
where p is the proposition expressed in that context.  
This kind of analysis might be motivated on the grounds that we need to 
posit a relation to mental particular (i.e. a tokened mentalese sentence) in order 
to explain the causal efficacy of thought (compare Fodor 1987). So when 
sentential theories are not motivated by general scepticism about propositions, 
a theory of propositions might play a role in a sentential theory of belief. 
However, it seems to me that sentential theories are better viewed as empirical 
theories about how beliefs are empirically realised in human beings rather than 
as metaphysical theories about the essential nature of belief. So while it might 
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be true that human beings have beliefs in virtue of tokening mentalese 
sentences inside their ‘belief boxes’, this does not explain what it is to have 
beliefs. 
This concludes my discussion of some of the issues surrounding 
expressivism and propositional attitude psychology that frame and constrain 
the discussion of this thesis. The main constraint is that providing an 
expressivist theory of normative propositional content is primarily understood 
to be a task for the expressivist’s theory of thought. However, while I will in the 
end endorse a particular conception of propositional attitude psychology, the 
main lesson from this discussion is that the general project undertaken in this 
thesis is compatible with a wide range of views within the philosophy of mind 
about how to understand the nature of our attitudes and the relation of our 




In this section, I examine in more detail some of the motivations for positing 
propositions in general, as well as for positing normative propositions within 
an expressivist theory of normative thought and discourse. The arguments 
sketched here are not meant to decisively show that a nonpropositional theory 
of normative thought and discourse will fail. Rather, they make a prima facie 
case for a propositional approach, both in general terms and for expressivists. 
I doubt there are any general arguments that would decisively favour one 
approach over the other. The plausibility of either will ultimately depend on 
the plausibility of the particular theories that each approach provides. The 
main focus of this thesis will be to make the case that expressivists should, pace 
most of the expressivist tradition, adopt a propositional approach by showing 
how far we can develop that approach into detailed theories of propositional 
attitudes consistent with expressivism. Nonetheless, I think the arguments put 
forward in this section suggest that embracing propositions provides a simple 
and powerful way of explaining intentional thought and talk and that rejecting 
propositions for the normative domain is a heavy theoretical cost. 
Stephen Schiffer (2003) argues that propositions are implicated in the ‘face 
value theory’ of belief and that this theory enjoys a prima facie status. The basic 
idea is that they are implicated in the most straightforward account of the 
logical form of belief attributions and the inferences we can make using them. 
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(6) Harold believes that there is life on Venus, and so does Fiona. 
So, there is something that they both believe — to wit, that there is life 
on Venus. 
 
(7) Harold believes everything that Fiona says. 
Fiona says that there is life on Venus. 
So, Harold believes that there is life on Venus. 
 
(8) Harold believes that there is life on Venus. 
That there is life on Venus is Fiona’s theory. 
So, Harold believes Fiona’s theory. 
 
(9) Harold believes that there is life on Venus. 
That there is life on Venus is implausible. 
So, Harold believes something implausible — to wit, that there is life on 
Venus. 
 
Schiffer argues that the most straightforward way to account for the validity of 
these inferences is by attributing the following logical structure to each 
argument: 
 
(6*) Fab & Fcb 
\$x(Fax & Fcx) 
 










\$x(Gx & Fax) 
 
The idea is that we should interpret ‘that’-clauses and expressions like ‘Fiona’s 
theory’ as singular terms denoting propositions, and interpret ‘something’ and 
‘everything’ respectively as existential and universal quantification over these 
propositions. If we reject propositions, then we need to find some other way to 
make (6)-(9) come out valid. Importantly, it seems that we can replace the 
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descriptive sentence “that there is life on mars” with any arbitrary normative 
sentence, e.g. “that one ought to give to charity” without affecting the validity 
of the inferences. So the expressivist who rejects normative propositions needs 
some alternative explanation of the logical form of the normative equivalents 
of (6)-(9). 
(A natural candidate here would be to say that the singular terms refer to 
sentences. However, these inferences seem to be just as valid if we suppose that 
Harold and Fiona speak different languages. So the singular terms cannot 
simply refer to sentences. Perhaps one could maintain that they refer to classes 
of sentences, namely those that have the same meaning. But this would be to 
posit a particular kind of abstract entity that is the object of beliefs, which is 
tantamount to positing propositions, given the minimal characterisation of 
them above. If we accepted this approach, one question that would need to be 
answered is this: in virtue of what does a singular term refer to one set of 
sentences rather than another set? A natural candidate is that the sentences 
share truth-conditions. But if we are typing sentences by their truth-conditions, 
why not simply type those sentences by the proposition they express and in 
virtue of which they inherit their truth conditions?) 
Additionally, Schroeder (2013: 76ff) argues that by positing propositions as 
the objects of our attitudes, we provide a straightforward account of what 
attitudes are expressed by logically complex sentences. Roughly, logically 
complex attitudes can be explained in terms of the complexity of the object of 
those attitudes. (This isn’t quite right, as unstructured views of propositions do 
not consider them to be complexes; but the point remains that an attitude 
expressed by a logically complex sentence can be explained in terms of its 
propositional object.) That something like propositional structure is needed 
can be illustrated by examining a non-propositional analysis of complex 
attitudes. For instance, consider the following example from Schroeder (2008: 
45, 2013: 77; the example is derived from Unwin 1999, 2001): 
 
(10) Jon thinks that stealing is wrong. 
(11) Jon does not think that stealing is wrong. 
(12) Jon thinks that stealing is not wrong. 
(13) Jon thinks that not stealing is wrong. 
 
What account should the expressivist give of these states? Imagine an 
expressivist who thinks that claims about what is wrong express attitudes of 
disapproval towards what ‘wrong’ is applied to. On this view, we arrive at the 
following account of the above states: 
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(10*) Jon disapproves of stealing. 
(11*) Jon does not disapprove of stealing. 
(12*) ??? 
(13*) Jon disapproves of not stealing. 
 
As the question marks indicate, it is unclear what attitude (12) consists in. This 
is because the attitude of disapproval does not possess the right kind of 
structure to explain what attitude is expressed by negating the sentence 
“stealing is wrong”.  
One possible strategy would be to posit a distinct attitude, say toleration, 
which is expressed by externally negated atomic ‘wrong’-sentences. However, 
this move appears ad hoc, and in any case it no longer explains what (12) 
consists in. Rather, it simply posits that there is an attitude with the right 
properties to explain the relations between (12) and the other attitudes. By 
contrast, if (10)-(13) are analysed in terms of Jon standing in a single relation to 
different propositions, then we face no such problem. On this approach, the 
wide-scope ‘not’ expresses the truth-functional operation of negation, which 
provides a way of computing one proposition from another. Specifically, it is a 
function that takes a proposition [p] to the proposition [not-p]. If the 
contribution of ‘not’ in (12) is explained in terms of the object of Jon’s thought, 
there is no need to posit a distinct attitude expressed by ‘not wrong’.  
I have only so far talked about negation, but the same point applies to other 
logically complex attitudes, including alethic modal attitudes about what is 
possibly the case and necessarily the case (Schroeder 2013: 82ff). As with logical 
connectives, the orthodox view of modals is to interpret them as propositional 
operators (e.g. Kratzer 1977). Given that normative sentences can fill the 
complement place of alethic modal terms, the most straightforward way to 
interpret normative modal claims would be to posit normative propositions as 
filling the argument position of a modal operator. More generally, if logical 
complexity can be explained in terms of the objects of our attitudes, then we 
have a straightforward way of accounting for the attitudes ascribed by logically 
complex attributions. By contrast, if logical complexity is to be accounted for 
in the attitude type rather than its content, as with (10*)-(13*) above, then we 
will face an ever-expanding taxonomy of different attitude types, the logical 
relations between all of which need to be explained. And it is very hard to see 
what a systematic explanation of all these relations would look like on this 
picture. This is a problem because all of our beliefs are systematically related 
in terms of their compatibility and inferential relations. By contrast, a 
propositional approach can provide a systematic explanation (partly) in terms 
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of the properties of the objects of belief, whereas a nonpropositional approach 
seems to have to proceed on a piecemeal basis.   
Moreover, we not only want a systematic account of how our beliefs relate 
to one another, but also of how propositional attitudes in general relate to one 
another. Expressivists need to explain not just what it is for Jon to think [that 
stealing is wrong], but what it is for Jon to hope, fear, doubt, etc., [that stealing 
is wrong]. However, if we follow the disapproval model sketched above, then 
it hard to see how to generalise it to other attitudes in a systematic manner. 
This problem, originating from Rosen (1998: 393ff) and also put forward by 
Schroeder (2010: 83f; 2013: 81f), is known as the many attitudes problem. It is a 
problem because it seems that the expressivist must proceed in a piecemeal 
fashion to explain what each attitude consists in and how each attitude relates 
to other kinds of attitudes with the same content. By contrast, the propositional 
approach provides a systematic and straightforward explanation in terms of a 
subject’s bearing a different relation for each kind of attitude towards the same 
propositional object.  
While most expressivists have rejected explanatory appeals to normative 
propositions in their theories of normative thought and discourse, many are 
happy to accept their use in theories of descriptive domains of thought and 
discourse. However, this creates a number of additional problems for 
expressivism. The core problem is that taken at face value, much of the 
phenomena that justify positing propositions for descriptive domains are just 
as present in the normative domain. So even assuming that expressivists 
manage to provide some nonpropositional explanation for these phenomena 
in the normative domain, there remains a residual question about why it is that 
these different domains have completely different explanations for what look 
to be the same phenomena.   
For example, all of the general relations that hold between different kinds of 
attitudes (e.g. the way belief and desires interact in the explanation of action) 
in the descriptive domain seem to hold just as true in the normative domain. 
Not only that, but these relations seem to hold across domains as well as within 
them. So whatever explanation we give of the underlying phenomena, we 
would expect it to explain how these relations hold at a fully general level. But 
given the expressivist’s commitment to a bifurcation in explanation, it’s 
difficult to see how this might be achieved. (As we will see in later chapters, 
considerations like these place important constraints on an expressivist theory 
of propositional attitudes.)  
One option here would be for the expressivist to reject the use propositions 
in explaining descriptive domains of thought and discourse as well, resulting 
in a kind of global expressivism (e.g. Horwich 1993; Gibbard 2012; Price 2013). 
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But if we accept the utility of propositions in explaining descriptive domains, 
it is hard to resist their application to the normative domain. In any case, the 
main aim of this thesis is not to show why nonpropositional views, whether 
local or global, are doomed to failure (though I take the above to show that 
such approaches face significant explanatory burdens). Rather, the main aim is 
to explore some of the strategies that expressivists might employ in order to 
develop a theory of normative propositions as the objects of normative 
attitudes.  
However, the aim is not only exploratory. It is also to evaluate and assess 
these different strategies with a view to arriving at the most promising 
expressivist view of normative propositions. I will argue that three different 
existing frameworks for theorising about content all provide an attractive basis 
for an expressivist theory of normative propositions. These will be the 
frameworks of cognitive act theories, conceptual role theories, and modal 
theories (to be explained below). However, I will also argue that all three 
approaches face difficult challenges in accommodating expressivism. In the 
end, I will argue that the last framework is the most promising and I will offer 
a solution to the challenges I raise for it in the form of a foundational theory of 
belief. The end result is not only an expressivist theory of propositions, but an 
expressivist theory of belief that incorporates both normative and descriptive 
beliefs. While this conclusion is reached through an examination of the 
particular theories, this result is exactly what we should expect, given the claim 
that the object-of-attitude role must be defined relative to one’s overall theory 
of propositional attitudes. 
In the final section of this introduction, I provide a roadmap to aid the reader 




Although the chapters of this thesis can be read as standalone chapters, the 
conclusions of each chapter are intended to lead naturally onto the next, and 
each chapter builds upon the conclusions of the previous ones. As I mentioned 
at the end of the previous section, the aims of this thesis are exploratory, 
constructive, critical, and prescriptive. Each chapter aims to explore how 
existing frameworks for theorising about mental content and the mind more 
generally can be adapted for an expressivist view of normative propositions 
and belief. Each chapter makes novel suggestions about how expressivists 
might develop such views. Each chapter aims to critically evaluate in the most 
general terms the application of each framework in an expressivist setting. And 
each chapter aims to assess whether expressivists should or should not adopt 
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the framework under consideration, or at least to make clear what challenges 
would need to be met if an expressivist were to adopt the framework. 
Moreover, the thesis as a whole is prescriptive in that it aims to recommend a 
particular approach to theorising about mental content and the mind more 
generally as the best framework for an expressivist theory of normative 
thought and discourse.  
With the in principle case made for an expressivist theory of normative 
propositions in this chapter, Chapter 2 begins with a brief survey of orthodox 
conceptions of propositions and why these look unattractive from an 
expressivist perspective. I then suggest that cognitive act theories of 
propositions might provide an attractive alternative. According to such 
theories, propositions just are types of cognitive acts. I argue that expressivists 
who accept this view owe us an explanation of the identity of conditions of the 
class of cognitive acts that are propositions. Moreover, I argue that this 
explanation should apply uniformly to normative and representational 
propositions. I show how Michael Ridge’s expressivist cognitive act theory 
fails to do this, and I propose a novel understanding of cognitive propositions 
aimed to solve the problem. Specifically, I suggest that we understand the 
relevant cognitive acts as acts of conceptual categorisation, which are 
individuated by the conceptual roles of the concepts involved. Although I do 
not defend the conceptual role view, I argue that this provides some licence for 
optimism, as this is a view that many expressivists are independently 
sympathetic to. 
In Chapter 3, I take up the task of evaluating the relationship between 
expressivism and conceptual role accounts of content more generally. 
Although many expressivists endorse some kind of ‘conceptual role 
expressivism’, there is no general characterisation that unites these otherwise 
disparate views. I provide such a characterisation and explain why three recent 
versions of conceptual role expressivism due to Paul Horwich, Sebastian 
Köhler, and Neil Sinclair all fall under it. I then raise a challenge to conceptual 
role expressivism based on James Dreier’s ‘hiyo’ predicate. In a nutshell, 
conceptual role expressivists seem to lack any story for why normative 
concepts are not defective if superficially similar ‘hiyo’-like concepts are 
defective. After examining and rejecting some responses, I suggest that 
conceptual role expressivists might solve the problem by supplementing their 
theory with a suitable account of what content is determined by normative 
conceptual roles. For example, perhaps normative concepts roles determine 
some kind of planning content, in Allan Gibbard’s sense. However, I argue that 
this makes conceptual role expressivism less distinctive and interesting than 
its proponents make out. 
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In Chapter 4, I examine Allan Gibbard’s notion of planning contents and 
some of its subsequent developments. I first locate the view within a broader 
framework for thinking about content that I call the modal conception of 
content. This is the idea that content can be explained in terms of possibilities. 
The simplest version of this view is the possible worlds conception of content, 
and I argue that Gibbard’s proposal that normative propositions encode 
planning information can be seen as a natural extension of the possible worlds 
view. Although this view has a number of features that should be attractive to 
expressivists, I argue that such a view of content needs to be grounded in a 
foundational philosophy of mind that is compatible with expressivism. After 
arguing against one such proposal due to Seth Yalcin, I propose that 
expressivists should ground this view of content in a general theory of belief 
that subsumes both normative and non-normative belief. 
In Chapter 5, I develop a theory of belief within an interpretationist 
framework that aims to provide a suitable foundational philosophy of mind 
for the view of normative propositions examined in the previous chapter. I 
argue that interpretationism fits well with this view of content and should be 
attractive for expressivists wanting to develop a general theory of belief. I then 
show how classic arguments for expressivism can be reframed as arguments 
for this particular view of belief. Finally, I argue that this version of 
expressivism has a number of advantages over versions of expressivism that 
claim that descriptive and normative beliefs are fundamentally different kinds 
of attitudes. 
In Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, I summarise the main conclusions of 
the previous chapters and discuss some of the further implications and 
directions of study suggested by the thesis. Additionally, I critically examine 
Mark Schroeder’s nondescriptivist theory of belief and propositions. While 
Schroeder’s view does not neatly fit into the frameworks discussed in the other 
chapters, it is one of the few nondescriptivist theories of propositions and belief 
aimed to solve the problems outlined in this chapter. It therefore constitutes a 
rival view to the theory of propositions and belief developed in Chapters 4 and 
5. While the theory has a number of virtues, I will raise some objections to view 
that would need to be answered before we could accept the view. As the 
objections do not apply to the view endorsed in the previous chapters, I 
conclude that Schroeder’s theory should be less attractive to expressivists. 
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2 
Cognitive Act Theories 
 
 
This chapter explores the prospects for developing an expressivist theory of 
propositions within the framework of cognitive act theories of propositions. 
First, I motivate the framework as an attractive alternative to traditional 
theories of propositions (section 2.1). Second, I argue that the only extant 
expressivist theory of cognitive propositions — Michael Ridge’s ‘ecumenical 
expressivist’ theory — fails to explain identity conditions for normative 
propositions (section 2.2). Third, I argue that this failure motivates a general 
constraint — ‘the unity requirement’ — that any expressivist theory of 
propositions must provide a unified nonrepresentational explanation of that in 
virtue of which propositional attitudes have the content that they have (section 
2.3). Fourth, I begin to develop a novel account of the act type of predication 
that is both compatible with expressivism and designed to satisfy the unity 
requirement (section 2.4).  
 
2.1 Cognitive propositions 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that expressivists would do well to 
incorporate a theory of normative propositions into their theory of normative 
thought and discourse. Suppose, then, that we are expressivists looking for a 
theory of normative propositions. Where should we look? We might choose to 
start from scratch and build our theory from the ground up. Alternatively, we 
might choose to survey some of the options already available. This chapter 
examines the prospects of one option in particular: cognitive act theories of 
propositions, which claim that propositions are types of cognitive acts. In part, 
this is because one of the few existing expressivist theories of propositions 
adopts the cognitive act framework (we will examine this theory in section 2.2). 
However, the cognitive act view provides a prima facie attractive framework 
for expressivism more generally. To see why, it is first helpful to consider why 
more orthodox conceptions of propositions appear less suitable for our 
purposes. 
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2.2.1 Orthodox views rejected  
 
First, consider the Russellian view of propositions according to which 
propositions are structured entities consisting of objects, properties, and 
relations. Thus the proposition [that Socrates is human] is the complex abstract 
entity whose components include the individual Socrates and the property 
being human. These components are then combined in such a way that the 
proposition represents Socrates instantiating the property being human. Or the 
proposition [that Othello loves Desdemona] is the abstract entity whose 
components include the individuals Othello and Desdemona and the loving 
relation structured such that the proposition represents the loving relation 
obtaining between Othello and Desdemona (in that order).  
It should be fairly clear that the Russellian view of propositions is unsuitable 
for expressivists to exploit. Russellian propositions are in part composed of the 
properties and relations that such propositions represent or are otherwise 
about. However, expressivists deny that there are any normative properties or 
relations. Or at least, expressivists deny that there are such things as normative 
properties or relations that could play an explanatory role in their theory of 
normative thought and discourse. Since we are after a conception of normative 
propositions that can play an explanatory role in an expressivist theory of 
normative thought and discourse, the expressivist cannot appeal to Russellian 
normative propositions. 
Next, consider the Fregean view of propositions according to which 
propositions are structured entities composed of abstract senses or modes of 
presentation, where senses are cognitively individuated entities that determine 
a unique referent. Senses compose functionally and have differing levels of 
adicity. Thus the proposition [that Bob Dylan is a musician] is the structured 
entity composed of the “saturated” sense BOB DYLAN which has adicity 0 and 
the “unsaturated” sense MUSICIAN which has adicity 1, where the level of 
adicity is the number of argument places required to be filled in order to 
express a complete thought.  
In contrast to the Russellian view, the proposition [that Bob Dylan is a 
musician] is distinct from proposition that [Robert Zimmerman is a musician] 
which is composed of the senses ROBERT ZIMMERMAN and MUSICIAN. This is 
because although BOB DYLAN and ROBERT ZIMMERMAN refer to the same 
individual, each sense has a distinct “cognitive significance”. The reason each 
sense has a distinct cognitive significance is that substituting each sense in a 
complete thought can be potentially informative for a subject who grasps those 
senses. In the present example, one might know that Bob Dylan is a musician 
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without knowing that Robert Zimmerman is a musician, because one does not 
know that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman. 
The orthodox Fregean view is also unsuitable for the expressivist to exploit, 
although perhaps this is less obvious than with the Russellian view. The reason 
is because Fregean senses are ultimately individuated in terms of their worldly 
referents. Thus, while the senses of the expressions ‘Bob Dylan’ and ‘Robert 
Zimmerman’ do not consist in the individual these expressions refer to, 
grasping each sense does consist in knowing the condition for something to be 
its reference. This is because the sense of an expression determines what that 
expression refers to. However, expressivists deny that the referent of a 
normative expression is determined by its sense or meaning, other than 
perhaps in a deflationary sense. They must therefore deny that normative 
concepts express Fregean senses, at least standardly construed, as although 
Fregean senses are distinct from their denotation, they are nonetheless 
individuated in terms of what they denote.  
Finally, consider an orthodox possible worlds view according to which 
propositions are sets of possible worlds, or alternatively functions from worlds 
to truth-values. Thus the proposition [that all grass is green] is the set of 
possible worlds in which all grass is green, or alternatively a function from 
worlds to truth values, specifically from worlds where all grass is green to the 
value True and worlds where not all grass is green to the value False. Possible 
worlds propositions are thought to represent, individuate, or perhaps simply 
be possible ways the world might be. In contrast to the Russellian and Fregean 
views, the possible worlds view provides an unstructured account of 
propositions that denies that propositions are complexes of simpler entities. 
Thus, on the possible worlds view, the proposition [that all grass is green] is 
identical to the propositions [that there is no grass that is not green] and [that 
it’s false that it’s false that all grass is green] because each proposition is true in 
all the same worlds. 
As it stands, the possible worlds view is unsuitable for the expressivist to 
exploit. This is because expressivists deny that there are any normative “ways 
the world might be”, where this is not a deflationary shorthand for a very 
general first-order normative claim. As such, the content of a normative belief 
cannot be represented or otherwise picked out by any set of possible worlds if 
this content is to play an explanatory role in characterising normative belief. 
We will see in Chapter 4 that there are ways of expanding the possible worlds 
model to incorporate certain kinds of nonfactual content, allowing the 
expressivist to adopt an enriched possible worlds model. However, I postpone 
discussion of this approach here. The important point for now is that as it 
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stands the orthodox possible worlds view of propositions is unsuitable for 
theorising about normative propositions from an expressivist standpoint. 
What these orthodox views have in common is that they explain the nature 
of propositions partly in terms of what those propositions represent or refer to. 
Thus, in the terminology of the previous chapter, each view is committed to 
the representationalist assumption. Because expressivists deny that normative 
expressions or concepts refer to normative properties or relations, other than 
in a deflationary sense, the expressivist cannot appeal to orthodox conceptions 
of normative propositions. This means that expressivists require a conception 
of normative propositions that is not explained in terms of the normative 
properties, relations, or states of affairs that such propositions represent or 
individuate. 
 
2.1.2 Expressivism and cognitive propositions 
 
A more promising candidate is found in cognitive act theories of propositions 
(examples include Carruthers 1989; Dummett 1991; Davis 2003; Soames 2010, 
2014, 2015; Hanks 2015). According to such theories, propositions are ways of 
thinking and speaking. More specifically, propositions are certain kinds of 
cognitive acts or events. Call such entities ‘cognitive propositions’ for short. 
This immediately raises the question of what kind of cognitive acts could be 
suitable to play this role. But the basic idea should look attractive to 
expressivists. After all, normative cognitive acts are clearly the kind of thing 
that an expressivist can allow in her theoretical ontology. Indeed, expressivists 
do not simply allow for normative cognitive acts. Providing an account of such 
things is part of the central task for an expressivist theory of normative 
thought. Moreover, in the same way that expressivists aim to elucidate 
normativity by providing a psychological account of what it is to think 
normative thoughts, cognitive act theories aim to elucidate meaning and 
intentionality by providing a psychological account of what it is to have 
thoughts with propositional content. So expressivism and cognitive act 
theories appear to make natural bedfellows. 
Further, the cognitive act view provides an attractive alternative to orthodox 
views more generally. Recent exponents of the cognitive act view see their view 
as answering a host of difficulties that face orthodox conceptions (see 
especially Soames 2015 and Hanks 2015). For example, according to orthodox 
views, propositions are inherently representational and are the fundamental 
bearers of truth and falsity. However, if this is the case, then a proposition 
cannot be identified with any set-theoretic object, such as an n-tuple of objects 
and properties or a set of possible worlds. For such objects themselves do not 
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represent anything; rather, they are representational only insofar as we 
interpret them as such. In light of this difficulty, it might seem that we would 
do better to treat (say) an n-tuple of objects and properties as representations of 
propositions (Soames 2015: 13). However, this leads us to posit a sui generis 
class of abstract objects with the necessary properties to play this role rather 
than providing any real explanation of what propositions are like such that 
they can play that role. Moreover, cognitive act theorists argue that if 
propositions are the primary bearers of truth and falsity, then our beliefs and 
assertions have their truth-conditions only derivatively in virtue of their being 
related to propositions. But it seems mysterious how concrete thought and talk 
is meaningful by being related to some mysterious Platonic realm of sui generis 
abstract objects. By contrast, the cognitive act view reverses the order of 
explanation by explaining the nature of propositions as derivative from 
concrete intentional activity, which is taken as fundamental. This is because the 
nature of a type is derived from its concrete instances. Among other things, the 
hope is that this provides a naturalistically plausible metaphysics and 
epistemology of propositions. 
While the basic idea of cognitive propositions is a more promising starting 
place for an expressivist theory of propositions, the idea is typically developed 
in a way that is unsuitable for expressivists. This is because cognitive act 
theories generally still give a central role to the notion of representation in 
explaining the relevant cognitive acts. In other words, extant cognitive act 
theories are committed to the representationalist assumption about 
propositions. For example, Scott Soames (2015) argues that the proposition [p] 
is identical to the act of entertaining p, where to entertain p is to represent some 
state of affairs. Thus, the proposition [that the sea is blue] is identical to the act 
type of representing the sea as being blue (we will examine Soames’ theory in 
more detail throughout this chapter). And Peter Hanks (2015) argues that the 
proposition [p] is identical to the act of predicating properties or relations to things. 
Thus, the proposition [that the sea is blue] is identical to the act type of 
predicating blueness of the sea. Such views are clearly unsuitable for expressivists. 
Nonetheless, the basic idea that propositions are cognitive acts does not 
entail that the relevant acts are representational in nature. So it is open to the 
expressivist to characterize normative propositions as cognitive act types that 
are nonrepresentational in the relevant sense. This means explaining the 
relevant acts other than in terms of their representing normative states of 
affairs or attributing normative properties or relations to things. However, this 
is something that expressivists aim to do with respect to normative thought 
and discourse anyway. So the fact that cognitive act theories typically develop 
their theory by appealing to the representational properties of the relevant acts 
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should not deter us from the possibility of an expressivist cognitive act theory 
of normative propositions, at least from the outset.  
The challenge for an expressivist variant of the cognitive act theory is to 
provide an account of cognitive propositions that is suitably 
nonrepresentational. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine two answers 
to the challenge. The first comes from Michael Ridge’s ‘ecumenical 
expressivist’ theory of normative thought and discourse (section 2.2). Within 
this theory, Ridge adopts Soames’ cognitive act theory as it applies to 
representational thought and talk, and then extends the account to also cover 
normative thought and talk as Ridge conceives it under ecumenical 
expressivism. I argue that Ridge’s theory fails to explain the identity conditions 
for normative propositions and is thereby either extensionally or explanatorily 
inadequate. I then argue that that this failure motivates a general constraint — 
the ‘unity requirement’ — on any expressivist theory of propositions to the 
effect that any such theory must provide a unified nonrepresentational 
explanation of that in virtue of which propositional attitudes have the content 
that they have (section 2.3). Finally, in a constructive spirit, I propose a novel 
conception of conceptual predication that is suitably neutral with respect to 
whether normative predication is representational in nature (section 2.4). I 
suggest that conceptual role accounts of content might provide a suitably 
nonrepresentational explanation of the identity conditions of conceptual 
predication. Whether such a view is ultimately viable is then taken up in the 
next chapter. 
 
2.1.3 Two objections 
 
Before proceeding, I want to briefly consider two possible objections 
concerning my discussion about expressivism and orthodox views of 
propositions. For the purposes of this thesis, I have understood expressivism 
in as broad terms as possible. I took this to be the conjunction of (i) the negative 
thesis that normative thought and discourse is nonrepresentational together 
with (ii) some positive thesis about its practical role. Taken this way, this 
characterization would seem to classify Mark Kalderon’s (2007) moral 
fictionalist position as expressivist. (Kalderon rejects the label but that is merely 
terminological.) In relation to my above discussion, this is a problem because 
Kalderon argues that moral sentences express propositions that represent the 
attribution of moral properties to things. However, Kalderon also denies that 
accepting a moral sentence consists in believing the proposition it expresses. 
Instead, it consists in some kind of noncognitive attitude. But this apparently 
gives us an account of moral thought and discourse that respects the 
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conjunction of (i) and (ii) yet appeals to orthodox normative propositions. If 
this is a theoretical possibility, then what motivation is there for constructing a 
new theory of propositions rather than opting for Kalderon’s? 
By claiming that moral sentences express propositions, Kalderon aims to 
provide a straightforward solution to the Frege-Geach problem by showing 
how there can be straightforward semantic entailment between moral 
sentences. However, moral propositions play no role for Kalderon in relation 
to explaining the noncognitive attitudes involved in accepting moral sentences. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that there are good reasons for positing 
normative propositions in one’s theory of normative thought. If this is right, 
then Kalderon’s account of normative attitudes will face many of the same 
problems that more traditional expressivists face. For example, although his 
account might be able to explain how a set of sentences semantically entail their 
conclusion, normative propositions can play no role in explaining why 
accepting those sentences logically commits one to also accept the conclusion 
(see Eklund 2009).  
It is also unclear how Kalderon proposes to explain thoughts with mixed 
contents. Further, because only moral sentences and not moral attitudes have 
moral propositions as their content, it is unclear to what extent Kalderon’s 
approach is compatible with the priority of thought thesis, which we assumed 
in the previous chapter. Finally, supposing that there are orthodox moral 
propositions, as Kalderon claims, it is unclear why we can’t believe such 
propositions. Kalderon argues that in fact we don’t believe them because, very 
roughly, moral acceptance and belief are governed by different epistemic 
norms. This itself is contestable (see Joyce 2012; Chrisman 2007). But even 
granting that moral acceptance is governed by difference epistemic norms, it’s 
unclear why this should entail that moral acceptance is noncognitive. In short, 
Kalderon’s view faces many problems of its own. While a full discussion of 
Kalderon’s view would take us too far afield, I think that the above 
considerations provide sufficient reason to set this kind of approach aside. 
The next objection to my argument against combining expressivism with an 
orthodox view of propositions derives from a discussion of Michael Ridge’s 
(2014: 223f). Although Ridge proposes a novel cognitive act theory of 
normative propositions, which we will discuss in the next section, he hedges 
his bets and argues that if the cognitive act view is wrong, his general 
expressivist theory can be combined with orthodox views of propositions. The 
suggestion comes at the end of a discussion about how his expressivist theory 
can accept a correspondence theory of truth, so long as talk of truth is construed 
as normative. Without going into details, the basic idea is that if talk of 
normative propositions is also normative, then such talk can be construed as 
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talk about which factual propositions constitute the normative proposition in 
question: “Different speakers can disagree about which descriptive/factual 
proposition does constitute a given proposition, and this can be a form of 
practical disagreement — disagreement in prescription.” (2014: 223) Here, a 
‘factual’ proposition describes any kind of orthodox proposition. If this is right, 
it might therefore seem that expressivists do not need any new or novel 
conception of normative propositions. 
However, if we take Ridge’s discussion to be an objection to the arguments 
against combining expressivism with orthodox propositions (which is not 
necessarily what Ridge intends), it arguably fails due to an equivocation 
concerning ‘talk about propositions’. As I understand him, Ridge is primarily 
concerned to explain and vindicate our ordinary talk of normative 
propositions. Thus, for example, consider the sentence “Philip believes that 
talking in bed ought to be easiest.” The idea is that it is a normative matter 
what factual proposition we refer to when we ascribe this belief in ordinary 
belief attributions. However, our current investigation was not simply to 
explain our ordinary talk of propositions but to provide a conception of 
normative propositions that can play an explanatory role in a theory of 
normative attitudes. By treating talk about propositions as normative in this 
way, it’s unclear that we arrive at any such conception. From a theoretical 
perspective, I should be able to characterise Philip’s belief without taking a 
stand on any first-order normative issue. But it’s hard to see how I could 
provide a suitably neutral characterisation if proposition talk is normative in 
this way. Ridge compares his approach to Gibbard’s (2003) proposal that 
normative properties are constituted by natural properties, even if normative 
concepts are distinct to natural concepts. However, Gibbard stresses that 
although normative properties are constituted by natural properties, the 
meaning of a normative concept cannot be explained in terms of its denotation. 
So while Ridge’s approach may in a sense explain what normative propositions 
are, it fails to provide a conception of normative propositions that could play 
an explanatory role in the expressivist’s theory of normative thought and 
discourse.  
More generally, while there might be approaches that combine expressivism 
and orthodox normative propositions, these views fail to respect the 
considerations set out in the previous chapter that motivated our search for an 
expressivist theory of normative propositions. With these two objections to 
rejecting orthodox conceptions of propositions considered, I now turn to 
Ridge’s theory of cognitive propositions.  
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2.2 Normative propositions in ecumenical expressivism 
 
In this section, I briefly explain Ridge’s (2014) ecumenical expressivism and the 
theory of normative propositions therein. I then raise two objections to the 
view. First, I argue that Ridge’s theory fails to plausibly identify any specific 
cognitive act type to play the role of normative propositions. Second, I argue 
that even if the first objection can be answered, Ridge’s theory fails to explain 
the identity conditions for normative propositions. This second objection gives 
rise to a general desideratum on any expressivist theory of propositions, 
discussed in section 2.3.  
 
2.2.1 Ridge’s theory 
 
The central claim of ecumenical expressivism is that normative claims express 
hybrid, relational states of mind (see also Schroeder 2015: chapters 6 & 7 and 
Toppinen 2013 for other ‘relational’ versions of expressivism). These are 
complex states comprised of a representational and nonrepresentational 
component. The nonrepresentational component is a kind of noncognitive 
practical stance (a 'normative perspective') that provides the agent with a set 
of policies about which standards of practical reasoning to reject and accept 
(Ridge 2014: 115). A standard is a rule that can be used in an action-guiding 
way as the basis of a practical judgment or decision (ibid: 40). The standards 
that make up an agent's normative perspective are 'ultimate', in that they are 
not derived from other standards and provide a complete guide to action (ibid: 
116f.). However, standards are ultimately explained in terms of what it is for 
an agent to accept a standard, where this is for that agent to be disposed to 
issue the relevant prescriptions and intuitively endorse them (ibid: 111f.).  
On this view, the representational component of the state expressed by a 
normative claim is a robustly representational belief. The belief is indexed to 
the agent's normative perspective such that, for any normative judgment, the 
object of evaluation is evaluated or ranked by the standards not ruled out by 
the agent's normative perspective (Ridge 2014: 119). The exact nature of the 
ranking will depend on the normative predicate employed in the claim (e.g., 
very roughly, 'good' will mean 'ranked high', while 'bad' will mean 'ranked 
low'). While the content of the representational component is robustly 
representational, the overall content of the normative claim itself is not 
identified with any representational content. Rather, it is irreducibly 
normative. 
To illustrate the above, consider the following example: 
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(1) "Giving to charity is good." 
 
According to Ecumenical Expressivism, (1) conventionally expresses the 
relational state of mind comprised of: 
 
(1a) A normative perspective. 
(1b) The belief that giving to charity is highly ranked by any admissible 
ultimate standard of practical reasoning. 
 
The state expressed is relational in virtue of the concept of an admissible 
standard, which refers to the standards not rejected by the normative 
perspective of the speaker (Ridge 2014: 119). As different speakers will have 
different normative perspectives, (1a) and (1b) together comprise the relational 
state type that is multiply realized by any agent that tokens the state expressed 
by (1). Logical complexity is then “off-loaded” to the representational 
component of the state, which sets the stage for Ridge’s attempt to solve the 
Frege-Geach problem (ibid: 144ff). For example, the claim “If giving to charity 
is good, then Socrates would approve of it” would express the multiply 
realizable relational state comprised of (1a) together with the belief [that if 
giving to charity is highly ranked by any admissible ultimate standard of 
practical reasoning, then Socrates would approve of it]. 
Thus far, this account has explained normative thought and discourse 
without recourse to normative propositions. However, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, there are lots of good reasons for everyone to recognize 
normative thought and discourse as propositional. To accommodate 
normative propositions within ecumenical expressivism, Ridge appeals to 
Soames’ (2010, 2014, 2015) cognitive act theory of propositions. For Soames, the 
nature of propositional content is explained by concrete cognitive activity. On 
his view, propositions are certain types of cognitive acts or events.1 More 
specifically, propositions are acts that are tokened in representational activity: 
“Propositions are repeatable, purely representational, cognitive acts or operations the 
performance of which results in concrete cognitive events; to entertain a proposition is 
to perform it” (Soames 2015: 16, original emphasis). Identity conditions for 
propositions are specified in terms of the essential representational properties 
of such acts. 
For example, consider the proposition [that the sea is blue]. According to 
Soames, this is identified with the cognitive act type of representing the sea as 
being blue. Judging, asserting, imagining, and so on [that the sea is blue] are all 
 
1 I’ll follow Soames in assuming that acts are events rather than, say, processes. For the 
latter view, see Hornsby (2013). 
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ways of entertaining this proposition. To perform any of these acts is to token 
the act type of representing the sea as being blue. Thus, the identity conditions of 
the proposition [that the sea is blue] are explained in terms of representational 
properties of concrete acts of representing the sea as being blue.  
With this basic notion of entertaining a proposition in place, other 
propositional attitudes and acts can be defined in terms of it. For example, to 
judge [that the sea is blue] is to perform that predication in “the affirmative 
manner”, where this is cashed out in terms of its role in one's cognitive 
economy (Soames 2015: 18). To believe [that the sea is blue] is to be disposed 
to judge [that the sea is blue], and so on (Soames 2014: 97; 2015: 18f.). Soames 
states that all propositional acts and attitudes are ways of entertaining 
propositions. However, the case of belief shows that although this might be 
true of propositional acts, propositional attitudes like beliefs are best thought of 
as having content in virtue of their standing in some appropriate relation to 
propositional acts.   
For Soames, as for most others, propositional thought is eo ipso 
representational. Hence, in order to accommodate normative propositions, 
expressivists need to broaden the relevant class of cognitive event types that 
constitute propositions. This is analogous to the more familiar expressivist 
move of broadening the relevant class of mental states that are 'beliefs' to 
include not only robustly representational beliefs, but any mental state 
conventionally expressed by sincere utterances of declarative sentences (Ridge 
2014: 128). Whereas Soames appeals to an intuitive antecedent understanding 
of 'representing' out of which propositional acts and attitudes can be defined, 
Ridge reverses the order of explanation. First, he provides an account of what 
it is to believe, desire, assert, fear, and so on, the normative claim ‘p’ without 
any appeal to the proposition [p]. Second, he abstracts away from each case to 
that cognitive event type that is tokened in all and only those acts and attitudes. 
The idea is that each such act is a way of entertaining the normative proposition 
[p], and each such attitude stands in an appropriate relation to entertaining the 
normative proposition [p]. 
Because (1a) and (1b) provide an account of what is involved in normative 
belief qua mental state, this cannot itself be a way of entertaining a proposition 
for the reasons given above. What, then, is the cognitive act that it is 
appropriately related to? Ridge (2014: 128) proposes the following: 
 
(1a) A normative perspective. 
(1c) The judgment that giving to charity is highly ranked by any admissible 
ultimate standard of practical reasoning. 
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Here, the belief component is replaced with a judgment component, which we 
saw above was plausibly belief’s active counterpart. In the next subsection, I’ll 
argue that this move faces a number of problems. But let’s run with it for now. 
The suggestion, then, is that <(1a) and (1c)> constitute a way of entertaining the 
proposition [that giving to charity is good], and <(1a) and (1b)> has the content 
[that giving to charity is good] by being appropriately related to the judgment 
constituted by <(1a) and (1c)>.  
Judgment is not the only way of entertaining a proposition, however. The 
proposition [that giving to charity is good] can also be entertained in other 
propositional attitudes, such as desire, doubt, hope, and so on. Glossing over 
complications that arise from the difference between states and events, 
ecumenical expressivism is well placed to generalise its account of belief to 
other kinds of attitude (Ridge 2014: 148). For example, the doubt [that giving 
to charity is good] can be understood as the complex state of mind comprised 
of: 
 
(2a) A normative perspective. 
(2b) The doubt that giving to charity is highly ranked by any admissible 
standard of practical reasoning.  
 
Here, the ‘that’-clause in (2b) denotes a representational content indexed to the 
agent's normative perspective in the same way as (1b). This move can then by 
applied mutatis mutandis to other attitude types. Ridge further notes that it is 
possible to entertain a normative proposition whereby one “simulates” a 
normative perspective, where this is run “off-line”, such as when one “merely 
entertains” that p (ibid: 128).  
The proposition that giving to charity is good is then identified as the 
minimal cognitive event type tokened in cognitive acts such as <(1a),(1c)> and 
is appropriately related to relational states such as <(1a),(1b)>, <(2a),(2b)>, and so 
on. In contrast to the representational case, it is somewhat harder to intuitively 
grasp what this act type this consists in. However, it should be clear that it is 
the act type all instances of which have the following features: (i) a component 
with a stable representational content2; (ii) an actual or simulated normative 
perspective; and (iii) the structural relation between (i) and (ii) encoded by the 
concept of being ranked highly by any admissible ultimate standard of practical 
reasoning. It is in virtue of this concept that the component with stable 
representational content is necessarily tied to the agent's normative perspective 
 
2 Given that this content will involve the indexical concept of ‘admissible standard’, the 
stability for Ridge will have to be at the level of character rather than content, in Kaplan’s 
terminology.  
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in every possible instance of entertaining the proposition that giving to charity 
is good. With Ridge’s theory of normative propositions now explained, I will 
raise two objections to it.  
 
2.2.2 A problem concerning states and events 
 
The first objection to Ridge’s theory of propositions is that by not paying 
sufficient attention to the distinction between states and events, Ridge’s theory 
fails to identify any mental event that could be the object of normative attitudes. 
It is highly plausible that states and events are distinct metaphysical categories 
and should not be identified (see, for example, Kenny 1963; Vendler 1967; 
Mourelatos 1978; Steward 1997; Chrisman 2012). Events are dynamic in that 
they possess a temporal structure that states lack. They have a different 
'temporal shape', in that they occupy time in different ways (the term is 
Steward’s 1997: 72). Whereas events happen, states obtain. This distinction can 
be illustrated by comparing the different temporal properties of judgments and 
beliefs. Understood as a mental event, a judgment is an achievement. To make 
a judgment is something that one does. It is active in a way that believing is 
not. Belief, understood as a mental state, is better understood as a disposition 
that obtains across time. Thus, to say that Jones believes such and such at time 
t is not to say that Jones does something at t, in the same way that to say that 
Jones judges such and such at t does imply that Jones does something at t.  
With this distinction in mind, the problem for Ridge’s theory is that the 
general account of normative attitudes from which normative propositions are 
abstracted only provides an account of normative mental states. And if states 
are different in kind to events, then we cannot identify any mental event by 
abstracting from mental states. Thus, Ridge’s theory fails to identify any 
candidate cognitive act type that could play the role of normative propositions. 
As I noted in the previous section, Ridge is aware of the problem. I’ll argue, 
however, that his response is unsatisfying. Consider again the judgment [that 
giving to charity is good]. According to Ridge, this is constituted by: 
 
(1a) A normative perspective. 
(1c) The judgment that giving to charity is highly ranked by any admissible 
ultimate standard of practical reasoning. 
 
Here, (1c) replaced the belief state (1b) in the initial analysis. Because judgment 
seems to be a clear example of a mental event, it might seem that (1a) and (1c) 
together constitute a normative mental event. The obvious problem with this, 
however, is that although we have substituted an event for a state for the 
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representational component, we have failed to do so for the 
nonrepresentational component. If both components were events, then the 
occurrence of both events could constitute a complex event, which could be 
identified with the judgment [that giving to charity is good]. However, a 
normative perspective is not an event but a state. And it is far from clear that 
an event could be constituted by a distinct event together with a state. 
To be fair, Ridge (2014: 128n) acknowledges this problem as well. In a 
footnote, he offers two different answers to this problem. The first strategy 
maintains that normative perspectives qua states can either be or else partly 
constitute events. The second strategy maintains that the manifestations of 
normative perspectives can provide the right sort of event. I consider each 
strategy in turn. 
The first strategy can be maintained by arguing either that (i) normative 
perspectives are themselves events, or (ii) normative perspectives, while not 
themselves events, can partly constitute events. Taking (i) first, Ridge argues 
that we might understand a normative perspective as an event in virtue of the 
fact that one's having of a normative perspective is something that can happen 
at a moment in time. Depending on one's view of events, it is not obvious that 
any such event actually exists. However, granting that this is a real event, we 
have been given no reason to identify this event with the state itself. Simply 
because the durational properties of the event match the state, it does not 
follow that the event can be identified with the state. As we saw above, the fact 
that the durational properties of an event match some state, it does not follow 
that they have the same temporal properties, for they plausibly have a different 
temporal shape. By comparison, suppose we can pick out the event of my 
believing [that 2 + 2 = 4], which has been happening since my early childhood 
to the present day. It seems counterintuitive and misleading, however, to 
identify that event with the belief state itself. The same goes for normative 
perspectives.  
Even if normative perspectives are not themselves events, perhaps they can 
partly constitute events. This was suggestion (ii) of the first strategy. However, 
this is to merely state what needs to be shown. We haven’t yet been given any 
reason to think that this is true. Given their different temporal shape, one might 
be sceptical of the general claim that events can be partly constituted by states 
(compare Steward 1997: 72ff). But even putting such general scepticism aside, 
it is totally unclear why a descriptive judgment such as (1c) together with a 
normative perspective could together constitute a distinct event. Note that it is 
not enough for Ridge to say that it is necessary that certain states obtain for a 
certain event to occur. What needs to be shown is something stronger, namely 
that the relevant state partly constitutes the event. For example, it seems 
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plausible to suppose that in order to judge [that p] it is necessary to believe 
[that p]. However, there is no pressure whatsoever to think that the judgment 
is partly constituted by the belief. Without any details as to how states 
generally could be partly constitutive of events, let alone any arguments for 
why normative perspectives in particular could be, the onus is surely on the 
ecumenical expressivist to argue this point.  
So I think we have no reason to accept the claim that states can be or else 
partly constitute events. What about the suggestion of the second strategy, that 
is it the manifestations of normative perspectives that partly constitute the 
relevant events? Ridge suggests that these manifestations might be “intentions 
to act and reason in certain ways” (2014: 128n). This can’t quite be right, 
because intentions are states and not events. But perhaps deciding to act and 
reason in certain ways or forming intentions to act and reason in certain ways 
might be better candidates. However, this can’t be right either because it is 
possible to judge some normative claim as true without deciding or forming 
an intention to act in accordance with that judgment. For instance, perhaps I 
have already made the decision or formed the intention from a previous 
judgment. Perhaps instead one might invoke some broad notion of affirming to 
act or reason in certain ways, where this applies to deciding and forming an 
intention, as well as re-affirming where one has already decided or formed the 
intention. However, this is just to give a label to type of mental event that we 
are looking for and gives us no reason to believe that such a type exists.  
So the second strategy owes us an account of the relevant manifestations of 
normative perspectives that could partly constitute normative judgments. 
Moreover, it owes us an argument that some such manifestation does indeed 
exist in every instance of entertaining a normative proposition, not just in 
judgment but across all possible ways of entertaining it. Although I am here 
primarily concerned with Ridge’s theory of propositions, it’s worth noting that 
this difficulty applies to his theory of normative thought more generally. 
Whatever the fate of normative cognitive propositions, ecumenical 
expressivism needs to explain what it is to judge normative claims. But without 
any account of the active counterpart of normative perspectives, it fails to do 
this. Nonetheless, I haven’t said anything to rule out the possibility of such an 
account, so the argument here is not decisive. In any case, the objection raised 
in the next section will apply to Ridge’s theory of normative propositions 
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2.2.3 A problem concerning identity conditions 
 
A more serious problem for Ridge’s theory is that it presupposes rather than 
explains identity conditions for normative propositions. Whatever a theory of 
propositions is for, presumably it should explain their identity conditions, i.e., 
the conditions under which propositions are individuated and distinguished 
from one another. (Hence the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on 
propositions states: “[A]ny good theory of propositions ought to have 
something to say about when propositions are identical and when they are 
distinct” [McGrath and Frank 2018].) For example, on the possible worlds 
view, propositional identity is explained in terms of set identity: p and q are 
identical just in case p and q have the same worlds as elements. Or on the 
Russellian view, propositional identity is explained in terms of constituents 
and structure: roughly, p and q are identical just in case p and q have the same 
constituents in the same ordering. The ecumenical expressivist view, I will 
argue, fails to provide principled identity conditions for normative 
propositions. As such, it either makes incorrect predictions about which 
cognitive act types are propositions or makes correct predictions but only by 
presupposing which cognitive acts are normative propositions. 
To see why, consider the following comparison. We saw above that for 
Soames, propositions are not just representational cognitive acts, but purely 
representational cognitive acts. Soames needs this additional constraint because 
there are far more representational cognitive acts than there are propositions, 
and this allows him to identify the subset of these acts that are propositions. 
Thus, for example, “the acts of predicating humanity of Plato (i) on Thursday, (ii) 
in Peru, (iii) while dancing, (iv) in giving a lecture, or (v) when speaking in a whisper 
all represent Plato as being human, even though we would not be happy 
thinking of them as propositions” (Soames 2015: 70, original emphasis). If just 
any representational cognitive act were a proposition, then predicating humanity 
of Plato on Thursday would be a distinct proposition from predicating humanity 
of Plato. But it is implausible that there is any such proposition. However, if 
cognitive propositions are purely representational, then the act type of 
predicating humanity of Plato on Thursday is not a proposition. This is because the 
condition of the act being on Thursday does not contribute in any way to 
representing Plato as human. 
It is important to note that Soames’ constraint is not an ad hoc fix to a 
problem of deviant or gerrymandered cases. Rather, it is a consequence of his 
commitment to explaining the nature of propositions in terms of concrete 
representational activity. We will explore the significance of this in the next 
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section. For now, however, we can ask the following question of Ridge’s 
theory. For any normative claim ‘p’ and for the cognitive act types 
 
(A1) entertaining p 
(A2) entertaining p on Thursday, 
 
in virtue of what is (A1) a proposition but (A2) not a proposition? As far as I can 
see, Ridge’s theory offers no answer to this question. (It’s worth highlighting 
that the act type of (A2) has all the same properties as (A1) that were needed to 
solve the Frege-Geach problem for normative attitudes.) This means either that 
Ridge’s theory makes incorrect predictions about what cognitive act types are 
propositions, or it rules out cognitive acts like (A2) as the objects of attitudes 
simply by fiat. There are many more normative cognitive act types than 
normative propositions, and Ridge’s theory provides no principled way of 
delineating the latter class from the former. 
One possible response would be to highlight that because the theory of 
propositions is explanatorily downstream from the theory of attitudes, there is 
no real worry here. The idea is that since we begin with an account of what it 
is to judge, doubt, and so on [that p] and only then go on to abstract the 
proposition [p] from this account, there is no possibility of deriving acts like 
(A2) as propositions. However, in response to this response, there is no reason 
why we cannot provide an account of what it is to judge, doubt, and so on [that 
p] on Thursday. Indeed, the account is the same other than the condition that 
the acts occur on a Thursday. It is true that we probably have no interest in 
giving an account of this kind of attitude. But that is a pragmatic question about 
our interests. Just as with Ridge’s original account, we have a theory of a set of 
concrete acts or attitudes from which we can abstract the act type (A2) that is 
tokened in all and only those acts or attitudes. So even if we might never in fact 
have use to refer to the act type (A2), the theory still predicts that it is a 
proposition. 
Another response would be to find some property that (A1) possesses and 
(A2) lacks in virtue of which (A1) but not (A2) is a proposition. Given the hybrid 
nature of normative thought, perhaps we might say that the act of entertaining 
a normative proposition must possess the conjunctive property of having some 
purely representational component, some purely practical component, and no 
other component, where ‘purely practical’ identifies the relevant action-
guiding property in virtue of which normative judgments settle the thing to 
do. To make good on this suggestion, one would need to cash out the notion of 
‘purely practical’ without begging the question about what sort of acts can be 
purely practical. The notion must be related to guiding action. However, it 
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cannot be related in just any way. For example, suppose that while entertaining 
the proposition [that I ought to F], I simultaneously experience an unconnected 
occurrent desire to F (or manifestation thereof). Insofar as this desire might 
determine my actions or intentions to act, on what grounds can we exclude this 
desire from being ‘practical’ in the relevant sense? Further, suppose I entertain 
the proposition [that I ought to F] by imagining [that I ought to F]. Such an act 
bears no direct link to action or intention, yet must still be a realization of an 
act type that has a ‘purely practical’ component. So ‘purely practical’ must 
somehow include these cases as well. 
These considerations are not decisive. For example, we might first appeal to 
the purely representational component and then derivatively identify the 
practical components necessarily implicated by the representational 
component. Specifically, we would identify the normative perspective 
necessarily implicated by the concept of an admissible standard. However, 
even assuming a suitable notion of ‘purely practical’ can be provided, it is not 
clear that this response does anything other than re-invite the original worry. 
Why is it that only act types with this conjunctive property are normative 
propositions? The appeal to the property of being purely practical is not simply 
meant to provide an account of what is distinctive about the 
nonrepresentational component of normative propositions. Rather, the 
property was meant to explain (in part) that in virtue of which cognitive act 
types that possess the conjunctive property are propositions. But again, we 
seem to have simply stipulated that cognitive act types that have this 
conjunctive property are propositions. 
In the next section, I argue that the very form of this kind of explanation is 
problematic. This is because the approach posits an implausible explanatory 
bifurcation regarding why representational and normative cognitive acts can 
play the role of propositions. As we will see, this motivates a desideratum on 
any expressivist theory of propositions. 
 
2.3 The unity requirement 
 
In light of the considerations above, I propose that any expressivist theory of 
propositions must conform to the following desideratum: 
 
Unity requirement. Expressivists need a unified explanation of that in 
virtue of which our cognitive acts and attitudes have propositional 
content.  
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By ‘unified’, I mean that this explanation should hold for all domains of 
propositional thought. Because expressivists must hold that some propositions 
are not purely representational, this general story must appeal to some other, 
nonrepresentational (or at least not purely representational) unifying property 
of propositional thought. By ‘in virtue of’, I mean a grounding explanation for 
why some act or attitude has propositional content. 
Using Ridge’s theory as an illustrative example, suppose that we fully cash 
out the notion of ‘purely practical’ in such a way as to successfully delineate 
the subclass of normative propositions from the broader class of normative 
cognitive act types. I want to suggest that it is unclear whether this could 
adequately explain the individuation conditions for normative propositions. To 
be clear, the problem is not that normative propositions are distinct in kind 
from representational propositions — since both fall under the broader 
heading of cognitive act types, normative and representational propositions 
can be understood as different species of a unified genus. And the problem is 
not a lack of uniformity as such — after all, expressivism is premised on the 
idea that there is an important disunity between normative and 
representational thought. Rather, the problem is that in each case we have a 
completely different explanation regarding that in virtue of which each 
respective domain of thought is propositional. 
This is a problem because the account implies a conjunction of the following 
form: (a) event type R can play the role of propositions in virtue of the F-
properties of representational thought; and (b) event type N can play the role 
of propositions in virtue of the G-properties of normative thought. This seems 
strange. Given that R and N play the same role (objects of attitudes), is it 
plausible that they could both do this for completely different reasons? Should 
we not expect some unifying feature of each domain to explain how R and N 
could play the same role and stand in the right sorts of relations to each other? 
For example, any arbitrary proposition must be able to stand in the right sort 
of inconsistency, entailment, and independence relations to any other arbitrary 
proposition. This is true regardless of whether the propositions in question are 
normative or representational. In the absence of any unifying properties 
common to each domain of thought, it would be a coincidence or unexplained 
fact that the propositions of each domain are apt to play the role that they do. 
And if there is some further underlying common feature that does explain this, 
then (a) and (b) do not provide the full explanatory story. 
Perhaps one might respond that while it would be desirable to have a unified 
explanation, there is no reason to think that this is a requirement. After all, the 
thought goes, there is something special about normative thought and 
discourse, and so there is no reason to rule out an explanatory bifurcation along 
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more traditional expressivist lines. Although nothing I have argued strictly 
rules out this approach, I think there are reasons to believe that a unified 
explanation is indeed a requirement. First, expressivists about the normative 
domain are often sympathetic to expressivism in other domains of discourse. 
On the assumption that there would be strong reasons to posit propositions in 
these other domains, we would no longer have an explanatory bifurcation, but 
a distinct explanation for each domain. Second, and relatedly, one of the 
motivations for positing normative propositions was to avoid unacceptably ad 
hoc explanations about unified phenomena (e.g., quantification over attitude 
contents, treatment of modals, etc.). However, by providing distinct 
explanations of the shared properties of different kinds of propositions, we 
simply introduce new ad hoc explanations at a different explanatory level. 
If we accept the unity requirement, a diagnosis of the failure of Ridge’s 
theory is that it retains too much of the representationalist paradigm of 
Soames’ theory while trying to break away from it in a select case. Ridge is 
committed to explaining the logical properties of normative propositions as 
derivative from their representational properties (2014: 144ff). However, act 
types such as predicating humanity of Plato on Thursday possess exactly the same 
kind of representational properties, but they do not plausibly stand in 
consistency and entailment relations. By explaining the identity conditions of 
propositions in terms of what and how they represent, we provide no 
principled grounds for accepting Ridge’s normative propositions while 
rejecting Soames’ deviant examples. Both are cases of impurely 
representational acts of predication. In light of this, the representationalist 
paradigm for explaining propositional content should be rejected by 
expressivists. 
(As an aside, other commentators also seem to miss the central explanatory 
role that Soames assigns to representation. For example, Davis (2019: 7) 
complains: “To judge that water is wet, [Soames] said, is to entertain the 
proposition in a specific way. To imagine that water is wet is to entertain it in 
another way. Judging and imagining are specific ways of entertaining a 
proposition. This does not provide a reason to identify a proposition with 
entertaining rather than judging or imagining, however. For if entertaining P 
is a proposition, and judging and imagining P are specific ways of entertaining 
P, then judging and imagining P would have to be a [sic] more specific 
propositions.” However, given that Soames thinks that propositions are purely 
representational acts, this clearly rules out judging or imagining P as being 
more specific propositions. For the fact that P is judged or imagined does not 
contribute to the representational content of P. Moreover, the purely 
representational constraint explains why entertaining P but not judging P or 
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imagining P are propositions. As a purely representational act, entertaining P 
captures what judging P and imagining P have in common. So Davis’ objection 
fails because he fails to take into account the central explanatory role of 
representation in Soames’s theory.) 
Although I have used Ridge’s theory as an illustrative example, the unity 
requirement supplies a general constraint on any expressivist theory of 
propositions. But what implications does this have for the prospects for an 
expressivist theory of cognitive propositions? Extant theories of cognitive 
propositions assume a broadly representationalist explanatory framework. 
However, it is not obvious that a representationalist framework is essential to 
the basic idea that propositions are types of cognitive acts or events. In the next 
section, I outline a novel way of conceiving cognitive propositions that does 
not presuppose a representationalist framework that might provide the basis 
for an expressivist theory of cognitive propositions. 
 
2.4 Rethinking predication 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I suggest that expressivists might embrace the 
idea that propositions are cognitive acts of predication by conceiving of 
predication as a kind of categorisation by concepts. I’ll argue that this conception 
can apply both to representational and nonrepresentational thought. As such, 
it provides a suitable starting point for an expressivist theory of cognitive 
propositions that respects the unity requirement. It is only a starting point, 
however, because conceiving of predication in this way does not entail any 
particular grounding explanation of the identity conditions of such acts. It is, 
rather, a way of conceptualising the target phenomenon that is compatible with 
expressivism and suitably unified across domains. I then explain how 
conceptual role accounts of content determination might be utilised by 
expressivists to provide a suitable grounding explanation of the identity 
conditions of acts of predication. This then leads to the discussion of the next 
chapter, which examines the prospects for conceptual role expressivism more 
generally. 
 
2.4.1 Predication as categorisation  
 
We saw that Soames began his account with an antecedent understanding of 
entertaining a proposition and then built his theory around this. Because 
entertaining a proposition is taken by Soames to be a single unified act type 
(representing states of affairs), this is apt for providing a unified explanation 
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of that in virtue of which our cognitive acts have propositional content. 
Namely, the concrete representational activity of agents explains why acts of 
entertaining propositions have propositional content. As a first step towards 
an expressivist theory of cognitive propositions, I propose that we follow suit 
and find some alternative general understanding of entertaining a proposition 
and then build our expressivist theory around that. My proposal is that the act 
type of predication should remain central, but that if we characterise 
predication in terms of categorisation by concepts, as opposed to the attribution 
of properties and relations, then we have an antecedent understanding of 
entertaining a proposition that is compatible with expressivism. While the 
proposed account of predication is compatible with expressivism, it does not 
entail expressivism either. For that, we need some additional 
nonrepresentational story about normative concepts that meets the unity 
requirement.  
Let’s begin first with the idea that the cognitive act of predication is an act 
of categorisation. This seems both plausible and intuitive. When we predicate 
something of something else in thought or in speech, we group the object of 
predication with other things we so predicate. If propositions are acts of 
predication, as the cognitive act view suggests, then we can think of 
propositions as ways of categorising. I have left this description deliberately 
vague as there are at least two distinct ways we can conceive of categorisation 
in thought and speech. I call these the properties-first view and the concepts-
first view.  
According to the properties-first view, categorisation is something 
fundamentally explained in terms of properties and relations. This seems to be 
the view endorsed by contemporary cognitive act theorists. For example: “Acts 
of predication are acts of sorting things into groups. When you predicate a 
property of an object, you sort that object with other objects in virtue of their 
similarity with respect to the property” (Hanks 2015: 64). If propositions are 
acts of predication, it follows from this that propositions are ways of 
categorising. Thus, in predicating (say) yellow of my scarf, I perform a mental 
act of grouping my scarf together with other objects, such as rubber ducks, 
daffodils, and Rothko’s No 14 No 10. According to Hanks, this involves sorting 
these objects in virtue of their similarity to the property of yellowness. Thus, 
according to the properties-first view, properties and relations feature in the 
individuation conditions for acts of categorisation. 
Theorists like Hanks and Soames often write as if notions like predication 
and categorisation simply presuppose a properties-first view. If this were 
correct, then thinking of predication in terms of categorisation would do little 
to help the expressivist. However, I think it should be clear that the notion of 
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categorisation does not presuppose the properties-first view. After all, it is 
presumably coherent to be a nominalist who denies the existence of any 
properties without thereby denying that there are any true acts of 
categorisation. However, this would seem to follow if the notion of 
categorisation presupposed a properties-first view.  
Moreover, it seems to me that there is a clear sense in which acts of 
normative predication involve sorting things into groups (the good, the right, 
etc.) that expressivists can and should accept. For example, when I judge [that 
it is wrong to skip the queue], there is a sense in which I am sorting the act of 
skipping the queue with other acts, such as murder and lying. Moreover, we 
can think of this kind of sorting as independent from endorsing that sorting or 
judging that sorting to be true. Thus, when I imagine [that it is wrong to skip 
the queue], we can think of this as involving the same act of sorting as my 
judging [that it is wrong to skip the queue]. It is just that the categorisation 
involved in this act is not endorsed or affirmed as true.3 Again, it seems to me 
that there is a theoretically neutral sense of categorisation on which the 
expressivist can and should accept the above characterisations of normative 
thought. 
Hence, I want to I propose that expressivists make sense of this by adopting 
the concepts-first view, according to which categorisation is something 
fundamentally explained in terms of concepts. That is, we sort things into 
groups according to our concepts, which provide us with certain rules or 
principles of categorisation. Given that expressivists can and commonly do 
accept normative concepts in their theoretical ontology, I see no reason why 
they should not accept these claims. Moreover, thinking of predication this 
way allows us to identify acts of categorisation without appeal to properties or 
relations. We therefore have a way of conceiving of predication that is in 
 
3 This issue mirrors the debate between Hanks (2015: 35ff) and Soames (2015: 219ff) 
concerning whether predication is essentially forceful or committal. Whereas Soames argues 
that it is non-committal, Hanks argues that the idea of non-committal predication is 
incoherent. He then has to introduce the notion of a “cancellation context” (2015: 90ff) 
where a predication is “cancelled” or “overridden” when it is embedded in a logically 
complex act of predication. Although I’m inclined to accept Soames’ view, it would take 
us too far afield to assess these arguments here. However, the notion of a cancellation 
context might be of interest to expressivists more generally in dealing with the Frege-Geach 
problem. One of Geach’s (1965) initial complaints was that nondescriptivist views failed to 
respect the distinction between force and content. However, if Hanks is right, there is no 
such distinction. Although I cannot pursue the question here, it would be interesting to see 
whether cancellation contexts could explain how expressive contents might embed in 
logically complex constructions without subjects expressing the attitudes such contents 
would express in atomic assertoric contexts. 
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principle compatible with expressivism. However, this is just to give a 
characterisation of the target phenomenon. Expressivists also need to provide 
a suitably nonrepresentational explanation of what individuates one act of 
categorisation from another. 
Moreover, while the concepts-first view of categorisation is compatible with 
expressivism, it is also compatible with a representationalist view of normative 
thought. For all that has been said, categorising according to concepts might be 
explained in terms of the properties and relations denoted by such concepts 
(compare this to the worry about orthodox Fregean views of propositions 
discussed in section 2.1.1). If this is true of normative concepts, then the 
concepts-first view will be of no help to expressivists. However, this possibility 
should not deter expressivists from developing a concepts-first approach to 
predication. This is because quite independently of providing a theory of 
cognitive propositions, expressivists already deny that normative concepts are 
explained in terms of what those concepts represent or refer to. What is needed 
is a theory of normative concepts that can explain how acts of categorisation 
are (i) suitably nonrepresentational and (ii) apt to play the object-of-attitude 
role for normative attitudes.  
In the remainder of the chapter, I explore the idea that conceptual role 
accounts of content might provide expressivists with some helpful resources 
for explaining predication. I argue that there are a number of features of 
conceptual role accounts that appear prima facie promising for explaining (i) 
and (ii). In the next chapter, I will take a more critical approach to expressivist 
theories that embrace conceptual role accounts of content. But given that a 
number of prominent expressivists are independently sympathetic to 
conceptual role accounts of content (e.g. Blackburn 2006; Horwich 2010; 
Gibbard 2012; Båve 2013; Köhler 2017; Sinclair 2018), this might seem an 
attractive approach for expressivists. 
 
2.4.2 Toward a conceptual role account 
 
In the next chapter, we will take a more detailed look at conceptual role 
accounts of content. Here, I briefly sketch one particular approach to 
conceptual role theory to illustrate how it might be combined with the picture 
of conceptual predication suggested above. According to this approach, 
concepts are abstract objects individuated by their possession conditions (see 
Peacocke 1992; Wedgwood 2007; other approaches to conceptual role theory 
include Harman 1973; Field 1977; Block 1986; Horwich 1998). The possession 
conditions for a concept specify the transitions to and from mental states 
involving that concept that an agent generally makes, is disposed to make, or 
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is rationally committed to making. The idea is clearest when applied to logical 
concepts. For example, Peacocke (1992: 6) proposes that the concept of 
conjunction is that concept C to possess which an agent must find the following 
transitions primitively compelling (i.e. not derived from or answerable to 
anything else): 
 
A(C)  p, q ® p C q   p C q ® p  p C q ® q  
 
At first glance, this might look promising to the expressivist because A(C) 
individuates the concept of conjunction not in terms of what it represents, but 
in terms of its relational role in cognition, namely the inferences involving 
conjunction that we find primitively compelling. In the next chapter, I argue 
that things are in fact more complicated for the expressivist. But I will put this 
complication aside for now. What is important here is that the above formula 
for identity conditions for concepts makes no appeal to their representational 
or referential properties. 
How do concepts fit into the cognitive act view? Concepts are components 
of thoughts. If concepts are abstract entities, as we are presently assuming, then 
they are components of propositions. If propositions are cognitive acts, it 
follows that concepts are components of cognitive acts. A natural way to 
understand this thought is that propositions are complex acts comprised of 
sub-acts, and these sub-acts are what concepts are. (The idea that concepts are 
event types is developed in detail by Davis [2003]; Hanks [2015] and Soames 
[2015] also endorse a structured view of cognitive propositions as complex acts, 
though because they accept a properties-first view they do not characterise 
these sub-acts in terms of concepts). An attractive feature of combining these 
accounts is that it seems to demystify how concepts as abstract entities could 
be involved in concrete thought. Namely, concepts are involved in concrete 
thought by being tokened in concrete thought (though these tokens are not 
themselves concepts).   
In the simplest case, we can think of predication as a complex act type 
comprised of: (i) identification of the predication target; and (ii) application of 
a rule of categorisation to the predication target. What makes it the case that an 
agent applies some concept C rather than C¢ and thus applies one rule of 
categorisation rather than another is the transitions she is disposed or ought to 
make to and from judgments involving the concept. (Hanks [2015: 23] and 
Soames [2015: 23] suggest a tripartite structure for predication which involves 
a distinct sub-act of identifying or “expressing” a property in addition to the 
sub-act of predicating that property of the target; given that the present account 
aims to give nonrepresentational individuation conditions for propositions, it 
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has no need to invoke a distinct act over and above the application of the rule 
of categorisation). Identity conditions for cognitive propositions can then be 
given in terms of the constitutive conceptual roles of their component concepts. 
Where [p] and [q] are cognitive propositions: [p] and [q] are identical just in 
case the constituent concepts in each act of predication license the same 
transitions to and from mental states with those contents. 
One possible objection here is that the application of the rule of 
categorisation is not itself a distinct act in the way that identifying the 
predication target seems to be. So it is not clear in what sense concepts are act 
types according to this view. In fact, this is a problem not just for this view, but 
for Soames’ and Hanks’ respective views as well, which also appeal to sub-acts 
of predicating properties of the predication target that are distinct from the 
propositions they partly constitute (see Davis 2019: 13f for this objection to 
Soames and Hanks).  
One possible response would be as follows. It is true that there is no act of 
applying a concept that can be performed independently of performing a 
whole act of predication, in contrast to the plausible (though not 
uncontroversial) claim that one can identify a predication target without 
performing an act of predication. However, whole acts of predication are 
nonetheless complex structured acts. And the way to arrive at the concept is to 
take the entire act of predication and abstract away the sub-act of identifying 
the predication target. The remainder will give us something like an 
“unsaturated” cognitive act type component that is common across all 
predications performed using that concept, forming a constitutive structural 
part of the cognitive proposition. The thought then is that concepts are act type 
components, tokens of which are necessarily parts of more complex acts.  
Recall that Ridge’s theory was rejected because it failed to explain why 
cognitive act types like entertaining p on a Thursday are not propositions. By 
contrast, the conceptual predication view does seem to explain this. According 
to this view, the reason why cognitive act types like entertaining p on a Thursday 
are not propositions is because the sub-act of F-ing on a Thursday has no 
constitutive conceptual role. That is, the act type of F-ing on a Thursday is not 
plausibly individuated in terms of any transitions agents are disposed to make 
between mental states. So the act type is not a concept and by definition 
therefore not a propositional constituent. Thus, entertaining p on a Thursday is 
not wholly individuated by the constitutive conceptual roles of its components 
and so is not a proposition.  
Further, it’s worth re-emphasising that concepts are here individuated as 
abstracta with an essential or core conceptual role. If they were individuated 
as mental representations, in the sense discussed in the previous chapter 
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(section 1.2.1), conceptual roles arguably would not be suitable for determining 
the propositional content of a mental state. This might be because such roles 
differ across times and persons or because of their holistic individuation (see, 
for instance, Fodor and Lepore 1991). The present account faces neither 
problem. 
I have not defended the conceptual role approach nor offered any 
conceptual roles for normative concepts in particular. Rather, the approach 
sketched above is offered as a general explanatory framework in which the 
expressivist might develop an account of predication as categorisation 
according to concepts that is suitably nonrepresentational. Whether some 
version of conceptual role expressivism is ultimately viable is a question I take 
up in the next chapter. The point here is that if conceptual roles for normative 
concepts can be given an adequate nonrepresentational explanation, then 
expressivists have a suitable framework in which to explain cognitive 
propositions. Likewise: if the cognitive act view is a plausible view of 
propositions, then expressivists have a suitable framework for thinking about 
normative propositions. Given that a number of expressivists do in fact 
endorse some sort of conceptual role account of normative concepts, this 
provides an attractive framework in which to situate an expressivist theory of 
cognitive propositions.  
Moreover, just as conceptual role expressivism can provide support for an 
expressivist theory of cognitive propositions, I think that the converse might 
hold as well. A number of contemporary philosophers prefer to think of 
conceptual role expressivism as a metasemantic view about that in virtue of 
which certain mental states have the content that they have, as opposed to a 
semantic view that specifies the contents of particular mental states (e.g. 
Chrisman 2016, 2017; Köhler 2017). However, this view leaves a residual 
question about the nature of the content that is determined by the 
metasemantic theory. It is precisely here that a conceptual role metasemantics 
might be supplemented with a theory of cognitive propositions to explain what 
the contents of mental states are. Indeed, without some such account, we have 
not ruled out the possibility that one’s nonrepresentational metasemantics for 
some concept determines a robustly representational content for that concept. 
(I discuss this possibility at length in the next chapter). So the two approaches 
to thinking about content can be thought of as complementary.  
This point would also apply to ecumenical expressivism, which Ridge 
endorses as a metasemantic thesis. Indeed, Ridge (2014: 222) also suggests that 
ecumenical expressivism would fit well with conceptual role accounts of 
content. So the general framework should be compatible with various ways of 
implementing expressivism. However, while the view of predication as an act 
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of conceptual categorisation goes some way to identifying what normative 
propositions could be for the expressivist, it seems fair to say that the 
explanatory weight of explaining how such acts could play this role will be 
carried by the conceptual role account. This leads us to the next chapter, which 




Cognitive propositions provide a prima facie attractive framework for an 
expressivist theory of propositions because normative cognitive act types are 
exactly the kind of thing expressivists already appeal to in their theoretical 
ontology. I argued that Ridge’s theory of cognitive propositions failed to 
adequately explain identity conditions for normative propositions, and 
diagnosed this failure as a result of failing to respect a more general 
desideratum. This desideratum was the unity requirement, which states that 
any expressivist theory of propositions must provide a unified 
nonrepresentational explanation of that in virtue of which our attitudes have 
propositional content. I then proposed a novel conception of predication that 
expressivists might use to explain normative propositions and argued that 
conceptual role accounts of content might be well placed to provide an 
explanatory framework for this view of predication. This move shifts the 
explanatory burden to the conceptual role account, which will be topic of the 








Conceptual Role Expressivism 
 
 
Conceptual role expressivism is the label for expressivist theories that endorse 
a conceptual role approach to thinking about content and meaning. At the end 
of the previous chapter, I suggested that the fate of an expressivist theory of 
cognitive propositions might be dependent on the fate of conceptual role 
expressivism. This chapter examines conceptual role expressivism more 
generally. Despite a number of recent endorsements of conceptual role 
expressivism, there has not been a general characterisation of the view. First, 
then, I provide such a characterisation, explaining how extant versions of 
conceptual role expressivism fit this characterisation (section 3.1). Next, I raise 
a challenge for conceptual role expressivism in relation to defective concepts 
(section 3.2). More specifically, I argue that conceptual role expressivists owe 
us an account of why normative concepts are nondefective. I then go on to 
discuss deflationist responses to the challenge and argue that they are lacking 
(section 3.3). Finally, I propose an alternative solution that appeals to 
something like Gibbard’s (2003) planning contents (section 3.4). However, I 
argue that doing so leaves conceptual role expressivism a less interesting and 
distinctive position than it might otherwise seem. Nonetheless, I argue that this 
is exactly what we should expect. I conclude by considering the implications 
this has for the cognitive act view suggested at the end of the previous chapter, 
as well as examining some similarities to Gibbard’s (2012) more recent account 
of normative concepts. 
 
3.1 Conceptual role expressivism: an overview 
 
In this section, I will first explain conceptual role theory, and then provide a 
fully general characterisation of conceptual role expressivism. I will then 
briefly outline three competing conceptual role expressivist views in the 






3.1.1 Conceptual role theory 
 
As I will be using the label, conceptual role theory is a general approach to 
explaining the contents of thoughts and concepts. Programmatically, the idea is 
that concepts should be explained fundamentally by their role in reasoning, 
belief formation, and practical deliberation. We saw in the previous chapter 
one particular way in which to develop conceptual role theory. Due to the wide 
variety of approaches that fall under the label, however, it can be difficult to 
say informatively at a general level what the overall approach consists in. 
Indeed, as we will see below, there are different conceptions of the explananda 
as well as the explanantia of conceptual role theory. But what all such theories 
have in common is a commitment to explaining mental content relationally in 
terms of certain connections between a subject’s mental states involving that 
content and certain other features of the subject.1 More specifically, conceptual 
role theories explain mental contents in terms of certain conditions under 
which a subject accepts those contents, where these conditions specify 
connections between states of acceptance and other states of the subject. In 
addition to other states of acceptance, these might also include connections 
from input-states, which might include perceptual states or worldly states in 
which the subject finds herself, and connections to output-states, which might 
include actions or intentions to act. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the acceptance conditions provided by 
conceptual role theorists are a form of possession conditions, which explain 
under what conditions a subject possesses some concept or other. So the idea 
is that the content of a concept is explained fundamentally by its possession 
conditions, where these specify certain transitions in thought that a subject is 
apt to make. In the previous chapter, we saw how this might work for logical 
concepts like conjunction. The basic idea was that to possess the concept 
CONJUNCTION is be disposed to accept contents on the basis of the introduction 
and elimination rules for conjunction. Another example might be colour 
concepts. Very roughly, to possess the concept RED might be to form beliefs 
about what is red in the presence of red things (e.g. Horwich 1998) or on the 
 
1 This characterisation already rules out certain views that might go by the name 
‘conceptual role theory’, such as Brandom’s (1994) inferentialism. Here the relevant 
“connections” are not between a subject’s mental states, but rather between certain 
commitments and entitlements that an agent can possess within a linguistic community. 
Although Brandom’s view is a somewhat neglected framework for developing a 
nondescriptive view of normative thought and discourse, it would take us too far afield to 
examine it here (see Chrisman 2016 for discussion). In any case, such a view does not 
respect the priority of thought thesis, which I am assuming throughout (see section 1.2.3).  
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basis of certain perceptual experiences (e.g. Peacocke 1992). The transition or 
set of transitions that individuates a thought or concept is its conceptual role.  
In developing a conceptual role theory for some concept or concepts, there 
are a number of choice points that one must make with respect to cashing out 
the conceptual roles in question. For example (compare Whiting 2006; 
Chrisman 2017; Sinclair 2018): 
 
• Concept-first vs thought-first. Do conceptual roles primarily apply to 
concepts, the constituents of thoughts, or to entire thoughts? 
• Particulars vs abstracta. If conceptual roles primarily apply to concepts, are 
concepts concrete mental representations or abstract components of 
propositions?2 
• Naturalism vs normativism. Do conceptual roles specify transitions that 
subjects in fact make or are disposed to make, or that subjects ought to make 
or are rationally committed to making? 
• Atomism vs holism. Do concepts have core or essential conceptual roles, or 
are conceptual roles locally or globally holistic?  
• Solipsistic vs communitarian. Are individuals the locus of conceptual roles, or 
communities? 
• Narrow vs wide. Do conceptual roles specify transitions only between 
mental states, or also between mental states and worldly objects, 
properties, events, states of affairs, etc. 
• Doxastic vs non-doxastic. Do narrow conceptual roles specify transitions 
only between doxastic states (beliefs, suppositions, perceptual experiences, 
etc.), or also between non-doxastic states (desires, intentions, etc.)? 
 
Assessing the prospects for conceptual role expressivism will require taking a 
stand on some of these issues with respect to characterising conceptual roles 
for normative concepts and thoughts. Where either choice point is open to the 
expressivist, I will remain noncommittal. For ease of exposition, I may at times 
talk in more particular terms than is required. However, where some choice is 
required, I will always make this explicit. 
 
3.1.2 Conceptual role expressivism characterised 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that conceptual role accounts of content 
should look prima facie attractive to expressivists. According to expressivism, 
normative concepts should not be explained fundamentally in terms of their 
 
2 Note that this sense of ‘representation’ is distinct from the sense in which expressivists 
deny that normative thoughts are ‘representations’ of reality — see section 1.2.1. 
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representational properties, but rather by their role in practical deliberation. 
According to conceptual role theory, concepts in general should not be 
explained fundamentally in terms of their representational properties, but by 
their role in reasoning, deliberation, and belief formation. Insofar as conceptual 
role views provide an independently attractive framework for explaining 
meaning and content, it would seem that expressivists would do well to 
embrace them. 
The basic idea of conceptual role expressivism, then, is to explain normative 
concepts in terms of their conceptual roles in a way that respects the central 
commitments of expressivism. Although specific accounts will vary, both in 
terms of the choice points above as well the details of the conceptual roles for 
different normative concepts, I propose that conceptual role expressivism is 
characterised by its commitment to the following three theses: 
 
(A) Conceptual roles for normative concepts do not specify any particular 
worldly or perceptual input conditions. 
(B) Conceptual roles for normative concepts specify some connection to 
conative or affective states. 
(C) Conceptual roles for normative concepts do not determine robustly 
representational content for normative thoughts. 
 
(I focus my attention here on thin normative concepts; thick normative 
concepts would plausibly have some particular input conditions.) Below, I will 
show how existing versions of conceptual role expressivism go about meeting 
these constraints. However, first some general comments on each. 
Commitment (A) is a consequence of the expressivist’s claim that in making 
a normative judgment, one is not responding to normative reality. In order to 
possess some normative concept, expressivists hold that it is sufficient to know 
how to deploy that concept in practical reasoning. There are no constraints 
concerning the worldly or perceptual conditions one must satisfy in accepting 
some normative content in order to possess some normative concept. This is 
not to deny that subjects do in fact respond to features of reality when 
deploying normative concepts. But there is no distinctive domain of reality that 
all subjects must respond to in order to possess normative concepts. Among 
other things, this is meant to explain how different subjects can systematically 
respond to different features of reality in applying a normative concept 
without thereby employing distinct concepts. Thus, for example, two subjects 
might have radically divergent conceptions of what makes up the subject 
matter of moral wrongness, for example a Kantian who thinks it is wrong to 
violate the categorical imperative and a moral egoist who thinks it is wrong for 
anyone to not pursue their own self-interest. These two subjects will respond 
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to distinct aspects of reality in applying the concept MORALLY WRONG, but they 
still seem to disagree about what is wrong. Consequently, expressivist 
conceptual roles for normative terms will be narrow in scope.  
Commitment (B) is meant to capture whatever it is that expressivists want 
to claim is the distinctive function or purpose of normative concepts in our 
cognitive economy. Traditionally, expressivists have endorsed some form of 
motivational internalism, which claims that there is some kind of necessary 
connection between normative judgments and being motivated to act in 
accordance with those judgments. On the present approach, this can be cashed 
out in terms of normative concepts involving conceptual connections between 
normative judgments and desires, intentions, or other action-guiding states. 
Expressivists might also claim that normative concepts are conceptually linked 
to affective states as well, such as certain reactive attitudes. No doubt different 
normative concepts will be linked to different kinds of attitude, and the exact 
details of these connections will be controversial. What the expressivist will not 
take as controversial, however, is that normative concepts are distinctive in 
their connections to non-doxastic attitudes. This also suggests a more atomistic 
or at least locally holistic approach to characterising normative conceptual roles, 
though (B) remains compatible with a more global holism. However, I will 
assume for simplicity that normative thoughts and concepts have a core 
conceptual role.3  
As we will see below, existing conceptual role expressivists seem to apply 
their account only to practical normative concepts. One might worry that 
commitment (B) fails to apply to epistemically normative concepts. This is 
because it is does not seem that judging (say) [that I ought to believe p] can be 
connected to conation in the same way as action, because I cannot decide or 
form an intention to believe anything. Because expressivists typically aim to 
explain normative thought in general, it is a problem if their theory only 
applies to practical normativity. Epistemic normativity has been somewhat 
neglected by expressivists, at least in terms of providing detailed accounts of 
what epistemic normative judgments are like, and it would be too big an issue 
to adequately address this here (see Chrisman 2012 for an overview of the 
issues). However, it can be pointed out that commitment (B) specifies only that 
there be some connection to conative or affective states. It does not say anything 
about what those states are. So perhaps the expressivist can say that the 
acceptance conditions for [I ought to believe p] do not involve a connection to 
an intention to believe p, but rather something more complex, such as a 
 
3 As we saw in the previous chapter, a holistic conceptual role theory might have a hard 
time individuating propositional contents, as there is bound to be variation interpersonally 
and intrapersonally across time — see section 2.42.  
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disposition to feel a corrective response and to intend to take self-corrective 
measures when I do not believe p (compare Gibbard 2012: 173), or to criticise 
myself and others in discussion about what to believe, and so on. In sum, 
commitment (B) is at least in principle compatible with expressivism about 
epistemic normativity as well as practical normativity.  
Moving on to commitment (C), conceptual role theorists typically hold that 
the conceptual role of a concept or thought in some sense determines its 
content. A more orthodox reading of this claim is that the conceptual role of a 
mental state determines its representational content, i.e. the worldly relata that 
the mental state is in some sense about. Clearly, conceptual role expressivism 
must deny that this is true of at least normative concepts, and this is why 
commitment (C) is also a requirement of the view. As we will see below, this 
has usually been taken to involve a commitment to some kind of minimalist or 
deflationary notion of content. But as we saw in the previous chapter, it is also 
open to the expressivist to adopt some kind of substantive notion of content, 
so long as it is suitably nonrepresentational. Insofar as there is good reason to 
posit normative propositions, as I argued in Chapter 1, then conceptual role 
expressivism should adopt a theory of propositions akin to that developed in 
Chapter 2. However, because the issues discussed in this chapter apply to 
conceptual role expressivism more broadly, I will not emphasise this point in 
this chapter but instead focus on commitment (C) more generally.  
(It’s worth emphasising that commitment (C) is itself a substantive and 
independent commitment that does not simply follow from (A) and (B). 
Kalderon [2007: 82ff] examines and rejects a number of arguments that attempt 
to derive something like (C) from something like (A) and (B). However, if we 
take (C) to be an independent commitment motivated on independent grounds 
rather than derived from (A) and (B), then Kalderon’s arguments do nothing 
to undermine it.) 
 
3.1.3 Three theories 
 
In the remainder of this section, I examine three different versions of 
conceptual role expressivism that can be found in the literature, and explain 
how each version adheres to commitments (A), (B), and (C). As my aim here is 
simply to show how existing versions of the view respect these commitments, 
for now I will suppress critical discussion of these views. For ease of exposition, 
I have regimented the terminology to that used above. However, these 
terminological alterations do not change the substance of the views. 
The first version comes Paul Horwich (2010), who holds that to believe a 
proposition [p] is to accept a sentence that expresses [p], where acceptance 
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involves relying on that sentence in theoretical and practical reasoning. 
Horwich argues that the meaning-constituting property of a word is its 
property of having some core conceptual role. This core conceptual role, 
together with other factors such as the environment and the meaning-
constituting roles of other words, explain when sentences containing the word 
are accepted and rejected (hence for Horwich, conceptual roles are solipsistic, 
naturalist, concept-first, and subjectivist). Thus, for Horwich, the propositional 
content of a belief is determined by the meaning-constituting properties of the 
components of its sentential object, together with its syntactic structure. 
Because Horwich denies that the meaning-constituting properties of words are 
relations between those words and what they stand for, including semantic 
vocabulary such as truth and reference, he denies that any meaning-
constituting properties determine a robustly representational content. Hence, 
his view respects commitment (C) by being globally nonrepresentationalist.  
He then goes on to propose the following example of a conceptual role for 
the ought of practical rationality (2010: 188): 
 
(1) (i) S believes [that he ought to do X] « S is strongly inclined to do X  
(ii) S denies [that he ought to do X] « S is not inclined to do X  
 
(Throughout this chapter, I use arrow notation to specify the transitions 
between mental states constitutive of the conceptual role in question.) Hence, 
Horwich’s view respects both (A) and (B), as the core conceptual role for the 
ought of practical rationality does not specify any worldly or perceptual input 
conditions and is constitutively connected to an action-guiding attitude. It’s 
worth noting that Horwich (2010: 189ff) does not place too much credence in 
the specific proposal, accepting that an adequate characterisation will no doubt 
be more complicated. However, he nonetheless endorses the general approach, 
and it seems that any complication will still respect (A), (B), and (C). 
The next example comes from Sebastian Köhler (2017), whose primary aim 
is to provide a deflationary account of propositional content. However, he does 
not arrive at deflationism by the sort of sententialist view of belief endorsed by 
Horwich. Instead, Köhler aims to provide an account of the 
nonrepresentational function of content attributions that does not invoke any 
entities as the referents of ‘that’-clauses. In a nutshell, Köhler’s idea is that the 
sentence mentioned in a ‘that’-clause serves as an illustrative example of certain 
“basic explanatory properties” of the belief being attributed (2017: 198). 
Specifically, it serves as an illustrative example of the belief’s conceptual role, 
where Köhler understands this as the subset of its total causal-functional role 
that relates to perceptual, inferential, and action-producing processes (hence 
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for Köhler, conceptual roles are thought-first and naturalist). Declarative 
sentences are then understood as codifying information about the conceptual 
role of the belief state they express.  
By explaining the role of content attributions without appealing to contents, 
Köhler’s account is committed to (C). He then proposes that representational 
states are those whose conceptual roles include sensory input conditions but 
no direct relation to action production, and that conative states are those whose 
conceptual roles include no sensory input conditions but directly relate to 
action production. Although Köhler offers no specific conceptual roles for 
normative mental states, he suggests that normative judgments are conative 
states in the above sense. However, these conative states are nonetheless belief 
states in virtue of their having sufficiently rich inferential transitions to and 
from other belief states. Hence, the account respects commitments (A) and (B). 
Finally, Sinclair (2018: 109) proposes that expressivists follow Wedgwood’s 
(2001) conceptual role for the concept X IS (ALL THINGS CONSIDERED) BETTER FOR 
ME TO DO AT T THAN Y as that concept B such that: 
 
(2) S accepts B(x,y,me,t) ® S has conditional intention to do x rather than y 
at t. 
 
If (2) is the conceptual role for the normative concept B, it should be clear that 
it respects commitments (A) and (B). However, although Sinclair endorses (2), 
it’s unclear what other parts of Wedgwood’s view he endorses. For example, 
because Wedgwood is a normativist about conceptual roles, Sinclair claims 
that (2) derives from the following norm: If acceptance of B(x,y,me,t) is rational 
then a conditional intention to do x rather than y is rational. However, 
Wedgwood would actually claim that (2) derives from the distinct norm: If 
acceptance of B(x,y,me,t) is not irrational then not having a conditional intention 
to do x rather than y at t is irrational (compare Wedgwood 2007: 84). Further, 
whereas Wedgwood is explicitly committed to an abstract Fregean view of 
concepts, Sinclair does not acknowledge the distinction between concepts as 
concrete representations or abstracta and seems to waver between the two.  
A more pressing difference between Sinclair and Wedgwood is that 
Wedgwood is a robust realist about normativity. As we will see in more detail 
below, Wedgwood thinks that (2) determines a unique worldly referent for B. 
So Wedgwood’s own view does not respect commitment (C). By contrast, 
Sinclair (2018: 110) believes that he can respect (C) by endorsing a deflationary 
view of truth and reference. I will return to this, and to important features of 
Horwich’s and Köhler’s views, in more detail below. However, I hope it should 
be clear how the otherwise disparate expressivist views advanced by these 
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theorists respect the three core commitments of conceptual role expressivism, 
thereby supporting its claim to full generality. 
As we have seen, conceptual role theory provides an attractive framework 
for expressivism insofar as it individuates mental states with distinct contents 
relationally in terms of their role within one’s cognitive economy rather than 
in terms of what those mental states represent. According to conceptual role 
expressivism, normative thoughts and concepts are individuated by their 
nonrepresentational, practical, core conceptual roles. Although these three 
examples by no means exhaust all versions of conceptual role expressivism, 
they nonetheless provide examples of prominent expressivist views that make 
explicit appeal to the resources of conceptual role theory. (Horwich does not 
actually use the label ‘conceptual role theory’, but that is terminological —see 
Whiting [2006]; Block [1998].) However, they nicely illustrate how conceptual 
role expressivists might cash out commitments (A), (B), and (C). Moreover, 
given the wide variety of differing choice points, they show how different 
versions of conceptual role expressivism can respect these commitments in 
theoretically diverse ways. In the next section I will raise a challenge to 
conceptual role expressivism. Because I take the challenge to be fully general, 
I will articulate the challenge in abstract terms.  
 
3.2 A challenge for conceptual role expressivism 
 
In this section, I first introduce the notion of a defective concept and explain why 
this notion poses a challenge for conceptual role expressivism. I then argue that 
the challenge arises from expressivism’s distinctive commitments by showing 
how the challenge can be solved by descriptivist conceptual role theories. 
 
3.2.1 Defective concepts 
 
Any theory of concepts must explain their semantic and logical properties. 
Conceptual role expressivism must therefore explain the semantic and logical 
properties of normative concepts. Specifically, it needs to explain how 
normative concepts can meaningfully embed in complex thoughts and 
participate in genuine inference, given commitments (A), (B), and (C). With 
this in mind, let a candidate concept be defective just in case it cannot 
meaningfully embed in complex thoughts or participate in genuine inference. 
The challenge for conceptual role expressivism is to explain why normative 
concepts are not a species of defective concepts.  
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The challenge arises because normative concepts as conceived by 
conceptual role expressivism bear a number of similarities to other concepts 
that are defective. I will argue that without any explanation of why normative 
concepts are not defective, the expressivist must accept either (i) that normative 
concepts are also defective, or (ii) that certain clearly defective concepts are in 
fact not defective. While perhaps early emotivists might happily accept (i) 
(Ayer sometimes describes moral concepts as ‘proto-concepts’), both claims are 
highly implausible.4 So expressivists need to explain why normative concepts 
are not defective.  
In what follows, I provide two examples of defective concepts. Before this, 
however, let me say something more about what it is for a candidate concept 
to be defective. First, it is worth stressing that I am only concerned here with 
defectiveness in the narrow sense defined above. There are, of course, a 
number of other ways in which a concept might be described as “defective”, 
but my concern here is only with a concept’s capacity for participating in 
embedding and inference. Second, it is important to distinguish between the 
property of being defective and the explanation for why a concept is or is not 
defective. In targeting the phenomenon, I do not wish to presuppose any 
particular explanation of what makes concepts defective.  
Third, where I have been careful, I have been using the qualification of 
whether a candidate concept is defective or not. This is because depending on 
one’s view of concepts, one might maintain that a “defective concept” is in fact 
no concept at all. That is, one might think that the class of concepts is not 
divided into those which are defective and those which are not. Rather, the 
capacity to participate in inference and embedding is a necessary condition for 
something’s being a concept, and thus a “concept” that lacks this capacity is a 
spurious concept. On this view, the challenge for conceptual role expressivism 
 
4 Derek Shiller (2018) makes an interesting suggestion that, in effect, expressivists should 
claim that moral concepts are defective. First, he supposes the representational theory of 
mind according to which concepts are mental particulars. Next, he argues that moral 
concepts are characterised by “non-representational proper functions that operate in the context 
of straightforwardly predicative moral judgments.” (2018: 432 original emphasis) However, he 
claims that although moral concepts are syntactically compositional and so can embed and 
occur in processes of reasoning and so on, such combinations are in fact semantically 
incoherent. To support this idea, he introduces the notion of a “spandrel context” which 
explains why evolution may have given us concepts with properties that outstrip the 
requirements of their designed function. As Schiller admits, however, the view is highly 
revisionary of our ordinary conception of morality and does not provide the sort of 
vindication of morality that quasi-realist expressivism aims for. As I take this to be one of 




is to explain why normative conceptual roles successfully individuate any 
concept whatsoever. Although it is a substantive issue as to which is the correct 
way of framing the challenge, the arguments discussed below apply mutatis 
mutandis to either formulation. For ease of exposition, I will therefore continue 
to talk about defective concepts without taking a stand on whether defective 
concepts are genuine concepts that have the property of being defective, or 
whether they are spurious concepts, descriptions of which are merely a façon 
de parler. 
With these qualifications out the way, I will now provide two examples of 
defective concepts. The main focus of the challenge for expressivism will be the 
second example, but it will be helpful to first examine a more familiar example 
to get a grip on the notion of a defective concept. The classic example comes 
from Arthur Prior’s (1960) ‘tonk’ connective. Transposing Prior’s example from 
the linguistic to the conceptual mode, suppose we define TONK as that concept 
T to possess which a subject S is apt to accept the following transitions:  
 
A(T) S accepts p ® S accepts pTq 
S accepts pTq ® S accepts q 
 
TONK therefore functions as a logical connective, with A(T) functioning much 
like Peacocke’s possession conditions A(C) for CONJUNCTION. It might therefore 
seem that like A(C), A(T) explains the rules of inference governing TONK, as 
well as how TONK can meaningfully embed. However, a moment’s reflection 
shows that any such impression would be an illusion. 
To see why, first note that given A(T), it apparently follows that anyone who 
possesses the concept TONK can derive any arbitrary proposition from any 
other arbitrary proposition. So much follows simply from the meaning of TONK. 
But it is surely not possible to genuinely infer the truth of any arbitrary 
proposition from another simply by possessing TONK. Perhaps there is some 
loose sense of ‘inference’ such that one could ‘derive’ q from p via TONK in that 
one can recognise the rules that individuate TONK and consciously follow the 
rules that lead from p to q, perhaps drawing ‘truth tables’ for TONK and writing 
out TONK ‘derivations’. But this weak sense of recognising and following the 
rules specified by A(T) is not plausibly sufficient for one to genuinely infer 
anything. The lesson that Prior thought we should draw from this example is 
that stipulating the meaning of an expression in terms of its role in inference is 
not sufficient to bestow genuine meaning. In the present context, the lesson is 
that stipulating the meaning-constituting conceptual role of a concept in terms 
of its role in inference is not sufficient to explain that concept’s capacity to 
participate in inference and embedding.  
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A number of responses have been given to Prior’s example. For instance, the 
conceptual role theorist might explain TONK as defective in virtue of the fact 
that it provides a non-conservative extension of our conceptual scheme (Belnap 
1962). The idea is that the rules specified by A(T) are inconsistent with the rules 
of our existing concepts, allowing TONK to lead to contradictions. Alternatively, 
one might deny that TONK is a genuine concept at all because it is impossible 
for a subject to be disposed to accept TONK-thoughts (Horwich 1998: 133ff). This 
is because forming beliefs using TONK would lead to radical instability in our 
beliefs. So it’s unclear that the example is as fatal to conceptual role theories as 
Prior took it to be (see Whiting 2006 for an overview).  
In any case, I do not wish to examine these responses here for two reasons. 
First, insofar as TONK does present a problem for conceptual role expressivism, 
it is only because it presents a problem for conceptual role theory in general, 
which I’m not here calling into question. Second, as a candidate logical 
connective, the conceptual role for TONK differs in important ways to 
conceptual roles for normative concepts as conceived by expressivism. 
Specifically, TONK does not respect commitment (B). This means, I think, that 
the kind of responses given to Prior’s example will not apply in the normative 
case. Nonetheless, I hope the discussion of TONK helps to clarify the notion of a 
defective concept. 
A more worrying example for conceptual role expressivism derives from 
James Dreier’s (1996: 44) ‘is hiyo’ predicate. I will first introduce the example 
as Drier presents it and then go on to explain its relevance to conceptual role 
expressivism. Suppose we use the word ‘hiyo’ to perform the speech act of 
accosting. For example, by uttering ‘Hiyo, Bob!’ in Bob’s presence, I thereby 
accost Bob. Clearly, this isn’t the kind of word that could meaningfully embed 
in logically complex sentences or participate in genuine inference. Most 
obviously, ‘hiyo’ does not have the right syntactic properties — ‘Hiyo, Bob!’ is 
not a declarative sentence. However, suppose we introduce the predicate ‘is 
hiyo’ whose constitutive meaning is to perform the speech act of accosting 
what it is predicated of. Thus, by uttering ‘Bob is hiyo’ in Bob’s presence, I 
thereby accost Bob in virtue of the meaning of the sentence uttered. Because ‘is 
hiyo’ is syntactically a predicate and ‘Bob is hiyo’ is a well-formed declarative 
sentence, superficially it might appear that ‘is hiyo’ can meaningfully embed 
and participate in genuine inference. However, any such appearance would be 
false. Even if ‘hiyo’-sentences are syntactically well-formed, we surely have no 
conception of what a sentence like ‘If Bob is hiyo, then a Dingo is near’ means. 
And if we have no conception of what this sentence means, then surely it is 
because ‘is hiyo’ is not able to meaningfully embed in complex sentences. In 
other words, ‘is hiyo’ is a defective predicate. 
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Dreier’s original target in constructing his example was to show that it is not 
enough for expressivists to appeal to a minimalist or deflationary theory of 
embedding and inference to explain how a predicate with an expressive 
function can meaningfully embed and figure in inference. The challenge for 
expressivists, as Dreier sees it, is to explain the meaning of expressive 
predicates in such a way as to explain their aptness for embedding and figuring 
in inference. How does this relate to conceptual role expressivism? It might 
initially seem that conceptual role expressivism is isolated from Dreier’s 
example. This is because ‘is hiyo’ is predicate rather than a concept. Moreover, 
it does not seem to correspond to any concept in the standard sense in that its 
meaning is specified in terms of its role in performing certain speech acts. By 
contrast, conceptual role theory individuates concepts in terms of transitions 
to and from mental states involving that concept. Because the meaning-
constituting rules for ‘is hiyo’ fail to specify any such transitions, they fail to 
individuate any concept whatsoever.  
Granting this, however, it is easy to construct an example that mirrors 
Dreier’s but is formulated at the level of concepts rather than predicates. For 
example, consider the following. Let HIYO be that concept H to possess which a 
subject S is apt to accept the following transitions: 
 
A(H) S wants to accost x ® S accepts Hx 
 S does not want to accost x ® S rejects Hx 
 
Here, we have clearly defined acceptance rules for when to form HIYO-beliefs. 
However, just as we have no conception of what the sentence ‘If Bob is hiyo, 
then a dingo is near’ means, we surely have no conception of what the content 
of the thought IF BOB IS HIYO THEN A DINGO IS NEAR is. Thus, although 
superficially it might appear that HIYO can embed in complex thoughts and 
figure in genuine inference, this appearance would be false. So HIYO is a 
defective concept. 
This is a problem for conceptual role expressivism because the meaning-
constituting possession conditions for HIYO bear a strong resemblance to the 
conceptual role expressivist’s meaning-constituting possession conditions for 
OUGHT and BETTER THAN. After all, the conceptual role for HIYO (A) does not 
specify any worldly or perceptual input conditions, (B) specifies an essential 
connection to conative states, and (C) is not plausibly interpreted as denoting 
any particular property (at least simply in virtue of its particular conceptual 
role). So HIYO respects the three core commitments for normative concepts 
constitutive of conceptual role expressivism. However, it is highly plausible 
that HIYO is a defective concept. But it is also highly plausible that OUGHT and 
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BETTER THAN are not defective concepts. At least, insofar as expressivists aim to 
vindicate our normative practices rather than debunk them, then expressivists 
will not accept that normative concepts are defective. Conceptual role 
expressivists therefore owe us an explanation of why our normative concepts 
are not defective when similar candidate concepts like HIYO are.  
Before examining some responses on behalf of conceptual role expressivism, 
I first want to sharpen the challenge by showing how descriptivist variants of 
conceptual role theory can explain why normative concepts are not defective 
in terms of their representational properties. 
 
3.2.2 Conceptual role and representational content 
 
One response to the challenge might be that insofar as HIYO presents a 
challenge to conceptual role expressivism, it is because it presents a challenge 
to conceptual role theory in general. In other words, HIYO is everyone’s 
problem. More generally, it seems, any version of conceptual role theory 
should provide some account of the difference between conceptual roles that 
bestow genuine meaning and conceptual roles that characterise defective 
concepts. So one might think that the conceptual role expressivist is no worse 
off than any other conceptual role theorist. And although this would certainly 
count against conceptual role expressivism, my aim in this chapter was not to 
assess the overall viability of conceptual role theory on its own terms. Rather, 
it was to examine whether expressivists would do well to adopt some form of 
conceptual role theory insofar as it is an independently attractive framework.  
It certainly seems right that any conceptual role theory should have 
something to say about defective concepts. However, classical conceptual role 
theories typically do have something to say about defective concepts. But 
unfortunately for the expressivist, the standard explanation of defectiveness 
results from combining conceptual role theory with a representationalist 
picture of conceptual thought. Although conceptual role theory fundamentally 
explains concepts in terms of their conceptual roles, many of its proponents 
also hold that concepts have representational properties. Specifically, they hold 
that a concept’s conceptual role determines it’s representational properties. 
Moreover, we will see that this provides a straightforward explanation of why 
concepts like HIYO are defective. However, the representationalist explanation 
also predicts that normative concepts as conceived by expressivism are 
defective. As such, explaining defective concepts provides an acute challenge 
for conceptual role expressivism in particular. 
This can be easy to overlook because the representationalist explanation of 
defectiveness is not a response to a challenge, but is rather a consequence of 
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already held assumptions about the representational nature of conceptual 
thought. The dialectic here should be familiar from the previous chapter. 
There, we saw how Soames’ already held assumption that propositions are 
purely representational cognitive acts predicted the correct identity conditions 
for propositions. By denying this assumption, Ridge’s theory robbed itself of 
the resources needed to capture the identity conditions for normative 
propositions in a principled way. Similarly, by denying the assumption that 
conceptual roles for normative concepts determine any kind of robustly 
representational content for the thoughts in which they figure, conceptual role 
expressivists rob themselves of the resources needed to explain defective 
concepts. To see this, however, I will first need to set out exactly what these 
resources are. 
I will begin by providing some evidence that many prominent conceptual 
role theorists do in fact accept a representationalist picture of conceptual 
thought. In the previous chapter, I discussed Christopher Peacocke’s (1992) 
conceptual role account of logical constants. Although Peacocke individuates 
concepts in terms of their possession conditions and not in terms of what they 
denote, he does not deny that concepts are denotational or that reference plays 
an explanatory role in his theory of concepts. For example (ibid: 17): 
 
As a matter of principle, the level of reference is inextricably involved with 
concepts, as understood here. Concepts are individuated by their possession 
conditions; the possession conditions mention judgments of certain contents 
containing the concepts; judgment necessarily has truth as one of its aims; and 
the truth of a content depends on the references of its conceptual constituents. 
It would be wrong, then, to regard the referential relations in which concepts 
stand as grafted onto a structure of concepts that can be elucidated without 
any reference to reference. Referential relations are implicated in the very 
nature of judgment.  
 
So, for Peacocke, that concepts are representational is entailed by a 
representationalist conception of judgment.  
Another conceptual role theorist who endorses a representationalist picture 
is Ralph Wedgwood (2007). This will be of particular interest in what follows, 
because, as we saw above, Wedgwood provides conceptual roles for normative 
concepts that respect commitments (A) and (B) while denying (C). As such, this 
will provide an acute presentation of exactly how commitment (C) robs 
expressivists of the resources available to representationalist views for 
explaining defective concepts. For now, however, I simply want to emphasise 
that Wedgwood’s commitment to the representationalist picture of concepts is 




What is essential to concepts is just that they play a representational role: the 
nature of a concept consists purely in the contribution that it makes to the 
nature of the thoughts in which it appears; and such thoughts are nothing 
more than ways of representing some possible state of affairs. […] [T]he 
essential features of a concept must all be relevant to determining the concept’s 
reference or semantic value. 
 
Finally, consider the sort of conceptual role picture endorsed by Ned Block 
(1986). Block’s picture is in many ways very different to that of Peacocke and 
Wedgwood. Whereas the latter two endorse a broadly Fregean view of 
concepts and propositions, Block is more concerned to adopt a psychological 
view of content as part of a more empirically informed explanation of cognition 
and the mind. However, he takes the initial desideratum on any such account 
to explain “the relation between meaning and truth/reference” (ibid: 616) and 
argues that (ibid: 643f): 
 
[W]hat theory of reference is true is a fact about how referring terms function 
in our thought processes. This is an aspect of conceptual role. So it is the 
conceptual role of referring expressions that determines what theory reference 
is true. Conclusion: conceptual role factor determines the nature of the 
referential factor.  
 
Although Block does not engage with the issue of defective concepts, these 
comments make it clear that embracing conceptual role theory does not rule 
assigning an explanatory role to the level of reference in a theory of concepts. 
However, I’ll continue to focus on the kind of framework employed by 
Peacocke and Wedgwood, as this brings the issue more sharply into focus. 
We see, then, that conceptual role theorists like Peacocke and Wedgwood 
are still committed to a representationalist picture of conceptual thought. I will 
now describe how this picture explains defective concepts. Peacocke and 
Wedgwood argue that any theory of concepts needs not just a theory of 
possession conditions but also a determination theory that explains how the 
reference of a concept is fixed by its possession conditions. As well as 
explaining how the conceptual role aspect of their view squares with the 
representationalist aspect, a determination theory also aims to explain why it 
is appropriate or correct for subjects to make the transitions specified by the 
theory of possession conditions. If there is no reference that can explain the 
appropriateness of correctness of the transitions specified by some concept’s 
conceptual role, then we can explain that concept as defective.  
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There are some minor differences between how Peacocke and Wedgwood 
develop their determination theories, so I will take each in turn. For Peacocke, 
correctness is ultimately cashed out in terms of truth and reference. For logical 
concepts, a determination theory assigns to the concept whatever reference 
would make the transitions specified in its conceptual role truth-preserving. 
Thus, recall Peacocke’s theory of possession conditions for CONJUNCTION, 
according to which CONJUNCTION is that concept C to possess which a subject S 
is apt to make the following transitions: 
 
A(C) S accepts p and S accepts q ® S accepts pCq 
 S accepts pCq ® S accepts p 
 S accepts pCq ® S accepts q 
 
The determination theory then assigns as the reference of C whatever would 
make the transitions specified by A(C) truth-preserving, here the classical truth 
function of conjunction (Peacocke 1992: 18). Because one preserves truth in 
one’s beliefs in accepting pCq on the basis of accepting p and accepting q, we 
can say that it is correct or appropriate to transition from accepting p and 
accepting q to accepting pCq. The determination theory for empirical concepts 
(e.g. RED) will take a slightly different form. This is because the possession 
conditions for empirical concepts will involve beliefs based on perceptual 
experience. The determination theories for these concepts will then assign 
references to concepts such that these belief-forming practices result in truth 
beliefs. In both cases, however, correctness or appropriateness in conceptual 
roles is explained in terms of truth and reference. 
Importantly for our purposes, a determination theory such as Peacocke’s 
can explain why a concept like TONK is defective whereas CONJUNCTION is not. 
Like CONJUNCTION, TONK functions as a logical connective with its conceptual 
role specifying mind-to-mind transitions about what combinations of contents 
to accept. However, unlike CONJUNCTION, there is no semantic assignment for 
TONK that would make the transitions specified in A(T) truth-preserving and 
hence correct or appropriate for subjects to follow. Accordingly, Peacocke’s 
theory correctly predicts that TONK is a defective concept.  
By contrast, the central notion for explaining correctness for Wedgwood is 
not truth but rationality. This is driven by his theory of normative concepts. I 
will here focus on Wedgwood’s theory of the practical all-things-considered 
ought. He proposes that OUGHT is the unique concept O to possess which a 




A(O) S accepts the first-person proposition [O<me, t>(p)] ® S makes p part of S’s 
ideal plan about what to do at t. 
 
Here, one’s ideal plan is what would be one’s plan if it were not affected by 
ignorance and uncertainty about what to do in the situation one is in at t; to 
make p part of one’s plan is to adopt a plan that entails p. It should already be 
clear why A(O) forces Wedgwood to reject a Peacocke-style determination 
theory for OUGHT. This is because A(O) specifies a transition from a judgment 
to a planning attitude. Because plans are not truth-apt, the correctness of the 
transition cannot be explained in terms of truth-preservation or as a true belief-
forming practice. (Some might argue that plans are in fact truth-apt; however, 
even if they are, it seems implausible that their being so would explain why it 
is appropriate for subjects to follow A(O).)  
Instead of truth, Wedgwood (2007: 100) appeals to the “point” or “purpose” 
of the attitudes in question and to the corresponding rational norms that 
govern them. Thus, while “getting things right” in believing is having a true 
belief, getting things right in planning consists in something else, such as 
having “genuinely choiceworthy” plans (ibid: 101). Wedgwood then argues that 
if being genuinely choiceworthy is what governs our plans, then the 
determination theory for A(O) should assign to O the logically weakest 
property of a proposition in virtue of which it is correct to make that 
proposition a part of one’s ideal plan. So although Wedgwood appeals to 
rationality rather than truth in providing a determination theory for OUGHT, his 
determination theory still explains OUGHT in terms of its reference. 
Importantly for our purposes, a determination theory like Wedgwood’s can 
explain why HIYO is defective whereas OUGHT is not. Although it might be 
rational to accost someone if one has a desire to accost that person, this is not 
captured by A(H). Rather, on Wedgwood’s framework, what is captured by 
A(H) is a connection between wanting to accost some individual and the belief 
that that individual possesses the property denoted by H. However, it is 
unclear that there are any rational norms governing our desires to accost 
people such that there is some property that could be assigned to H that would 
explain the correctness of the transition specified by A(H).5 If this is correct, 
then Wegdwood’s account explains why HIYO is defective while OUGHT is not. 
 
5 Perhaps one could assign to H the property of being wanted to be accosted by S. If this is 
correct, then HIYO might in fact be nondefective. Two comments. First, if this is correct, 
then it is not obviously problematic that HIYO is nondefective, initial intuitions 
notwithstanding. Second, this would be of no help to expressivists, because saying 




My aim here has not been to show that these explanations are correct or 
without problems of their own.6 Rather, my aim has been to show that existing 
strategies for dealing with defective concepts and for explaining the properties 
of conceptual roles more generally make reference to the representational 
properties of concepts. Because expressivists deny that normative concepts are 
representational in this sense, they cannot pursue this strategy in any form. So 
the challenge to explain defective concepts is particularly pressing for 
expressivists. They must look elsewhere. 
 
3.3 Deflationist responses 
 
In this section, I examine whether any of the expressivist theories discussed 
earlier in the chapter (section 3.1.3) have the resources to explain defective 
concepts. I argue that they do not. Although only Horwich explicitly addresses 
the challenge, it is nonetheless instructive to see how the challenge applies in 
each case. Moreover, despite the differences of these theories, they all take on 
board some kind of deflationism about propositional content in order to 
respect commitment (C). As such, I have brought these responses together 
under the heading ‘deflationist responses’. In the next section, and in keeping 
with the thesis of this thesis, I suggest that conceptual role expressivists need 
some non-deflationary notion of normative propositional content to answer the 
challenge. But first, I examine responses on behalf of the expressivist theories 




Although Sinclair does not acknowledge the problem of defective concepts, he 
does acknowledge that a theory of possession conditions for a concept should 
be supplemented with a determination theory of that concept. This is because 
Sinclair (2018: 110) considers it a platitude that the truth conditions of thoughts 
are determined by the semantic values of their constituents. If concepts are the 
constituents of thoughts, and we accept a conceptual role account of concepts, 
then it follows that conceptual roles determine the contents of thoughts. And 
explaining how conceptual role determines the contents of thoughts is the job 
of a determination theory. However, Sinclair argues that a deflationary 
 
6 They do have problems of their own. For example, it’s not obvious that Wedgwood’s 
conceptual role for OUGHT really provides enough constraints to specify a unique reference 
across all uses. 
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determination theory can do just as well as Peacocke or Wedgwood’s realist 
versions.  
Sinclair’s idea is that all of the relevant platitudes about conceptual roles 
determining semantic values and truth conditions can be satisfied by a 
deflationary interpretation of ‘truth conditions’ and ‘semantic values’. 
Specifically, his idea is that “if truth-conditions are understood in deflationary 
terms and semantic value is just contribution to truth conditions, then semantic 
value is also deflationary.” (2018: 110) Thus, the truth conditions of a simple 
predicative thoughts can be given by the deflationary schema: the thought [that 
x is F] is true iff x is F. If we then understand semantic value in terms of 
contribution to truth conditions, we can then say that the deflationary semantic 
value of a predicative concept F is the set of F-things (ibid). Sinclair then argues 
that his deflationary determination theory respects the platitudes about how 
conceptual role determines content without supposing that normative 
concepts denote worldly properties. In this way, Sinclair believes that he can 
adopt Wedgwood’s theory of possession conditions for concepts like OUGHT 
and BETTER THAN while respecting commitment (C). 
I will grant for the sake of argument that Sinclair’s deflationary 
determination theory respects all of the platitudes about conceptual roles 
determining the contents of thoughts. The problem, as we have already seen, 
is that a determination theory is meant to do more than this. Among other 
things, a determination theory is meant to explain defective concepts. 
However, the deflationary determination theory looks ill equipped to do this. 
First, and most generally, deflationary semantic notions cannot play any 
explanatory role in a theory of meaning or content. A fortiori, they cannot play 
a part in explaining defective concepts. Although semantic deflationists do not 
deny that deflationary truth or reference or whatever is genuine truth or 
reference or whatever, they claim that these notions can only play an 
expressive role in theoretical discourse. According to deflationists, there is 
nothing it is to be true, and because truth has no (substantive) nature, it isn’t 
such that it can play an explanatory role. 
Second, suppose we put this general worry about the explanatory potential 
of deflated notions aside and look Sinclair’s determination theory for 
normative concepts in particular. Recall that Sinclair endorses the following 
conceptual role for BETTER THAN as that concept B to possess which a subject 
must be apt to make the following transitions: 
 





Could Sinclair’s deflationary determination theory explain why subjects are 
correct to follow A(B)? It is hard to see how it could. For Sinclair, the 
deflationary semantic value of a predicative concept is its extension. In this 
case, we can think of the extension of B as a set of tuples corresponding to 
<x,y,me,t> — though this set will not be determined by some metaphysical 
property or relation of better-than-ness instantiated or obtaining between the 
members of the tuple, which would amount to a representationalist 
determination theory. But if the semantic value of B is merely a set, it is unclear 
that this explains why one’s accepting that <x,y,me,t> falls within the extension 
of B makes it appropriate for one to intend to do x rather than y at t.  
Third, not only do we lack an explanation of the correctness of the 
transitions specified by A(B), but we also lack an explanation of why we cannot 
provide a deflationary determination theory for concepts like HIYO. Recall the 
possession conditions of HIYO were as follows: 
 
A(H) S wants to accost x  ® S accepts Hx 
 S does not want to accost x ® S rejects Hx 
 
If a deflationary determination theory says that the semantic value of a 
predicative concept is just its extension, then it would seem that there is 
nothing to stop us from providing a deflationary determination theory for H in 
terms of its extension. Presumably, Sinclair would want to deny that HIYO is a 
genuinely predicative concept and thus deny that it has any extension. But this 
is exactly what needs to be explained. Unlike the representationalist 
determination theory, the deflationary theory alone lacks the resources to 
explain this. So Sinclair’s deflationary determination theory neither explains 




Because Köhler endorses a thought-first version of conceptual role theory, 
according to which whole thoughts are primary rather than their constituents, 
the challenge will take a slightly different form. More specifically, the challenge 
will not so much be to explain defective concepts, but rather to explain a 
defective class of mental states. So instead of individuating a concept by its core 
conceptual role, on Köhler’s picture we would need to individuate the relevant 
class of mental states in terms of the normative predicate used to 
conventionally express such states. Roughly, we can individuate (say) ought-
beliefs as those mental states conventionally expressed by sentences of the form 
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‘S ought to do x’. According to Köhler, this sentence provides an illustrative 
example of a shared functional profile of ought-beliefs.  
Like Sinclair, Köhler does not discuss the possibility of defective concepts or 
the challenge it might pose to expressivism. In any case, it does not seem that 
his account has the resources to explain defective concepts. First, note how on 
Köhler’s account, logical and semantic relations between declarative sentences 
earn their keep in codifying functional relations between mental states that are 
expressed by such sentences. Next, note that it is surely possible that there could 
be a functionally defined state such that a subject comes to accept [that Bob is 
hiyo] on the basis of the subject’s desire to accost Bob, and which also causally 
interacts with other mental states that preserves the isomorphism of the 
‘logical’ relations between ‘hiyo’-sentences and other sentences. If this is a 
genuine possibility, then ‘hiyo’ can meaningfully embed and participate in 
genuine inference just as much as any normative predicate. So Köhler’s account 




Recall that for Horwich, to believe [that I ought to do x] is to accept the sentence 
‘I ought to do x’. If the meaning-constituting property of ‘ought’ is that subjects 
accept sentences of the form ‘I ought to do x’ when they are strongly inclined 
to do x, the challenge for Horwich is to explain why a subject cannot genuinely 
accept ‘hiyo’-sentences. As far as I’m aware, Horwich is the only conceptual 
role expressivist to acknowledge that something like HIYO might pose a 
particular challenge for his view. Like Sinclair and Köhler, Horwich embraces 
a thoroughgoing deflationism about semantic notions. And Horwich, perhaps 
more than anyone, is keen to stress that deflationary notions cannot be put to 
explanatory work. So Horwich’s solution is to introduce additional constraints 
on the theory of possession conditions to explain why HIYO is defective but 
normative concepts are not. (Again, it’s worth stressing that Horwich doesn’t 
frame his theory or arguments in these terms, but that’s merely a matter of 
terminology.) Given Horwich’s sententialism about belief, we have already 
seen one such additional constraint. This is that to believe some proposition, 
the sentence one accepts in believing it must be syntactically well-formed. 
However, because ‘hiyo’-sentences are syntactically well-formed, we will need 
some further constraint.   
To identify the relevant constraint, Horwich begins with the observation 
that when one person genuinely accepts something and someone else accepts 
its negation, there is a disagreement: “there is conflict, a clash, a feeling that the 
other person is somehow in bad shape.” (2010: 182) This seems to be something 
 
 78 
lacking in the hiyo-case. Suppose I want to accost Bob and come to accept [that 
Bob is hiyo]. Next, suppose you do not want to accost Bob and come to accept 
[that Bob is not hiyo]. Given A(H), we are both competent users of HIYO who 
have ‘correctly’ come to form our beliefs according to the meaning-constituting 
rules governing ‘hiyo’. However, it seems implausible to suppose that there is 
any real sense in which we disagree about whether Bob is hiyo. From this, 
Horwich argues that it is a necessary condition on genuine acceptance that 
accepting something and its negation must have the potential to engender 
practical conflict. This is grounded in the way that belief interacts with other 
attitudes in producing action. Specifically, Horwich claims “the conflict 
associated with contradictory beliefs consists in their potential, through 
inference, to engender conflicting desires and decisions.” (2010: 183) I will call 
this the disagreement constraint.  
In many ways, this notion of practical conflict echoes Stevenson’s (1944) 
notion of disagreement in attitude. An example Stevenson gives concerns a 
disagreement between a curator of a museum who wants to buy contemporary 
art and his advisors who prefer to buy traditional art. In this example, there is 
a practical disagreement about what to do (i.e. which kind of art to buy for the 
museum). While we can assume that such practical disagreement does not 
consist in any particular disagreement in belief, it is easy to see how such 
disagreement might derive from contradictory beliefs. For example, perhaps 
each party has contradictory beliefs about how many visitors each kind of art 
would attract to the museum. Or perhaps they have contradictory beliefs about 
the value of contemporary art in relation to traditional art. In each case, we can 
imagine a practical conflict that is engendered in part from each party holding 
contradictory beliefs. Moreover, as the example illustrates, this seems to be true 
of contradictory evaluative beliefs as well as empirical beliefs. For we can 
imagine that the practical disagreement stems from a disagreement over the 
proposition [that traditional art is more popular than contemporary art] or over 
the proposition [that traditional art is more valuable than contemporary art]. 
Because no such practical disagreement seems to stem from contradictory 
HIYO-beliefs, Horwich claims that we have an explanation of why HIYO is 
defective but normative concepts are not.  
However, Horwich’s proposal is unsatisfactory and should be rejected. On 
first appearances, it might look like Horwich’s disagreement constraint is too 
strong. First, there are examples where it is not obvious that believing 
contradictory propositions engenders disagreement. For example, suppose I 
believe [that gin is tasty] and you believe [that gin is not tasty]. Second, there 
are examples of beliefs that are far removed from our actions or practical 
attitudes. Suppose Kurt believes [that numbers are Platonic objects] and David 
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believes [that numbers are symbols to which we give an interpretation]. This is 
a case where there does seem to be disagreement, but it is not one that is likely 
to engender any practical conflict. Indeed, it seems plausible that the majority 
of our beliefs are not directly tied to action in any particular way. So one might 
think that the disagreement constraint is too strong. In fact, however, given 
Horwich’s characterisation of what it is to engender practical conflict, the 
constraint is far too weak. This is because any contradictory beliefs can 
engender practical conflict given other suitable premises to reason from. And this 
is no less true of HIYO-beliefs. 
Consider again Kurt and David. As a matter of fact, it seems unlikely that 
Kurt and David’s beliefs would engender the kind of practical conflict that 
Horwich has in mind. However, it is easy to imagine examples in which their 
beliefs would engender a practical conflict. For example, they might disagree 
over which of two research applications to grant funding to based on which 
application they believe is most worthy, which in turn might be based on what 
philosophical views they take to be true. Or perhaps Kurt has the bizarre belief 
[that if number are abstract objects they demand respect where demanding 
respect involves frustrating the desires of nonbelievers]. Together with Kurt’s 
belief [that numbers are abstract objects], this spells trouble for David. This 
shows that even beliefs that are typically far removed from practical 
considerations can engender practical conflict given suitable premises to 
reason from. The problem for Horwich is not that this is false, but that it cannot 
explain why HIYO is defective. 
Suppose Kurt and David both learn of a new faculty member called Bob 
who will be joining the department next semester. Upon learning that Bob is a 
hardcore Platonist, Kurt forms a desire to accost Bob and David does not form 
any desire to accost Bob. In virtue of their respective desires, Kurt comes to 
accept [that Bob is hiyo] and David comes to reject [that Bob is hiyo]. Now 
suppose that Kurt has the bizarre belief [that people that are hiyo demand 
respect where this involves frustrating the desires of hiyo-nonbelievers]. Taken 
together, Kurt’s beliefs spell trouble for David. So again, we have a practical 
conflict engendered by contradictory beliefs. Hence, Horwich’s disagreement 
constraint is too weak because it falsely predicts that we can genuinely accept 
‘hiyo’-sentences. 
What’s going on here? Horwich’s proposal claims that a sentence can 
participate in genuine inference in virtue of its capacity to engender practical 
conflict when it and its negation are accepted. I think the above examples show 
that this gets things the wrong way around. Rather, what the examples show 
is that accepting a sentence and its negation can engender practical conflict in 
virtue of their capacity to participate in genuine inference. So Horwich’s 
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explanation for why OUGHT-beliefs but not HIYO-beliefs can participate in 
inference begs the question, as it already presupposes that the former but not 
the latter can be used in practical reasoning. As such, Horwich fails to explain 
why HIYO is defective but normative concepts are not. 
 
3.3.4 Biting the bullet?  
 
I have assumed throughout this chapter that HIYO is a defective concept. All of 
the responses discussed above accept this assumption as a premise and try to 
explain the difference between HIYO and normative concepts. Could this 
assumption be challenged? In other words, could the conceptual role 
expressivist simply claim that HIYO, though weird, is not a defective concept? 
Although I’m not aware of anyone defending this position in print, it has been 
suggested to me that conceptual role expressivists would do well to respond 
this way.7 If this is right, then it’s at least not obvious that the expressivist faces 
any challenge explaining defective concepts, as the particular challenge for 
expressivism was motivated by the similarities between normative concepts 
and HIYO. 
We might develop this thought in the following way. First, suppose we 
adopt an inferentialist view of the logical connectives like the material 
conditional that says something like the following: to believe [that if p then q] 
is to be committed to not accepting p while also rejecting q (compare Blackburn 
1988). Given that we have an account of what it is to accept and reject HIYO-
thoughts, then contrary to my above arguments, it might seem that we do have 
a conception of how HIYO can meaningfully embed and participate in genuine 
inference, at least for truth-functional connectives like ‘if-then’. Specifically, to 
accept an embedded HIYO-thought is to be committed to holding certain 
combinations of HIYO-thoughts and other attitudes. This commits us to a 
certain picture of logical connectives, but it is one that conceptual role 
expressivists are likely to be sympathetic to anyway.  
Further, we might provide a debunking explanation of the intuition that 
HIYO is a defective concept as follows. Perhaps HIYO seems weird simply 
because we are not HIYO-people. We do not possess any such concept and 
would have no use for one. Moreover, it is hard to imagine what use a 
community would have for such a concept. This is in comparison to normative 
concepts, which expressivists claim earn their keep in motivating actions and 
coordinating attitudes. However, just because it is hard to imagine a use for 
HIYO it does not follow that there is no possible use. Perhaps we can imagine a 
 
7 This was suggested to me by separately by Michael Ridge and Wolfgang Schwarz. One 
might also deny that normative concepts are non-defective—see footnote 2 of this chapter. 
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community which for some bizarre reason attaches the utmost significance to 
people’s desires about who they accost. Surely such a community is possible, 
and it seems at least more plausible that they might have use for a HIYO-like 
concept. Arguably, therefore, HIYO is not defective. 
I think that there are at least three things that can be said in response here. 
First, one might worry that embracing HIYO will overgeneralise the quasi-
realist ambitions of most contemporary expressivists. Recall from the first 
chapter that expressivists typically employ deflationary interpretations of 
notions like normative truth, normative facts, normative properties, and so on. 
If we accept that HIYO is on all fours with normative concepts, then we should 
expect to be able to provide similar interpretations of hiyo truth, hiyo facts, 
hiyo properties, and so on. Of course, we might not care to vindicate these 
notions, but it does not follow that such notions could not be vindicated by or 
on behalf of those (possible) subjects who possess the concept. However, that 
there are vindicatory explanations to be had of these notions seems highly less 
plausible than for normative concepts. Perhaps one might reject expressivism’s 
quasi-realist ambitions, but I think this is a significant cost to those sympathetic 
to expressivism.  
Second, embracing HIYO in the way suggested above arguably begs the 
question. For recall that the above response relied on a certain view of logical 
connectives, namely that to believe [that if p then q] is to be committed to not 
accept [p] and reject [q]. It was then suggested that we simply substitute a 
‘hiyo’-sentence in place of ‘p’ or ‘q’ to see how HIYO can meaningfully embed. 
However, this already presupposes that we can genuinely accept and reject 
HIYO-thoughts, which is exactly what needs to be established (compare Woods 
2017: 231f). However, whether or not this does in fact beg the question might 
depend on thorny issues concerning whether the burden of proof lies with 
showing whether HIYO is defective or not.  
Regardless, surely not just any candidate constitutive acceptance conditions 
will individuate a concept. Surely there must be some general constraints on 
what kind of acceptance conditions can individuate nondefective concepts. So 
even if we are entitled to assume that HIYO is nondefective, it still seems that 
we are owed some account of what makes it the case that certain conceptual 
roles individuate meaningful concepts whereas others do not. One might 
respond that all that matters is whether we could in fact use a concept 
according to its constitutive acceptance conditions. However, this would seem 
to reject any distinction between defective and nondefective concepts. In effect, 
this seems to debunk the claim that conceptual role determines content. Rather, 
it is closer to a kind of meaning or content scepticism. I won’t try to argue 
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against such a view here, but it seems a high price to pay for embracing 
conceptual role expressivism. 
In sum, deflationist responses to the challenge do not adequately explain 
defective concepts. This is not to deny that a deflationary account of semantic 
notions should not be part of an overall expressivist theory. On the contrary, it 
seems plausible that expressivists need deflationism to explain normative 
truth, reference, and the like (though see Ridge 2014: ch.7 for an argument that 
expressivists can accept a correspondence theory of truth). But deflationism 
cannot help expressivists answer the challenge. 
 
3.4 An alternative  
 
Having rejected various deflationist responses to the challenge of explaining 
defective concepts, in this section I propose an alternative response. In effect, 
the response is to propose a nondeflationary but nonrepresentational 
determination theory for normative concepts. Although I think this response is 
more promising than its deflationist competitors, I will argue that it leaves 
conceptual role expressivism a less interesting and distinctive position than its 
proponents claim. However, I argue that this is in fact what we should expect. 
The alternative solution then provides a natural segue to the next chapter.  
An instructive place to begin is with Schroeter and Schroeter’s (2003) critical 
discussion of Wedgwood’s conceptual role theory for normative concepts. 
Focusing for the moment on the linguistic case, Schroeter and Schroeter 
consider the following putative possession conditions for the expression ‘x is 
right for me’: 
 
(3) S accepts ‘x is right for me’ ® S intends to do x. 
 
If, following Wedgwood, we want to provide a realist determination theory for 
(3), then we might suppose that ‘x is right for me’ denotes the property being 
the right thing for me. This property would then explain why subjects are correct 
to follow the transition specified by (3). Against this, Schroeter and Schroeter 
(2003: 202) argue that a determination theory for a predicate should not assign 
a property as its denotation if competence with that predicate does not exhibit 
any sensitivity to that property. Because (3) places no constraints on when a 
subject can form beliefs about what is right for her to do, they argue that the 
correct determination theory for (3) should not assign any property as the 
reference of ‘right for me’.  
Instead, they tentatively propose that the correct determination theory for 
(3) will assign the same semantic value associated with the sentence ‘I hereby 
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intend to do x’. It is plausible to think that this tentative suggestion correctly 
rationalises the transition specified by (3). If one sincerely utters ‘I hereby 
intend to do x’ then it is highly plausible that it would be appropriate to thereby 
intend to do x. However, it is less plausible that this suggestion can correctly 
explain other semantic features of the sentence ‘x is right for me’. 
Unfortunately, Schroeter and Schroeter do not say what they take the semantic 
value associated with the sentence ‘I hereby intend to do x’ to be. Whatever it 
is, however, it cannot be the same as ‘x is right for me’ because the two 
sentences cannot be substituted salva veritate.  
To be fair to Schroeter and Schroeter, they also deny that (3) provides the 
correct possession conditions for ‘x is right for me’, so perhaps their suggestion 
should not be taken too seriously. Nonetheless, I think their proposal points in 
the right direction. Transposing the example from the level of language to the 
level of thought, we might think of the mental analogue of uttering ‘I hereby 
intend to do x’ as something like a decision or commitment to intend to do 
something in the relevant circumstances. As before, this way of thinking would 
rationalise the transition from thinking [that x is right for me] to intending to do 
x. What we need is some way of understanding the left hand-side of the 
transition that reflects the propositional structure expressed by the sentence ‘x 
is right for me’. We need this because not only do we need to explain the 
correctness of (3), but we also need to explain how the content [that x is right 
for me] can meaningfully embed in other attitudes and participate in genuine 
inference.  
In fact, such a view of normative thought and content is available in Allan 
Gibbard’s (2003) plan expressivism. Very roughly, Gibbard thinks that 
normative attitudes are akin in important ways to planning attitudes, and that 
the contents of normative attitudes can be explained in terms of the sets of 
plans not ruled out by those attitudes. Thus, to think [that x is right for me] is 
something like planning to do x in the relevant circumstances, where the content 
of this thought can be specified in terms of a set of plans that prescribe doing 
x. Returning to conceptual role expressivism, we might then provide a 
nonrepresentational but nondeflationary determination theory in terms of the 
planning contents assigned to normative thoughts. In the next chapter, I will 
argue that this account has the right structure to explain the propositional 
structure of normative thought. The important point for now is that planning 
contents both rationalise the conceptual roles of the concepts they are assigned 
to and have the right sort of structure to explain embedding and inference.  
If we adopt this strategy for answering the challenge, however, we see that 
conceptual role expressivism becomes a less interesting position that it might 
have first appeared. For what this approach does is to shift much of the 
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explanatory burden from the theory of possession conditions to the 
determination theory. In other words, it is no longer the conceptual role part 
of the theory that is doing the heavy lifting, but the theory of content proper, 
which is to say, the theory of normative propositions. Where we were looking 
to conceptual role theory to explain normative content, the bulk of the 
explanation has come from elsewhere. Nonetheless, I think this is exactly what 
we should expect. This is because conceptual role theories are often couched as 
metasemantic theories or theories of content determination. Because conceptual 
role expressivists are typically also deflationists about propositional content, it 
is easy to overlook this point. This is because if a deflationary determination 
theory cannot explain defective concepts, then the theory of possession 
conditions has to provide all of the explanation. But as we saw above, such a 
view is highly problematic. 
As well as being less interesting, conceptual role expressivism also becomes 
less distinctive. Although expressivists might not appeal to a conceptual role 
framework to explain normative concepts, I doubt few would deny that 
normative concepts should be explained in terms of their distinctive role in 
practical reasoning. If we accept that expressivists need some further theory of 
meaning or content to explain the semantic and logical properties of normative 
concepts, then this might seem to be compatible with a wide variety of 
expressivist theories of normative concepts. This isn’t to say that expressivists 
should not embrace conceptual role theory. If conceptual role theory is an 
independently attractive view of content determination, or if conceptual role 
theory provides useful resources to formulate expressivist claims about 
normative concepts, then expressivists have every reason to embrace it. 
However, in doing so, the expressivist does not discharge the usual 
explanatory burdens that come with developing an expressivist theory of 
normative thought and discourse, contrary to what some conceptual role 
expressivists suggest. 
As a final note, it is worth considering the implications that our discussion 
has for the expressivist theory of cognitive propositions sketched at the end of 
the previous chapter. There, I proposed that normative propositions are acts of 
predication, where such acts were understood as acts of categorisation 
according to concepts. This notion was sufficiently theoretically neutral to be 
compatible with expressivism without entailing expressivism. I thus argued 
that we would need some suitably nonrepresentational account of the concepts 
involved in such acts in order to vindicate their use in an expressivist theory of 
normative thought and discourse. I then examined conceptual role 
expressivism as a candidate for such an account. However, I argued that the 
approach failed to fully explain the relevant properties of normative thought. 
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Bringing this back to the account of cognitive propositions, this means that the 
conceptual role approach fails to explain all the relevant properties of acts of 
normative predication such that they could play the role of propositions within 
an expressivist theory. I suggested that conceptual role expressivism might be 
vindicated taken in conjunction with something like Gibbard’s notion of 
planning contents, where conceptual role determines such contents for 
normative attitudes. While this might seem like an alternative to the cognitive 
propositions view, it is in fact compatible. For normative categorisation itself 
might be understood in terms of planning. Very roughly, categorising 
something as right for me to do would consist in grouping that thing with other 
things that I plan on doing in the relevant circumstances. Abstract planning 
contents could then be understood as modelling properties of such cognitive 
acts. So the account of cognitive propositions might be elucidated in terms of 
planning contents. However, because the approach to content examined in the 
next chapter can be maintained independently of the cognitive act view of 




In this chapter, I have examined expressivist theories that appeal to conceptual 
role accounts of content to explain normative thought. Although many 
contemporary expressivists express sympathies with conceptual role 
approaches to content, there is no consensus about what combining these two 
approaches amounts to and what commitments their conjunction entails. My 
first aim in this chapter was to provide a fully general characterisation of 
conceptual role expressivism that unites otherwise disparate views. 
Additionally, this characterisation provides a general framework in which 
expressivists sympathetic to conceptual role expressivism can develop their 
theory, making explicit recourse to the various choice points discussed above. 
This shows that the conceptual role framework has room for many different 
versions of conceptual role expressivism in addition to those theories discussed 
above. While I have expressed scepticism that the conceptual role framework 
alone has the resources to explain the semantic and logical properties of 
normative thought, I have not argued that this cannot be a fruitful framework 
for expressivists. So this chapter advances debates about conceptual role 
expressivism by making precise what the view is committed to and the 
theoretical options available to conceptual role expressivists. 
However, I have also argued that conceptual role expressivism cannot be 
the whole story of normative thought. Conceptual role expressivists owe us an 
explanation of how normative conceptual roles can determine genuinely 
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propositional content given commitments (A), (B), and (C). This was 
highlighted by the comparison with defective concepts like HIYO, but the point 
is a more general one. I think this point is particularly significant because 
conceptual role expressivists often write as if embracing conceptual role theory 
automatically solves the Frege-Geach problem. If the arguments I have given 
here are correct, then it shows that such a thought is mistaken. I therefore think 
that the most important lesson of this chapter is this. The conceptual role 
framework might provide a fruitful framework for expressivists to develop 
theories of normative thought. But the framework itself should not be seen as 
the solution to any problem or set of problems. All the puzzling features of 
normative thought as conceived by expressivists stand in no less need of 
explanation once we adopt a conceptual role view.  
 
3.6 Addendum: Gibbard on Meaning and Normativity 
 
I concluded this chapter proposing that conceptual role expressivism needs 
some notion of content, such as Gibbard’s notion of planning content, in order 
to answer the challenge of explaining defective concepts. As far as I know, 
Gibbard does not anywhere discuss this challenge. However, the view he puts 
forward in his Meaning and Normativity (2012) embraces both a conceptual role 
account of content and a plan-expressivist account of normative mental states. 
It is therefore worth asking whether the view I am proposing here is the same 
as Gibbard’s. I will argue that despite this initial similarity, the appeal to 
planning states in Gibbard’s theory plays a very different role to the one I am 
proposing here. However, it should be said at the outset that this will only be 
a very cursory examination of Gibbard’s view in Meaning and Normativity. This 
is in part because the view he proposes is complex and raises many questions 
of its own which would take the current discussion too far afield. But it is also 
because, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Gibbard has an idiosyncratic 
conception of the role that contents play in a theory of attitudes. However, I 
will also argue in the next chapter that one can make use of his distinctive 
notion of content while accepting a more orthodox conception of the role such 
contents can play in one’s theory of attitudes.  
Gibbard endorses a normativist conceptual role approach that assumes that 
we think in a version of the public language we speak and understand (2012: 
117). The meaning of a word is the concept it expresses, where a concept is 
individuated in terms of the rules of rationality governing it. Specifically: “The 
meanings of the words in a sentence combine to explain which inferential 
oughts apply to the sentence and the evidential conditions under which one 
ought to accept or reject the sentence. A word’s meaning what it does consists 
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in the pattern of oughts that enters into such explanations.” (2012: 114) So, for 
example, for a word to express the concept SOMETHING is for that word to be 
governed by inferential oughts such as: one ought to infer ‘something is white’ 
from ‘snow is white’ (2012: 113). Gibbard then goes on to develop notions of 
synonymy and analytic equivalence to flesh out the conditions under which 
the same oughts apply to the same word, and hence express the same concept. 
Roughly, the idea is that two sentences are analytically equivalent and express 
the same thought just in case one ought to give each thought the same credence 
under any intelligible supposition (2012: 121ff). The precise details of Gibbard’s 
view need not concern us here (see Williamson 2018 for critique). What is 
important is that Gibbard explains concept identity in terms of the rational 
connections between accepting thoughts containing that concept and other 
mental states. Hence, Gibbard endorses a conceptual role approach as I am 
using the term. 
Gibbard then goes on to provide an expressivist meta-theory of meaning 
claims. Because meaning claims are claims about what one ought to believe or 
infer, Gibbard proposes that they express a species of planning states. By 
‘planning’, Gibbard has something different in mind to our ordinary notion of 
planning. I will talk about this in more detail in the next chapter. But very 
roughly, planning states are a kind of directive attitude that govern our will 
and beliefs (2012: 172). Specifically, ought claims place restrictions on what to 
do or what to think for any subjective circumstance one could conceivably be 
in (2012: 174ff). So Gibbard thinks that our thought and talk about what things 
mean is tied to claims about what we should believe and infer, which are 
normative claims. However, this creates a strange sort of dual account of 
normative thought. On the one hand, normative thoughts are individuated in 
terms of their conceptual roles. But the same attitude is also modelled directly 
in terms of the restrictions it places on plans. So a question arises as to how 
these two accounts are related, and Gibbard is not entirely clear in explaining 
their relation. 
In line with my discussion above, however, I think that we can profitably 
think of this in the following way. The conceptual roles of normative thoughts 
determine the restrictions those thoughts place on plans, and Gibbard’s 
planning contents make explicit the form these restrictions take. Moreover, as 
we will see in the next chapter, the structure of these restrictions is such that it 
explains how normative thoughts can participate in genuine inference. To be 
clear, I am not claiming that this is how Gibbard himself would characterise 
his view. But it seems that by taking meaning to be normative, Gibbard ends 
up with a view that is similar to what is needed in order to solve the challenge 
of explaining defectiveness (though again, this is not something Gibbard takes 
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his account to do). Bringing the discussion back to conceptual role 
expressivism more generally, this discussion reemphasises two important 
implications. First, we need to appeal to more than just conceptual role in a full 
account of conceptual content. Second, conceptual role expressivism will need 
to take on other substantive commitments about the nature of normative 
content. And these commitments will be controversial and take us further 






The Modal Conception of Content 
 
 
This chapter examines whether an extension of possible worlds models of 
content can provide expressivists with a suitable theory of normative 
propositions. First, I locate the possible worlds model of content within a 
broader explanatory framework that characterises propositions in terms of 
possibilities (section 4.1). I call this the modal conception of content. Second, I 
explain how expressivists can develop a model of normative propositions 
within the modal conception of content (section 4.2). For concreteness and 
familiarity, I illustrate this with Allan Gibbard’s (2003) notion of planning 
contents, though this is simply one way of implementing a more general 
approach. Third, I raise a general challenge for expressivists who appeal to the 
modal conception (section 4.3). The challenge is to answer what I call the 
foundational question, is to explain how the expressivist’s model of content is 
grounded in an adequate foundational philosophy of mind compatible with 
expressivism. Fourth, I examine an answer to the challenge due to Seth Yalcin 
(2018a) and argue that it fails (section 4.4). Finally, I propose that the way to 
answer the challenge is to develop a general theory of belief compatible with 
expressivism that subsumes representational and normative beliefs (section 
4.5). The task of providing such a theory is then taken up in the next chapter. 
 
4.1 The possible worlds model of content 
 
Among the views of propositions discussed in Chapter 2, I rejected the 
standard possible worlds view as suitable for an expressivist theory of 
normative propositions. According to the standard possible worlds view, 
propositions are sets of possible worlds, or functions from possible worlds to 
truth values, which carve out possible states of the world (I hereafter omit the 
latter formulation for ease of exposition). Because expressivists deny that 
normative beliefs are fundamentally in the business of tracking how the world 
is, believing a normative proposition for expressivists cannot (only) involve 
taking some possible state of the world to obtain. As such, normative 
propositions cannot be sets of possible worlds. In this chapter, I argue that 
although the possible worlds view is unsuitable for an expressivist theory of 
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normative propositions, the view is an instance of a more general approach to 
explaining content that can provide an attractive framework for expressivists. 
This more general framework is what I will call the modal conception of content, 
which explains content in terms of possibilities. 
The basic thought behind why the modal conception of content might be 
attractive for expressivists is this. According to the modal conception, to accept 
a proposition is to rule out the set of possibilities incompatible with that 
proposition. The possible worlds view of content assumes that the relevant 
possibilities are possible states of the world. However, this assumption is not 
entailed by the modal conception as such and may be rejected. Doing so 
provides space for a view according to which to accept a normative proposition 
is to rule out a set of possibilities, but where these possibilities characterise 
some kind of nonfactual or nonworldly domain. So long as we can characterise 
this domain in terms of possibilities, such a view would remain firmly within 
the modal conception. So this approach would seem well suited to respecting 
the unity requirement argued for in Chapter 2. 
In the next section, I explore in more detail what such a view might look 
like. First, however, I explain and motivate the modal conception of content in 
more detail. Initially, I focus on the simplest version of the modal conception, 
the possible worlds model of content. I then show that quite independently of 
explaining normative belief, there are grounds for extending and enriching the 
possible worlds model to explain certain other distinctive domains of thought, 
specifically de se and de nunc thought. This provides support for the 
expressivist extension of the possible worlds model by showing that there are 
already pressures to enrich the model to account for other distinctive domains 
of thought. However, the support is only indirect, because while de se thought 
is not world-characterising content, it is factual in the broader sense defined in 
Chapter 1. 
 
4.1.1 The possible worlds model: an overview 
 
At the most general level, the modal conception of content makes the following 
claim: contents distinguish between possibilities. To grasp the content of 
assertion is to know which possibilities are ruled out by that assertion. To 
believe a proposition is to rule out certain possibilities as true, namely those 
incompatible with that belief. This makes intuitive sense. For example, if I 
believe [that Edinburgh is north of London], then presumably I rule out 
various possibilities in doing so, such as Edinburgh being south of London or 
their having a shared latitude. In failing to know what possibilities the belief 
rules out, it would seem that I fail to grasp its content. If someone asserted [that 
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Edinburgh is north of London] and I did not take this to rule out these other 
alternatives, then plausibly I have not understood what was said. 
More precisely, then, which possibilities do I rule out and which do I ‘rule 
in’ when I believe [that Edinburgh is north of London]? According to the 
simplest version of the modal conception, we can answer this question in terms 
of possible worlds. Specifically, where W is the set of all possible worlds and 
the variable w ranges over the members of this set, the content of my belief is 
the set of possible worlds in which Edinburgh is north of London, or {w Î W: 
Edinburgh is north of London in w}. (Equivalently, this can be characterised as 
the function f such that f(w) = true iff Edinburgh is north of London in w.) A 
possible world provides us with a complete specification of the way things 
might be, and the truth of the proposition [that Edinburgh is north of London] 
is compatible with many other ways the world could be besides how it actually 
is. The possible worlds view of content identifies this proposition with the set 
of those possibilities.  
More precisely, we can understand the possible worlds model of content to 
be the following (Yalcin 2018b: 24): 
 
The possible worlds model of content. The content of a state of belief 
is representable as a set of possible worlds, intuitively the worlds “left 
open” by what is believed. Propositions are sets of possible worlds, and 
the propositions an agent believes are those true with respect to all of 
those worlds the state leaves open.  
 
The possible worlds model of content is compatible with a number of different 
ways of understanding possible worlds. I will simply assume here that possible 
worlds are properties, namely possible states of the world or ways that the 
world might be (e.g. Stalnaker 1987; 2012). This contrasts with possible worlds 
being concrete (e.g. Lewis 1986), mind- or language-dependent (e.g. Carnap 
1947), or maximally consistent sets of propositions (e.g. Adams 1974). It follows 
from this conception that propositions are unstructured, in the sense that the 
proposition [that p and q] is identical to the proposition [that q and p]. This is 
because both propositions leave open the same set of possibilities and so have 
the same worlds as elements.  
Given this conception of possible worlds as properties, a further question 
arises as to how to characterise the set of all possible worlds W and how to 
individuate the worlds within W. As before, the possible worlds model as such 
does not commit us to any particular answer. A straightforward answer would 
be that W consists in the complete set of metaphysically possible ways the 
world can be. This is not the answer I will assume here, however. Rather, I will 
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assume that the relevant domain of possible alternatives is defined relative to 
the discriminatory abilities of the subject or subjects whose attitudes are in 
question (see Stalnaker 1987 for the classic statement of this view). This means 
that from the perspective of the theory of content, there is not a single domain 
of possibilities relative to which all propositions are subsets. Rather, the 
domain will vary depending on the theoretical context. So relative to subjects 
with differing cognitive capacities, or relative to different contexts of inquiry 
or conversation, the possible worlds in W might be cut up more or less finely. 
This feature, which I will call discrimination relativity, will prove important in 
the discussion ahead and will be returned to in more detail.1  
 
4.1.2 The possible worlds model: attractions 
 
The possible worlds model provides a first approximation of belief content as 
conceived by the modal conception. It provides a perspicuous representation 
of what is involved in claiming that contents are ways of dividing up 
possibilities. However, not only does the possible worlds model explain our 
intuitions about what is involved in grasping and accepting propositions. It is 
also attractive from a theoretical perspective. First, the possible worlds model 
provides an elegant way of explaining standard propositional relations in set 
theoretic terms (this will be important in accommodating a nonfactualist view 
of normative content). For example, for any sets of possible worlds f and ψ: 
 
inconsistency = f1, . . . , fn  are inconsistent iff (f1 ∩ . . . ∩ fn) =	∅ 
entailment = f1, . . . , fn entails	ψ iff	(f1 ∩ . . . ∩ fn) ⊆ ψ 
 
Logical notions can likewise be defined, for example: 
 
negation = f¢ 
disjunction = f È y 
conjunction = f Ç y 
 
As set-theoretic relations are already well understood, this provides an 
attractive framework for explaining propositional and logical relations. 
 
1 Stalnaker calls this feature “the relativity of content” (1987: 20) and Dennett calls it “agent 
relativity” (1987e: 207). Note also that defining the domain of possibilities relative to a 
subject does not entail that the existence of the domain is in any way dependent on the 
subject, so possible worlds can still be mind-independent on this view. 
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Second, another advantage of the possible worlds model is that it allows for 
non-linguistic creatures to possess beliefs and other propositional attitudes. 
This is because propositions are not linguistic entities but abstract possibilities 
individuated relative to the creature’s discriminatory capacities. This fact also 
provides the resources to explain how we could have evolved to have 
propositional thought in terms of the development of our discriminatory 
responses to our environment. Discrimination relativity also helps to explain a 
number of other features of belief. For example, it is plausible that 
understanding a proposition is gradable. Consider a young child whose 
mother is a doctor (this example comes from Dennett 1969: 183; see also 
Stalnaker 1987: 64f). From a young age, it is true to ascribe to the child the belief 
that her mother is a doctor. However, although the child believes this 
proposition from a young age, we can expect her understanding of the 
proposition [that her mother is a doctor] to increase as she grows older. The 
possible worlds view can explain this nicely. As the child grows older, we may 
suppose that the range of possibilities she rules out in believing [that her 
mother is a doctor] grows as she comes to discriminate more finely between 
possibilities in which her mother is a doctor and possibilities in which she isn’t.   
Third, a number of other advantages follow from a feature of the possible 
worlds model not yet commented upon. This is the idea that it is a subject’s 
total belief state that is primary as opposed to her individual beliefs. Thus, 
according to the possible worlds model, a subject S’s beliefs are modelled by 
the set of worlds WS compatible with S’s total belief state. Individual beliefs are 
then modelled as properties of the total belief state. Specifically, S believes [p] 
just in case WS is a subset of [p]. This holistic aspect of the model is well placed 
to explain phenomena such as how belief change seems to be holistic. For 
example, when I come to believe [that my keys are in the car], this seems to 
involve my coming to believe many other things, such as [that my keys are not 
in my pocket], [that they are in some car], and so on (Yalcin 2018b: 25). Given 
how extensive we could make this list, it seems implausible that acquiring each 
of these beliefs is a distinct cognitive achievement over and above the initial 
belief change. If changes in belief are primarily changes in one’s total belief 
state, however, then we can understand coming to believe all of these 
propositions as a single cognitive achievement.  
The holistic aspect of the model also explains how we can seemingly have 
beliefs of unbounded complexity (Yalcin 2018b: 25). For instance, consider an 
example in which A and B are said to have common knowledge of the 
proposition [p]. It is often thought that common knowledge entails that A 
knows [that B knows that p], A knows [that B knows that A knows that B 
knows that p], and so on. It seems implausible that with each rising level of 
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complexity, A grasps and accepts a distinct content. By contrast, the possible 
worlds model can characterise everything entailed by the common knowledge 
[that p] simply in terms of the possibilities ruled in and out by A and B’s 
common knowledge. 
To sum up, the possible worlds model provides a theoretically attractive 
model of belief content in that: (a) it reduces propositional and logical relations 
to well-understood set-theoretic relations; (b) it can capture the variability of 
content ascriptions across subjects in terms of discrimination relativity; and (c) 
it can capture holistic features of belief in virtue of the primacy of subjects’ total 
belief states.2 Of course, the possible worlds model is not without its problems 
either. I here mention three, the last of which will be important in setting the 
stage for an expressivist-friendly modal view of content. 
 
4.1.3 The possible worlds model: three problems 
 
The first problem is that it seems highly plausible that we can have distinct 
beliefs about distinct necessarily true claims. However, the possible worlds 
model apparently entails that all necessarily true propositions are identical, 
because they are characterised by exactly the same set of possibilities. If beliefs 
are individuated by possible worlds propositions, it follows that all beliefs in 
necessarily true propositions are identical. But this seems absurd. For example, 
my belief [that 5 +7 = 12] is surely not identical to my belief [that modus ponens 
is valid]. Although this is a serious problem, I do not wish to dwell on it here, 
as this would take us too far from the present inquiry. But one response to this 
problem might be to treat necessarily true claims as metalinguistic claims about 
which sentences express the one necessary proposition (see for example 
Stalnaker 1987: 72ff). In this way, we can take the objects of our mathematical 
and logical beliefs to be about which statements express the one necessary 
proposition. (I will briefly mention another response below.) 
A second problem is that it seems plausible that we sometimes acquire new 
beliefs by working out the consequences of what we already believe. However, 
the possible worlds model apparently entails that we already believe the 
logical consequences of what we already believe. As such, it fails to capture 
this kind of activity. Again, I do not wish to dwell for long on this problem. But 
one response might be to complicate the possible worlds model by attributing 
separate systems of belief to a subject as opposed to a single total belief state. This 
is the idea that a subjects’ beliefs are ‘fragmented’ or ‘compartmentalised’ to 
separate systems of belief (see Stalnaker 1987; Lewis 1986; for a discussion of 
 
2 In the next chapter, we will examine some further benefits of the modal conception of 
content in providing a foundational philosophy of mind. 
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independent empirical support for the idea of fragmented belief systems, see 
Porot and Mandelbaum forthcoming). Deductive reasoning can then be 
thought of in terms of integrating separate systems of belief (see Yalcin 2018b 
for further discussion). 
A third problem for the possible worlds model is its inability to explain de 
se and de nunc thought, or beliefs that involve indexical concepts such as I, 
HERE and NOW. For instance, it seems possible that (a) I believe [that my 
interview is at 1:00pm], (b) I believe [that my interview is not now], and (c) it 
is now 1:00pm. The possible worlds model struggles here because it apparently 
fails to differentiate between the propositions believed in (a) and (b), as given 
(c), both propositions are characterised by the same set of possible worlds. 
Unlike with the previous responses, I want to a spend a little more time 
exploring this problem, as it will set the stage for what’s to come. 
In general terms, the problem is this. I do not simply inhabit a possible world 
within logical space. I also inhabit a time and a place within that world. 
Indexical concepts such as I, HERE and NOW allow us to have what Perry (1977) 
calls self-locating beliefs — beliefs that allow me to ‘locate’ myself within the 
possible world I inhabit. We need indexical concepts in order to distinguish my 
belief [that my interview is at 1:00pm] and my belief [that my interview is now]. 
If I were to learn that it is now 1:00pm, I do not learn something new about 
what the world is like. Rather, I learn something new about the perspective I 
inhabit within that world, in this case something about my temporal location.  
On the basis of examples like these, Lewis (1979a) proposes that the objects 
of beliefs are centred worlds. It is a matter of controversy exactly how to 
conceive of centred worlds (see Liao 2012 for discussion), but as a first 
approximation we can say that they consist of an ordered set of (i) a possible 
world and (ii) a perspective within that world. More precisely, we might 
understand the perspective as a space-time coordinate <x, y, z, t> or an agent-
time pair <i, t>. The details here will not concern us, so I will assume that 
centred worlds are tuples of world, agent, and time <w, i, t>. Roughly, then, 
indexical content encodes information relating to the i and t parameters.3 
Using centred worlds to model various kinds of indexical thought is fairly 
commonplace. This highlights that those who utilise the modal conception of 
content are happy to add further complexity and structure to the domain of 
alternative possibilities if this is needed to model certain aspects of belief not 
 
3 Lewis (1979a) argues that this shows that the objects of beliefs are not propositions, 
because Lewis assumes that propositions just are sets of possible worlds. Because I define 
‘propositions’ as whatever entity plays the object of attitude role, sets of centred worlds (or 
the properties they consist in or represent) are understood here as a possible candidate for 
what propositions are, as opposed to something to be contrasted with propositions. 
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captured by the initial model. Indeed, this general strategy has also been used 
to answer the problem of distinguishing between the logically equivalent 
truths of mathematics by introducing a distinct parameter to model 
mathematical information (Pérez Carballo 2016). Similar strategies have also 
been employed to explain discourse about epistemic modality (Yalcin 2007; 
2011) and know-how (Santorio 2016). So although the possible worlds model 
is perhaps the most standard implementation of the modal conception, the 
modal conception itself is flexible about what exactly will constitute the 
domain of alternative possibilities in any particular theoretical context. 
Moreover, if content is discrimination relative, as was suggested above, this is 
exactly what we should expect. 
In the next section, I argue that a familiar expressivist strategy for explaining 
normative content is best understood as a particular instance of the more 
general strategy described in the previous paragraph. Specifically, I argue that 
Gibbard’s notion of planning contents can be understood as introducing a 
distinctive nonfactual parameter into the possible worlds model with which to 
model normative belief content. The point to be stressed here is that this move 
can be motivated from within the possible worlds framework. To that extent, 
Gibbard’s proposal is more conservative than is often thought. However, to the 
extant that normative belief content is nonfactual, Gibbard’s proposal 
constitutes a more radical departure from orthodox views. This is because 
although there is a sense in which indexical content is not world-characterising, 
it is still factual in the broader sense that the truth or falsity of an indexical 
belief is still determined by reality.  
 
4.2 The world-hyperplan model of content 
 
Gibbard (2003) proposes that normative beliefs are a kind of planning attitude, 
which can be characterised in terms of the plans they rule in and out, much as 
descriptive beliefs can be characterised in terms of the worlds they rule in and 
out. In this section, I show how we can understand this as a proposal within 
the modal conception of content. As we will see, locating Gibbard’s proposal 
within this broader explanatory framework will prove vital to providing an 
expressivist account of normative propositions that respects what in Chapter 2 
I called the unity requirement: 
 
Unity requirement. Expressivists need a unified explanation of that in 





The basic idea will be that if belief content is discrimination relative, then in 
order to see how we might extend the possible worlds model to characterise 
normative belief, we should first look to the distinctive discriminatory abilities 
implicated in normative belief in virtue of which it is correct to assign 
nonfactual contents.  
This way of developing Gibbard’s proposal will differ in a number of 
important ways to Gibbard’s own view, and I will indicate where I take there 
to be substantive rather than merely presentational differences between the 
two. However, it will not matter too much whether the resulting view is one 
that Gibbard himself would or would not accept. What matters is the view 
itself. The remainder of this section will be divided into two parts. First, I 
explain the world-hyperplan model of content. Second, I will further clarify the 
view by considering and responding to four possible objections. 
 
4.2.1 The world-hyperplan model: an overview 
 
Our ordinary factual beliefs aim to capture how the world is and where we 
stand in it. The centred worlds model of content cashes this out in terms of 
dividing up a domain of centred worlds and locating the actual world as 
among those worlds in which the content of one’s belief is true. Normative 
beliefs, the expressivist maintains, aim to settle not how things are but what to 
do, think, and feel in various circumstances. If the object of a prosaically factual 
belief is a way that things might be, we might therefore think of the object of a 
normative belief to be something like a possible way of acting, thinking, or 
feeling. If the object of a normative belief is something like a possible way of 
acting, thinking, or feeling, then how exactly should we characterise the 
relevant domain of possible alternatives that normative contents carve up? 
To begin to answer this question, let us first follow Gibbard (2003; 2012) in 
supposing that normative judgments are plan-laden attitudes. For instance, 
imagine that I judge [that all things considered I ought to give comments on 
my friend’s manuscript]. We might think of this judgment as akin to forming 
a plan to comment on my friend’s manuscript in the relevant circumstances. 
After all, if I make this judgment, then in normal circumstances and other 
things being equal, we would expect me to act as if I had made such a plan. So 
the suggestion seems intuitively plausible. 
However, the sense in which normative judgments are like plans is broader 
than our ordinary notion of planning in a number of ways. For example, 
consider the judgment [that Caesar ought to have crossed the Rubicon when 
Rome was lightly defended]. In some ways, this judgment is akin to a 
contingency plan to cross the Rubicon if I were in circumstances subjectively 
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indistinguishable from Caesar’s. However, it seems implausible that in making 
this judgment, I form any such plan in the normal sense. But it is nonetheless 
plan-like in that it prescribes a particular action based on a contingency. 
Further, consider the judgment [that Caesar ought to have believed that Rome 
was lightly defended, given the evidence]. Clearly, this judgment cannot 
involve a plan in the ordinary sense to have a certain belief in Caesar’s 
circumstances since I cannot literally plan to believe anything. Believing is 
simply outside the scope of volition. Nonetheless, when we criticise or correct 
others or ourselves for failing to follow the ‘plans’ prescribed by our epistemic 
normative judgments, or take steps to correct ourselves, we are in a broader 
sense following our plans to think in certain ways (compare Gibbard 2012: 173). 
Henceforth, I will use ‘plan’ and its cognates in this broader, extended sense. 
Suppose, then, that normative judgment can be profitably conceived of as a 
kind of planning attitude. How should we understand the relevant domain of 
alternative possibilities that the contents of normative judgments distinguish 
between? It is here that Gibbard introduces the technical notion of a hyperplan. 
Just as a possible world provides a complete and coherent specification of a 
way things might be, a hyperplan provides a complete and coherent 
specification of what to do, think, or feel for any possible situation. As a first 
approximation, whereas the content of a prosaically factual belief is given by 
the set of worlds left open by the belief, the content of a normative belief is 
given by the set of hyperplans left open by the belief. The intuitive idea is that, 
relative to some situation, hyperplans provide prescriptions about what to do, 
think, or feel, and to accept some set of hyperplans is to be disposed to behave 
in accordance with those prescriptions. More generally, where w is a centred 
world and h a hyperplan, a subject’s belief state can be modelled by the set of 
<w, h> pairs compatible with her beliefs.  
Intuitively, by characterising logical space in terms of points of <w, h> pairs, 
belief contents distinguish not only between ways the world can be and ways 
we can be located within the world, but also between what to do, think, or feel 
in different scenarios. To accept a normative claim on this view is to rule in 
some action, thought, or feeling as being the thing to do, think, or feel. More 
generally, we arrive at the following view:  
 
The world-hyperplan model of content. The content of a state of belief 
is representable as a set of <w, h> pairs, intuitively the <w, h> pairs “left 
open” by what is believed. Propositions are sets of <w, h> pairs, and the 
propositions an agent believes are those that hold with respect to all of 




From a formal perspective, the world-hyperplan model provides a 
conservative extension of the possible worlds model. First, hyperplans do not 
require introducing any new elements into the model because both possible 
worlds and hyperplans can be constructed out of possibilia and sets thereof 
(Yalcin 2012: 147; Stalnaker 2014: 130). If we think of plans as mappings from 
situations to prescribed outcomes, a hyperplan can be defined as a function 
from sets of worlds that realise possible situations to sets that realise prescribed 
outcomes. Second, the definitions of propositional relations and logical notions 
given in the previous section carry directly over to sets of <w, h> pairs. In this 
way, the world-hyperplan model treats logical complexity in factual and 
normative thought in exactly the same way as the possible worlds model. 
Third, as I argued in the previous section, the possible worlds model already 
needs enriching to account for indexical content. So there is no in principle 
reason why we cannot add further complexity to the model to characterise 
normative thought.  
In the next section, I raise a challenge for the world-hyperplan model in 
relation to what it is to accept world-hyperplan contents. In the remainder of 
this section, I consider four objections to the model. These objections will help 
to clarify the view further and to highlight the explanatory burdens faced by 
the view.  
First, however, it should be noted that the general approach of developing 
an expressivist theory of propositions within the modal conception is not 
wedded the world-hyperplan model as such. I opt for this model because of its 
familiarity within the metaethical literature and its clear associations with 
expressivism. Moreover, as we will see later in the chapter, one of the best 
developed expressivist theories that embraces the modal conception appeals to 
hyperplans (though I will go on raise some objections to it). But different 
notions might model normative content as conceived by expressivism just as 
well. For instance, Charlow (2014) proposes that expressivists might appeal to 
the kind of imperatival content that characterise the ‘To-Do Lists’ employed by 
Portner (2007) to model the pragmatics of imperatives.4 And Chrisman (2016) 
proposes that the semantics for ‘ought’ might appeal to Castañeda’s (1975) 
notion of a practition to explain agential ‘ought’-sentences. Another approach 
would be to appeal to something like standards understood as orderings of 
possible worlds in the style of Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals. For 
 
4 It is unclear whether Charlow’s proposal is consistent with the Portnerian framework he 
employs. This is because for Portner, “a modal sentence is proposed for addition to the 
Common Ground, while an imperative is proposed for addition to the addressee’s To-Do 
List.” (2007: 363) By contrast, Charlow suggests that deontic normative sentences (a) are 
modal sentences and (b) express imperatival contents. 
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example, Silk (2013) and Ridge (2014) endorse something close to this.5 As all 
of these proposals could be modelled within an extension of the possible 
worlds framework, they are all available to expressivists who embrace the 
modal conception of content. However, I will henceforth focus solely on the 
planning model. Importantly, the objection raised in the next section will apply 
equally to any of these alternatives, so this particular choice point will not 
matter too much for the purposes of this chapter. 
 
4.2.2 The world-hyperplan model: four objections 
 
I will now consider four possible objections to the world-hyperplan model of 
content. This subsection has two main aims. The first is to clarify the 
commitments of the world-hyperplan model and to forestall possible worries 
that are based on a misunderstanding of the view’s commitments. The second 
is to highlight the explanatory burdens left undischarged by the world-
hyperplan model. This discussion will therefore provide criteria of adequacy 




The first objection to the model concerns the role of truth. It might be thought 
that an essential component of the possible worlds model is the idea of a 
proposition holding or being true at a world. However, one might worry that 
whereas we have a clear idea of how something could be true at a world, we 
lack any such conception of a proposition holding or being true at a world-
hyperplan pair. For example, if we interpret ‘truth’ as some kind of 
correspondence relation between a proposition and a world, then if normative 
content is nonfactual there would be nothing for the h parameter to correspond 
to. Consequently, the notion of a proposition being true at a world-hyperplan 
pair fails to get a grip. 
The immediate response to this objection is that it misidentifies the role that 
holding or being true at a world-hyperplan pair plays within the model. As 
Stalnaker notes in relation to the standard possible worlds model, “[t]he role 
of the values true and false is simply to distinguish the possible worlds that are 
members of the selected subset from those that are not.” (1987: 2) The point 
here is that from the perspective of the model itself, a proposition being true at 
 
5 More work would need to be done here to connect standards with the intuitive 
characterisation of normative attitudes given above. This is because standards are less 
obviously connected to action than planning and To-Do Lists. Ridge achieves this by 
appealing to standards of practical reasoning – see Chapter 2. 
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a world simply consists in that world being a member of that proposition. 
Similarly, on the world-hyperplan model, a proposition being true at a world-
hyperplan pair consists simply in that pair being a member of that proposition. 
Thus, like other logical and propositional notions, truth at a world or a world-
hyperplan is defined set-theoretically: p is true at <w, h> just in case <w, h> is a 
member of p. As such, the possible worlds model does not presuppose a 
correspondence theory of truth, or any other theory of truth. The minimal role 
assigned to truth and falsity can apply just as much to sets of world-hyperplan 
pairs as to sets of possible worlds. (Note also that being true at a world or <w, 
h> pair is a technical notion and does not necessarily correspond to our 
ordinary conception of ‘truth’, whatever that is.) 
 
Unjustifiably ad hoc? 
 
A second objection grants that although there is no in principle reason that a 
nonfactual parameter cannot be added to our model of belief content, such an 
extension is unjustifiably ad hoc. It cannot be that we are justified in adding a 
nonfactual parameter simply because it helps expressivists. What we need, 
rather, is independent motivation for positing this parameter to model 
normative belief. I think this is a fair worry to raise, but that a number of things 
can be said in response. The first is simply that modelling normative belief 
content in terms of (centred) worlds alone is an instance of the representational 
picture of normative thought. Insofar as expressivists have good reasons for 
rejecting this picture, they have good reasons for rejecting this model of 
normative belief content. Relatedly, insofar as expressivists have good reasons 
for thinking that the kind of discriminations we make in normative judgments 
are in some sense practical, then given discrimination relativity, they have 
good reasons for positing something like a hyperplan parameter. So general 
arguments for expressivism should provide some justification for the added 
complexity. In the next chapter, I will explore in more detail exactly how 
standard arguments for expressivism might be employed to justify the world-
hyperplan model of content.  
Quite independently of expressivism, however, another reason to add 
complexity comes from an argument due to Alex Silk (2013). Silk points out 
that it is plausible that some normative propositions are necessarily true. For 
example, it is plausible that it is necessarily true [that torturing the innocent for 
fun is bad]. If this proposition is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible 
worlds. Therefore, the possible worlds model of content would characterise 
this proposition as the set of all possible worlds W. From this, it apparently 
follows that understanding the proposition [that torturing the innocent for fun 
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is bad] consists in being able to distinguish W from the empty set. Moreover, it 
apparently follows that this proposition is identical to any other necessarily 
true proposition. But both claims are implausible. We have already 
encountered the problem of distinguishing between necessarily equivalent 
propositions above, and this is just an instance of the more general problem. 
Note, however, that the metalinguistic response seems far less plausible here. 
A more ready response is to introduce an additional parameter to model 
normative content that is not world-characterising. Understanding a 
normative claim can then be taken to involve distinguishing (say) which 
hyperplans are ruled in and ruled out by some normative belief. A necessarily 
true normative proposition might then be true relative to all possible worlds 
but not to all hyperplans. This shows that quite independently of 
considerations in favour of expressivism, there is reason to introduce further 
complexity into the model. 
 
The disjunction problem 
 
The third objection is known as the disjunction problem. I here follow the 
presentation of the problem given by Schroeder (2015: 12ff), but it is also raised 
by Charlow (2015: 10ff) and Starr (2016: 373f). Earlier, I contrasted accepting 
factual contents as ruling out possible ways the world might be with accepting 
normative contents as ruling out what to do, think, or feel. A natural thought 
might then be that an agent’s total belief state supervenes on her total factual 
belief state and her total normative belief state. This could then be represented 
as the pair <W, H> where W is the set of worlds and H is the set of hyperplans 
left open by her total belief state. For any arbitrary proposition [p], an agent 
believes [p] just in case <W, H> is a subset of [p].  
The problem with this view, however, it that it fails to characterise mixed 
disjunctive beliefs where the subject does not believe either disjunct. Thus, 
where [p] is a factual proposition and [q] is a normative proposition, it follows 
from the definition of disjunction given above that a subject believes [p or q] 
just in case <W, H> is a subset of the union of [p] and [q]. Suppose, however, 
that a subject believes [p or q] but does not believe [p] and does not believe [q]. 
The problem with current view is that there is no region of <W, H> that 
represents this belief. Because worlds and plans are independent parameters, 
the union of [p] and [q] will always be a subset of either [p] or [q]. As such, the 
model will always characterise a subject’s belief [p or q] as believing at least 
one disjunct.  
The correct response to the disjunction problem is to point out that the 
world-hyperplan model, as defined above, does not model an agent’s total 
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belief state as the total set of worlds and hyperplans <W, H> compatible with 
her beliefs. Rather, according to the world-hyperplan model, an agent’s total 
belief state is the total set of world-hyperplan pairs compatible with her beliefs. 
Because this provides us with a more fine-grained notion of belief content, it 
allows us to adequately characterise mixed disjunctions. This is because by 
representing points in logical space as <w, h> pairs, accepting a mixed 
disjunction involves ruling out certain combinations of <w, h> pairs without 
ruling out any w or any h. And if accepting a proposition does not rule out any 
w or any h, then accepting that proposition does not entail accepting any purely 
normative or descriptive belief.  
Although this provides a technical fix to the problem, it raises a question of 
its own. For any formal distinction in our theory of belief content, we need a 
psychological distinction that the formal distinction models. However, 
Schroeder is sceptical that the world-hyperplan model can be grounded in a 
satisfactory philosophy of mind. For although individuating a subject’s belief 
states in terms of some <W, H> pair faces the disjunction problem, we 
nonetheless have a clear grip on the functional roles of the factual and 
normative beliefs that are meant to ground this assignment. By contrast, the 
world-hyperplan model “needs to give a richer and more powerful 
characterization of the functional role of belief, which can distinguish between 
arbitrary sets of world-norm pairs, and not just by their projections onto the 
world or norm axes.” (Schroeder 2015a: 21) And Schroeder is sceptical that any 
such characterization will be forthcoming. I agree with Schroeder that this is 
precisely the question that the proponent of the world-hyperplan model needs 
to answer. But I am less sceptical about the prospects for providing a 
satisfactory answer. In the next chapter, I propose a theory of belief that aims 





The fourth and final objection concerns whether the world-hyperplan model is 
entitled to the notion of inconsistency defined above. To present this problem, 
I will first explain Gibbard’s own interpretation of the world-hyperplan model 
and how it faces a problem explaining inconsistency. I will then go on to 
explain how the interpretation being offered in this chapter differs from 
Gibbard’s and why it provides a more attractive alternative. 
How should we interpret the world-hyperplan model? Gibbard provides a 
psychologistic interpretation of the model according to which sets of <w, h> 
pairs are nothing other than a useful heuristic to represent properties of mental 
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states. Specifically, he argues that sets of <w, h> pairs represent properties of 
hyperplanners, ideal agents who are fully opinionated with respect to what to 
do and how things are. On this view, invoking an abstract space of worlds and 
hyperplans is fruitful only insofar as it is isomorphic with properties of 
hyperplanners. Ultimately for Gibbard, world-hyperplan contents can be 
dispensed with in an explanatory account of belief. However, this aspect of his 
view raises some problems. 
One such problem is whether Gibbard’s view can provide a satisfactory 
explanation of inconsistency in belief. If belief contents are merely a useful 
heuristic that can be dispensed with in explanatory account of belief, then we 
cannot appeal to the fact that two beliefs have inconsistent contents to explain 
why those beliefs are inconsistent. Rather, the definition of inconsistency must 
be explained in terms of the more basic properties of mental states. To explain 
this difference, Schroeder (2008: 48) distinguishes between A-type and B-type 
inconsistency, where A-type inconsistency involves a single “inconsistency-
transmitting” attitude towards inconsistent content, and B-type inconsistency 
involves distinct and “logically unrelated” attitude types toward the same 
content. (Baker and Woods [2015] point out that B-type inconsistency is better 
defined as inconsistency in attitude that is not A-type, because Schroeder’s 
definitions are not exhaustive.) Schroeder then argues that whereas A-type 
inconsistency is well understood and theoretically respectable, B-type 
inconsistency is not theoretically respectable “because there are no good 
examples of it.” (2008: 48) Given that Gibbard’s explanation of inconsistency 
appeals to the basic inconsistency-properties of our beliefs, he is therefore 
helping himself to a B-type notion of inconsistency that stands in need of 
explanation. 
One might worry that Schroeder’s claim that there are no good examples of 
B-type inconsistency is too strong. Baker and Woods (2015) argue that there are 
a number of theoretically respectable examples of B-type inconsistency that are 
relatively well understood. For example, consider comparative preferences. 
Comparative preferences are not incompatible in virtue of having inconsistent 
contents; after all, the content of any comparative preference is a pair of 
inconsistent propositions. Credal states provide another example. Again, 
inconsistent credal states are not inconsistent simply in virtue of their contents, 
but partly in virtue of the specific credence one places in those contents. A 
further example is the inconsistency that holds between intentions and beliefs, 
for example if I intend [p] and intend [q] but believe [that p only if not-q]. 
Holding these attitudes seems to be a clear case of inconsistency, but it cannot 
be A-type inconsistency for the reason that it involves distinct attitude types. 
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Second, and relatedly, A-type inconsistency, even if it is familiar, stands in 
need of some explanation. On this score, Gibbard (2012: appendix 2) argues that 
his view is no worse off than rivals that appeal to A-type inconsistency. 
Whereas Gibbard helps himself to unexplained notions of disagreement and 
conceptual entailment between mental states, rival approaches help 
themselves to something like conceptual consistency of content, which explains 
inconsistency for A-type attitudes such as factual belief. Gibbard argues that 
this notion is unexplained because conceptual consistency cannot be reduced 
to alethic or metaphysical possibility. For example, although it is not possible 
both that I am drinking water and I am not drinking H2O, it is not conceptually 
inconsistent to believe that both are true. So Gibbard argues that the 
explanatory burdens of his view and his opponent’s are more or less parallel, 
as each approach starts off helping itself to something unexplained. 
So I think it is too quick to dismiss Gibbard’s explanation of inconsistency 
simply on the grounds that B-type inconsistency is not as theoretically 
respectable as A-type inconsistency. Even so, I think that there are other good 
reasons for rejecting a B-type explanation of inconsistent normative beliefs. 
First, B-type explanations eschew explaining inconsistency in terms of 
believing inconsistent contents. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, there are 
good reasons in general to think that propositions should play an explanatory 
role in one’s theory of attitudes, and so we should expect propositions to play 
a role in explaining inconsistency. Second, while there are a number of 
different ways in which an agent can be rationally incoherent, when an agent 
holds inconsistent normative beliefs, we take her to be (in some sense) logically 
inconsistent. And A-type explanations in particular seem well placed to 
explain this kind of rational incoherence (we’ll examine this issue further in the 
next section). Third, as Yalcin (2012; 2018a) argues, there is no reason why we 
cannot accept the world-hyperplan model while rejecting Gibbard’s 
psychologistic interpretation. Just as the standard possible worlds model 
assigns abstracta as the contents of beliefs without interpreting these abstracta 
as being properties of mental states, we can interpret the world-hyperplan 
model as assigning abstracta as the contents of beliefs without interpreting 
these abstracta as being properties of mental states. Rather, we are interpreting 
these abstracta respectively as being possible ways the world might be and 
possible ways of acting (broadly construed). 
This last point shows that despite my use of Gibbard’s formal apparatus, the 
view being offered is somewhat different to his overall picture, or at least how 
he presents it. But it also raises a question. If the world-hyperplan model 
assigns abstract contents to normative beliefs, in virtue of what is this 
assignment correct? Following Yalcin (2018a), I call this the foundational 
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question. The expressivist who accepts this view of normative belief content 
needs an answer to this question compatible with expressivism. However, the 
foundational question is a familiar question that any theory of content needs 
to answer, and there are a number of competing answers within the philosophy 
of mind already available. In this way, I think that conceiving normative beliefs 
as A-type attitudes is theoretically more conservative than Gibbard’s approach 
(see Yalcin 2018a for discussion). In this chapter and the next, I examine two 
existing frameworks for answering the foundational question and show how 
expressivists might utilise them. By contrast, Gibbard attempts to build a 
foundational philosophy of mind from the ground up in order to meet the 
needs of his expressivism. It would be beyond the scope of this discussion to 
provide a complete assessment of Gibbard’s (2012) foundational picture, and 
nothing I have said here rules out such an approach. However, in showing that 
the expressivist can utilise the world-hyperplan model while adopting a more 
conventional approach to explaining mental content, I hope to show that such 
a radical departure is under-motivated.  
 
4.3 The foundational question 
 
To repeat, the foundational question is this: In virtue of what is an agent’s state 
of belief well modelled by a given set of world-hyperplan pairs? This question 
applies to any given model of belief content, and this is no less true in the 
present case. So the world-hyperplan model is incomplete as a full account of 
normative belief. We can answer the foundational question by providing what 
I will call a foundational theory of belief. This is a theory that explains the more 
fundamental facts about the nature of belief and propositional attitudes more 
generally that ground the facts about what attitudes have what contents. 
Notice that the foundational question as it is posed here is just a more specific 
instance of the more general question that motivated the unity requirement in 
Chapter 2. Namely, in virtue of what do our attitudes have the content that 
they have? 
In what follows, we will therefore need to consider whether the answers on 
offer adequately respect the unity requirement. After rejecting Yalcin’s answer 
to the foundational question in the next section, I will go on to provide my own 
answer in the next chapter that both respects the unity requirement and 
answers the objections that were left unresolved in the previous section. First, 
however, I want to argue that although any theory of content needs to answer 
the foundational question, answering this question is more pressing for 
expressivists. This is because expressivists face a particular challenge 
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explaining (a) inconsistency in belief and (b) why normative beliefs are 
nonfactual.  
 
4.3.1 The negation problem (again) 
 
The first problem relates to how the expressivist explains inconsistent 
normative attitudes on the current picture. Among other things, a theory of 
normative belief should explain when and why two normative beliefs are 
inconsistent. To recap our discussion of this problem in Chapter 1, consider the 
following belief states: 
 
(1) Believing that one should help the meek. 
(2) Believing that one should not help the meek. 
(3) Believing that it is not the case that one should help the meek. 
 
Certain relations hold between the mental states described in (1)-(3). For 
example, (1) is inconsistent with (2) and (3). (2) commits one to (3) but not vice 
versa. Traditional versions of expressivism have trouble explaining these facts. 
This, we saw in Chapter 1, is known as the negation problem (Unwin 2001; 
Schroeder 2008). Suppose that ‘should’ expresses the attitude of requiring. We 
can then say that (1) and (2) consist in the following: 
 
(1*) Requiring that one helps the meek. 
(2*) Requiring that one does not help the meek. 
 
What about (3)? First, note that (3) must be distinct from: 
 
(4) Not believing that one should help the meek. 
 
Which would consist in: 
 
(4*) Not requiring that one helps the meek. 
 
This is because (3) consists in a settled view on the permissibility of not helping 
the meek, whereas (4) consists in lacking the mental state described by (1). 
Thus, (4) could be true while (3) false in cases where one has not considered 
the question, has no view of the matter, or suspends judgment. A natural 
response to this problem would be to say that (3) consists in: 
 




Intuitively, this suggestion seems plausible. However, note that we have 
postulated a distinct attitude type to account for (3). This looks problematic 
because we have simply postulated an attitude type with the relevant 
properties required to capture the relations that hold between (3) and other 
attitudes, whereas our theory was meant to explain these relations. Now, given 
the discussion in the previous section of A- and B-type inconsistency, perhaps 
some more concrete account of this attitude might be forthcoming. However, 
in lieu of such an account, we seem to lack an explanation of inconsistency for 
normative attitudes. Hence, the negation problem. 
Initially, it might seem as if the world-hyperplan model is in a good position 
to explain inconsistency and solve the negation problem. This is because 
normative attitudes can be explained as inconsistent in virtue of having 
inconsistent contents. Given that the definition of inconsistency in content 
given above applies equally to sets of world-hyperplan pairs as it does to sets 
of possible worlds, it might seem that the explanation of inconsistency is just 
as good as the standard explanation of inconsistent factual beliefs. However, 
while the world-hyperplan model mirrors the form of A-type inconsistency as 
it applies to factual belief, we haven’t yet been given any explanation of why 
accepting inconsistent world-hyperplan contents engenders attitudinal 
inconsistency. This is because we have yet to be given a story about why it is 
wrong to accept a normative proposition and its negation (compare Starr 2016: 
368f; Willer 2017: 197ff).  
Compare this with the representational picture of belief. For our prosaically 
factual beliefs, the standard view is that accepting a proposition and its 
negation is inconsistent in virtue of the representational properties of belief. 
Factual beliefs represent the world as being some way or other. Because there 
is no way the world can be such that some factual proposition and its negation 
are both true, it is inconsistent to accept both claims for the reason that one’s 
beliefs will necessarily fail to fulfil their representational function. Exactly how 
one fleshes out these claims about factual belief will vary depending on one’s 
preferred view of the nature of belief and mental representation, a topic we 
will return to. But the basic picture seems clear enough: A-type inconsistency 
for ordinary belief is not left unexplained (pace Gibbard). Rather, the 
representational account seems to provide a straightforward and attractive 
explanation of inconsistency. But it is one unavailable to the expressivist to 
explain normative belief. 
So although adopting the world-hyperplan model allows expressivists to 
retain the formal definition of propositional inconsistency, they cannot retain 
the standard explanation of inconsistency in belief. They need some other 
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explanation. So without answering the foundational question, the world-
hyperplan model leaves inconsistency in normative attitudes unexplained. In 
this respect, the model itself does little to improve on the more traditional 
expressivist notion of primitive inconsistency in attitude. Moreover, given the 
unity requirement, we should expect the explanation of inconsistency to be 
fully general across factual and normative beliefs. This means that 
fundamentally, inconsistency in factual beliefs will also need to be cashed out 
in nonrepresentational terms. (‘Fundamentally’ is important here because the 
expressivist does not need to deny that inconsistent factual beliefs are 
representationally inconsistent; it will just be that such inconsistency is a 
species of a more general genus.)  
 
4.3.2 The neutrality of the world-hyperplan model  
 
Another reason why the foundational question poses a particular challenge for 
expressivism is that although the world-hyperplan model of content is 
designed for a nonfactualist theory of normative thought and discourse, it is in 
fact compatible with factualism about normative thought and discourse as 
well. The formalism itself does not entail the truth or falsity of factualism or 
nonfactualism about normative belief. For example, a normative realist could 
maintain that the w parameter of a world-hyperplan proposition picks out the 
non-normative core of possible worlds and the h parameter picks out the 
prescriptions mandated by what reasons objectively exist (Sinnott-Armstrong 
1993: 300f; Kalderon 2007: 73).  
Similarly, a number of relativist theories also appeal to a distinct normative 
parameter to model normative content without thereby accepting expressivism 
about normative thought and discourse (e.g. MacFarlane 2014). Here, the 
normative parameter is taken to be the normative standards that a speaker or 
community implicitly accept, but the normative beliefs are themselves taken to 
be representational in the same way that a prosaically factual belief is. It is just 
that the relevant states of affairs are represented relative to a certain 
perspective. In short, the truth of the world-hyperplan model does not entail 
expressivism. Whether the world-hyperplan model supports nonfactualism 
depends on how we answer the foundational question (Stalnaker 2012: 201f 
makes a similar point). So the expressivist’s answer to the foundational 
question must explain why accepting a world-hyperplan proposition does not 





4.4 Yalcin’s plan expressivism 
 
In this section, I examine an answer to the foundational question provided by 
Yalcin (2018a). Yalcin follows Gibbard in construing belief contents as sets of 
world-hyperplan pairs. Like Gibbard, he also takes it that such contents model 
plan-laden belief states, understood as states of mind that involve a view of 
what to do as well as a view of how things are. To answer the foundational 
question and ground the world-hyperplan model within a foundational 
philosophy of mind, Yalcin appeals to Lewis’ analytic or common-sense 
functionalism (see in particular Lewis 1986, 1999 and Stalnaker 2004 for 
discussion).  
According to Lewis, propositional attitudes are constitutively rational 
mental states that cause an agent’s behaviour. He argues that folk psychology 
provides an implicit theory of the functional roles of mental states, which 
implicitly defines mental states according to certain principles of rationality. 
He then argues that there are physical states (e.g. neural states) that 
approximately realise the constitutively rational causal roles specified by the 
theory. Folk psychological states can thus be reduced to physical states via a 
Ramsey sentence that corresponds to our folk theory. Given this picture, the 
foundational question about our mental states in general can be answered as 
follows: “The intentional mental states of an agent have the content that they 
have in virtue of the fact that the behaviour of the agent can be explained as 
rational behaviour on the hypothesis that the agent's mental states have that 
content.” (Stalnaker 2004: 205)  
To see how this foundational theory of mind grounds a particular model of 
content, we first need to understand the rational principles that constitutively 
govern our attitudes. Focusing first on the centred worlds model, Yalcin 
(2018a: 25) proposes that this correctly models agents’ belief states in virtue of 
the following rational principle that constitutively governs belief, desire, and 
action: 
 
(P1) If agent A is in a belief state with the centered content B and in a desire 
state with centred content D, then A is disposed to act in ways that 
would tend to bring it about that he is located within D, were it the case 
that he occupied a centered world within B.  
 
Although this is perhaps the most prominent principle of folk psychology, it is 
not exhaustive of the principles governing content determination. Yalcin also 
notes that for Lewis, an agent’s belief state is not simply that which is most apt 
to produce behaviour compatible with (P1). Lewis also suggests an eligibility 
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constraint, which rules out deviant interpretations that are intuitively incorrect 
but give the right predictions, of the kind given by Putnam’s (1981) model-
theoretic argument against determinate reference. Very roughly, the constraint 
is that reality has a structure, and our beliefs are sensitive to that structure (in 
contrast to a “gruesome” or gerrymandered structure). While Yalcin is right to 
include this principle in addition to (P1), both are in fact part of the more 
general principle that folk psychology “is the constitutive theory not just of 
instrumental rationality but of rationality generally.” (Lewis 1986: 39) So all 
such principles applied in determining an agent’s beliefs are principles of 
rationality, and there are many principles of rationality other than (P1) and the 
eligibility constraint (see Lewis 1999: 320). 
In the next chapter, I will examine further the idea that folk psychology is 
the constitutive theory of rationality generally. For now, however, we can ask 
how the world-hyperplan model might fit into Lewis’ foundational philosophy 
of mind. To this end, Yalcin (2018a: 26) postulates the following 
interconnections between normative attitudes and other attitudes in addition 
to (P1): 
 
(P2) Agents are disposed to act in ways which would conform with their 
plans, in centred worlds with respect to which their (purely factual) 
belief content is true.  
(P3) Where agents’ plans leave several options open, agents tend to elect 
those options which would serve best to satisfy their preferences. 
(P4) Where agents find themselves in unplanned for situations, we appeal 
only to belief and desire.  
 
Although Yalcin puts forward these suggestions as initial approximations, it 
seems plausible that these sort of principles would determine something like 
the world-hyperplan model as the correct model of agents with planning 
attitudes. Moreover, it also seems plausible that the kind of planning attitude 
implicitly defined by (P2)-(P4) is suitably nonfactual and close to how 
expressivists understand normative thought. So Yalcin’s answer to the 
foundational question looks initially promising. 
However, I think that Yalcin’s proposal should be rejected for two reasons. 
The first reason is that Yalcin’s account fails to adequately explain 
inconsistency in normative belief. It seems plausible that it is rationally 
incoherent in some way to accept incompatible plans. We adopt plans in order 
to achieve our ends, and in adopting incompatible plans, we are likely to 
thwart our ends. However, as I argued in the previous section, when we accept 
inconsistent normative propositions, we are rationally incoherent in a 
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particular way. Specifically, we are logically inconsistent. Moreover, we seem 
to be logically inconsistent in exactly the same way as when we accept 
inconsistent factual claims. However, it is unclear how Yalcin’s account is 
meant to explain how accepting inconsistent normative propositions 
engenders logical inconsistency. Moreover, it is unclear how it is meant to 
explain this in a way that respects the unity requirement. This is because the 
fundamental explanation of what makes normative beliefs inconsistent seems 
to be different to the fundamental explanation of what makes factual beliefs 
inconsistent. More generally, despite having the form of an A-type explanation 
of inconsistency, it is unclear whether Yalcin’s theory is really any better than 
Gibbard’s in relation to explaining inconsistency, as Yalcin’s theory also helps 
itself to an unexplained notion of inconsistency in attitude. 
The second reason that Yalcin’s account should be rejected is that it faces the 
disjunction problem. Although Yalcin’s official line is that propositions are 
world-hyperplan pairs, his foundational theory of belief actually supports a 
different view. Specifically, it supports the view discussed by Schroeder that 
an agent’s total belief state is characterised by the pair <W, H> of worlds and 
hyperplans compatible with her belief state. This is because the constitutive 
principles (P1)-(P4) do not individuate a functional role that distinguishes 
between arbitrary sets of <w, h> pairs. Rather, it individuates distinct functional 
roles for factual belief and normative belief. This means that mixed beliefs will 
supervene on combinations of purely factual and purely normative beliefs. But 
as we have seen, this view fails to characterise mixed disjunctions. So Yalcin 





I think that the failure of Yalcin’s proposal ultimately comes down to a failure 
to respect the unity requirement. That the failure to respect the unity 
requirement leads to problems explaining inconsistency is fairly clear. But 
arguably the same failure leads to the disjunction problem. After all, the 
disjunction problem arises because we lack a suitably general attitude that can 
distinguish between arbitrary sets of world-hyperplan pairs. If this is correct, 
then what expressivists need to answer the foundational question is a unified 
foundational theory of propositional attitudes that fundamentally 
characterises factual and normative beliefs as one and the same kind of 
attitude. (Again, ‘fundamentally’ is important here because the expressivist 
will still want to say that there is a distinction in kind between normative and 
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factual beliefs; it is the fundamental characterisation of these attitudes that 
must be the same.)  
I propose that the best way for expressivists to provide an answer to the 
foundational question that respects the unity requirement is to provide a fully 
general account of belief that applies equally to factual and normative beliefs. 
This account should explain a number of things. First, it should explain why 
belief as a general attitude is not essentially representational — if belief as a 
general attitude were essentially representational, then there would be no 
room for an expressivist account of normative belief. Second, it should explain 
why some beliefs are representational, even if belief as such is not 
representational. This is because expressivists want to maintain a distinction 
between normative and descriptive beliefs. Third, it should adequately ground 
the world-hyperplan model of content — according to which points in logical 
space are <w, h> pairs and not individual w and h coordinates — in order to 
avoid the disjunction problem. Although contemporary expressivists generally 
accept that normative statements express normative beliefs, this is typically 
maintained in a minimal or deflationary sense. By contrast, I am proposing that 
expressivists should develop an explanatory but nonrepresentational theory of 
belief and propositional attitudes more generally in which to situate their 
theory of normative thought and discourse. In the next chapter, I provide such 
a theory.6 
Before proceeding, it might be worth forestalling a possible objection. I claim 
that expressivists need a general theory of belief in which to situate normative 
judgment. However, isn’t expressivism by definition the denial that normative 
judgments are non-deflationary beliefs? Isn’t belief eo ipso representational? 
My answer is twofold. First, there already exist accounts of belief that are 
nonrepresentational in the relevant sense, so simply assuming otherwise seems 
to beg the question (e.g. pragmatist, deflationary, and perhaps certain varieties 
of inferentialist and functionalist theories). Second, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the sense of ‘representational’ in question is ultimately a theoretical notion. So 
the expressivist can grant that it might be a conceptual truth that belief is 
‘representational’ in some platitudinous sense. However, if this is a platitude 
then it must be respected as such and cannot presuppose a metaphysically 
robust interpretation (see Divers and Miller 1995). Moreover, there are a 
 
6 One might wonder whether Horgan and Timmons’ (2006) ‘cognitivist expressivist’ theory 
provides such an account of normative belief. I’m not sure it does. Although Horgan and 
Timmons make a good case defending the claim that normative judgments are beliefs, they 
do not have a general theory of belief that explains why normative judgments are beliefs. 
Another example might be Schroeder’s (2013) account of belief as states of being for. I 
examine this suggestion in the Chapter 6. 
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number of distinctions that expressivists can appeal to here. For example, one 
might distinguish between two senses of ‘world’ — the world as everything 
that is the case, and the world as an ontologically robust environment. While 
all beliefs represent the world in the former sense, the expressivist might claim, 
only some beliefs represent the world in the latter sense (compare Price’s [2013] 










This chapter motivates and develops an expressivist theory of normative belief. 
By combining an interpretationist account of propositional attitudes with the 
world-hyperplan model of belief content examined in the previous chapter, I 
argue that expressivists can and should maintain that our ordinary normative 
commitments are beliefs not merely in a deflationary sense but in a 
theoretically robust sense. The plan is as follows. First, I situate the proposal 
that expressivists should develop a general theory of belief within a broader 
dialectic (section 5.1). Second, I introduce the interpretationist framework and 
make the case for an expressivist theory of normative belief within this 
framework (section 5.2). I call the resulting view ‘interpretative expressivism’. 
Third, I argue that interpretative expressivism has a number of benefits over 
rival versions of expressivism (section 5.3). Before concluding, I consider and 
respond to an objection concerning the normativity of attitude attributions and 




In the previous chapter, I examined the modal conception of content, the idea 
that content should be explained in terms of possibilities. I argued that this 
provided a suitably unified framework in which to develop a nonfactual notion 
of normative propositional content. In particular, I suggested that expressivists 
would do well to adopt the world-hyperplan model of content. However, I 
argued that any such approach needs to be grounded in a foundational theory 
of mind compatible with expressivism. And I argued that this should take the 
form of a fully general theory of belief according to which normative beliefs 
are nonrepresentational. This chapter aims to provide such a theory, therefore 
completing the account of normative content articulated in the previous 
chapter. However, before proceeding, it might first be helpful to take stock and 
situate the account proposed in this chapter within a wider dialectical context.  
In a nutshell, expressivism is the view that normative statements express 
nonrepresentational, nondescriptive, or nonfactual states of mind. Early 
versions of expressivism took this to mean that normative statements express 
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emotions or desires (Ayer 1936; Stevenson 1937). More contemporary versions 
maintain that normative statements express sui generis normative attitudes 
with a distinctive nonrepresentational functional profile (Gibbard 1990, 2003; 
Blackburn 1998). Other versions claim that they express complex attitudes such 
as a belief-desire pair (Ridge 2014). Although contemporary expressivists claim 
that normative attitudes can be beliefs in a minimal sense, what unites these 
views is the claim that, fundamentally, normative attitudes have a different 
psychological profile to prosaically factual beliefs.  
Notoriously, expressivists have a hard time explaining what attitudes are 
expressed by logically complex statements with normative elements (the 
literature is vast  — see Woods [2017] for an up-to-date overview). While it 
might seem intuitive that “stealing is wrong” expresses something like 
disapproval of stealing, it’s less clear what attitude might be expressed by 
“stealing is wrong or it doesn’t cause pain”. After all, one can seemingly accept 
this statement without disapproving anything. Contrast this with a complex 
descriptive statement like “stealing is not enjoyable or it doesn’t cause pain”. 
Here, the statement expresses a prosaically factual belief, the complexity of 
which is explained in terms of its content. That is, it expresses the belief in the 
proposition [that stealing is not enjoyable or it doesn’t cause pain].  
The driving idea of this thesis has been that expressivists would do well to 
mirror the descriptivist explanation in the normative case by providing a 
theory of normative propositions that can play the role of belief contents. The 
expressivist could then explain the attitude expressed by a complex statement 
with normative elements in terms of the content of the belief it expresses. In 
the previous chapter, I examined a view according to which normative belief 
contents are modelled in terms of the sets of nonfactual possibilities ruled out 
by one’s normative beliefs. Such a view, pioneered by Allan Gibbard (1990, 
2003), has recently been enjoying a resurgence (Yalcin 2012, 2018a; Silk 2013, 
2015; Charlow 2014; Pérez Carballo and Santorio 2016). Further, we saw that it 
has also been employed to develop expressivist views in a number of other 
domains, such as epistemic modality (Yalcin 2007, 2011; see also Field 2009, 
2018), mathematical thought (Pérez Carballo 2016), and know-how (Santorio 
2016). Given that expressivists about normative thought are typically 
sympathetic to expressivist treatments of other domains, this approach to 
modelling nonfactual content should therefore be attractive for expressivists.  
However, recent proponents of this approach have generally said little 
about the constitutive question of what it is for a thought to have nonfactual 
content. This has led to some scepticism about how much is achieved by 
characterising normative thought and discourse in terms of sets of nonfactual 
contents (e.g. Schroeder 2015; Starr 2016; Willer 2017). More generally, 
 
 117 
expressivists who appeal to nonfactual contents need to explain the role these 
contents play within an independently plausible and satisfactory philosophy 
of mind. Those who have addressed the constitutive question have typically 
tried to find a suitable noncognitive attitude that has the structure ascribed to 
it by their formal models. For example, Silk (2015) proposes that normative 
contents model properties of weak preference, of the kind studied by decision 
theory. Yalcin (2018a) proposes they model properties of planning states, a kind 
of sui generis state defined in terms of its unique functional role (see Bratman 
1987; Gibbard 2003).  
It seems to me, however, that expressivists should take a more radical 
approach. With the introduction of normative content, it is open to 
expressivists to answer the constitutive question in terms of what it is to believe 
some normative content. While most contemporary expressivists claim that 
normative statements express normative beliefs in a minimal or deflationary 
sense, they deny that this provides any informative answer to the constitutive 
question. By contrast, I am proposing that expressivists should claim that 
normative statements express normative beliefs in a theoretically robust sense, 
where this is explicated by an independently plausible theory of propositional 
attitudes. I will argue that given the role that certain theories of propositional 
attitudes ascribe to belief contents, a suitably nonfactualist theory of belief can 
be achieved by incorporating nonfactual contents into the theory. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first, 
I explore how expressivism can combine with an interpretationist theory of 
propositional attitudes to deliver a theory of belief that is suitably 
nonfactualist.1 ‘Interpretationism’ covers a fairly diverse family of theories 
(most prominently Davidson 1980; Lewis 1984; Dennett 1987a; see Child 1996 
for an overview). Here, I will adopt something close to Dennett’s intentional 
stance strategy. There are two parts to this strategy. The first part is to highlight 
the role that propositional attitudes play in the explanation and prediction of 
action or behaviour, broadly construed. The second is to argue that our 
understanding of propositional attitudes is exhausted by this role. Very 
roughly, for an agent A to believe [p] just is for A to be disposed to act as if A 
 
1 Blackburn (1998) also adopts a broadly interpretationist strategy in developing his 
expressivism; however, he accepts a representationalist construal of belief within this 
theory, answering the constitutive question in terms of the noncognitive attitude of valuing. 
Gibbard (1990) provides some intimation towards an interpretationist view of belief, 
though provides no elaboration and in later work seems to take a somewhat different view. 
Ridge (2018) argues that expressivists can adopt an interpretationist construal of normative 
certitude in terms of counterfactual betting behavior; in certain respects, the view 
developed in this chapter can be seen as extending this approach to normative 
propositional attitudes in general. 
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believes [p] according to the best theory of interpretation, where this theory 
specifies the conditions under which it is correct to ascribe attitudes to an 
individual in order to predict and make intelligible her behaviour. In this 
context, the expressivist’s task is to explain why the best theory of 
interpretation for agents with normative attitudes should appeal to nonfactual 
contents. I argue that standard arguments for expressivism can be utilised for 
this purpose. 
With the interpretationist cum expressivist theory of normative belief 
explained, I then outline the benefits of accepting such a view over versions of 
expressivism that explain descriptive and normative judgments as being 
fundamentally different kinds of attitude. I argue for four claims. First, 
interpretative expressivism has the virtue of theoretical parsimony, in that it 
postulates the existence of one rather than two (or more) kinds of attitudes. 
Second, it coheres well with an independently plausible theory of 
propositional attitudes. Third, it is well placed to explain mixed disjunctions 
and mixed attitudes more generally. Fourth, it is well placed to explain 
normative inconsistency. So not only does this theory of normative belief 
provide a distinct and novel way of implementing the expressivist programme, 
if my arguments are correct it also improves upon existing versions of 
expressivism.  
The resulting view not only constitutes an improvement in the prospects for 
expressivism. It also challenges a widely assumptions about the nature of 
belief. First, it challenges the assumption that beliefs by their nature have a 
distinctive mind-to-world direction of fit. This follows from the thesis that 
normative beliefs are nonrepresentational. Second, it challenges the 
assumption that beliefs by their nature are motivationally inert. This follows 
from the thesis that normative beliefs are practical. However, I will argue that 
these assumptions are not built into the interpretationist view of belief and that 
it is thus well placed to make sense of a nondescriptivist conception of belief. 
With the motivation for the view located within a wider dialectical context, I 
will now proceed to explain the view. 
 
5.2 Interpretative expressivism 
 
In this section, I explain how expressivism about normative thought can 
combine with an interpretationist theory of propositional attitudes to provide 
a suitably nonfactualist theory of belief. First, I set out the interpretationist 
framework and show how the modal conception of content finds a natural 
home within this framework. Second, I show how the world-hyperplan model 
 
 119 
can be employed within the interpretationist framework to provide an 
expressivist-friendly theory of belief. 
 
5.2.1 The interpretationist framework 
 
Interpretation is the process of ascribing beliefs, desires, and other 
propositional attitudes to subjects or agents on the basis of what they do and 
say. It is something we do all the time. Suppose Meredith is running across 
Covent Garden. Why is she doing this? Because she wants to see La Traviata and 
believes it’s about to start. She hasn’t picked up her ticket yet, so we can predict 
that she’ll first go to the box office as she knows she won’t get in without a ticket. 
Unfortunately, Meredith has forgotten her glasses and so she hopes that her seat 
isn’t too far back. Upon discovering that she is up near the gods, we can expect 
Meredith to be disappointed. However, music lover that she is, we also expect 
her to overcome her disappointment and tell all her colleagues the day after 
that it was a wonderful performance. The predictions and explanations offered 
by such a narrative are not infallible and require a background of other 
assumptions. But the idea that we ascribe attitudes to others (and ourselves) in 
the service of the explanation and prediction of action should be familiar 
enough. 
Dennett (1971; 1987a) proposes that we make sense of this kind of 
interpretation by distinguishing between three different predictive strategies. 
First, we have the physical stance, which involves predicting behaviour on the 
basis of the physical state of an object together with the laws of nature. Second, 
we have the design stance, which involves predicting behaviour on the basis of 
an object’s function (e.g. artefacts and biological objects). The design stance 
allows us to make predictions without any knowledge of the physical 
underpinnings of the object in question. For example, I do not need to know 
the physical laws governing my alarm clock in order to predict when it will 
ring. Third, we have the intentional stance, which involves ascribing intentional 
attitudes to an object under the assumption that it is a rational agent, and then 
predicting it to behave in ways that are rational given its attitudes. This is the 
stance we took towards Meredith and that we utilise in folk psychology more 
generally. Although less reliable than the other stances, the intentional stance 
allows us to effortlessly understand and predict a vast amount of human 
behaviour, a task of otherwise immense complexity.  
The intentional stance is first and foremost an epistemology of propositional 
attitudes. Dennett’s further metaphysical claim is that for an agent to possess 
propositional attitudes just is for that agent to be “reliably and voluminously” 
predictable using the intentional stance (1987b: 15). Thus, all it is for an agent 
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A to believe [p] is for the best (i.e. most predictive) interpretation of A to assign 
to A the belief [p]. Importantly, however, whether an agent believes [p] is an 
objective matter, as the predictive success of the interpretation is grounded in 
real patterns of behaviour (Dennett 1987b: 25ff; 1991). That said, 
interpretationists like Dennett accept that there is often a certain amount of 
indeterminacy about what an agent believes, though this is seen as reflective 
of the phenomena rather than as a problem for the view. Overall, Dennett’s 
interpretationism can be seen as a kind of dispositional view of belief — for an 
agent to believe some proposition is for that agent to be disposed to behave in 
certain ways under certain conditions (Dennett 1987c: 50). Spelling out exactly 
what ways and under what conditions is the task of intentional systems theory, 
or the theory of interpretation, which aims to make explicit the rules of 
attribution implicit in folk psychological practice. 
An initial gloss on these rules can be given as follows (Dennett 1987b: 17): 
 
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to 
be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent 
ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure 
out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you 
predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its 
beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires 
will in many — but not all — instances yield a decision about what the agent 
ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do.  
 
Thus according to Dennett, the interpretative principles that constitutively 
govern propositional attitudes are rational principles about what agents ought 
to think, want, and do.2 Beliefs and desires are therefore constitutively rational 
in the sense that they are dispositions whose manifestation conditions are 
specified in terms of norms of rationality. Accordingly, we can understand 
what it is for something to be a belief, say, rather than a desire, in terms of the 
respective norms by which it is constitutively governed. 
What exactly are these norms? While Dennett takes the assumption of 
rationality to play a “crucial role” (1987d: 96) in his theory, he claims that the 
relevant concept of rationality is “systematically pre-theoretical” and broad in 
scope (1987d: 98; Davidson 1980: 241 and Lewis 1986: 38f, 1996: 320ff make 
similar claims). Because of this, Dennett resists any attempt to provide a precise 
characterisation of the relevant notion of rationality. Nonetheless, he provides 
a number of general suggestions as to the kind of norms he takes to be 
 




constitutive of rationality. Most centrally, beliefs and desires are governed by 
the principle of instrumental rationality: rational agents will act in ways that 
satisfy their desires in light of their beliefs. Beliefs are also distinctively 
governed by norms of theoretical rationality, such as norms relating belief to 
truth and evidence. Thus, rational agents will have mostly true beliefs about 
those parts of the world they have had exposure to, relative to their perceptual 
capacities and what is relevant to their interests (Dennett 1987b: 19). 
Sophisticated agents will also acquire new beliefs via reasoning, and eliminate 
inconsistencies when brought to light, relative to interests and resource limits 
(ibid: 20; c.f. Harman 1995). What desires a rational agent ought to have will be 
determined in part by the nature of the agent in question. In virtue of the 
biologically evolved nature of human beings, Dennett proposes that we 
attribute to people a stock of basic desires such as “survival, absence of pain, 
food, comfort, procreation, entertainment” and so on (Dennett 1987b: 20; see 
also Anscombe 1957: §36-37; Lewis 1999: 320). Derived desires can be 
attributed on the basis of what the agent believes, such as desiring what an 
agent takes to be a means to an already desired end.  
And so on. Although the precise details are no doubt important and 
interesting in their own right, it will not be necessary to settle these details in 
relation to the more general purpose of this chapter of making the case for an 
expressivist theory of normative belief. Moreover, I freely admit that there is a 
lot of room for debate about these details and the overall viability of 
interpretationism in the philosophy of mind more generally (for discussion of 
some of these issues see Dennett 2009), though I do think that interpretationism 
is an independently attractive view. But the general idea that I want to work 
with in addressing the specific topic of this chapter is that we assign to an agent 
the propositional attitudes that best rationalise that agent’s behaviour in light 
of her nature, capacities, and sensory history. A believes [p] just in case A’s 
dispositional profile is best rationalised by A believing [p], where this is fixed 
by the norms implicit in folk psychology. It is matter of contention precisely 
what these norms are, and indeed if the relevant notion of rationality is 
ultimately codifiable (this notion comes from McDowell [1979] in relation to 
practical rationality, but Child [1996: ch.2] argues that it is central to 
interpretationism more generally). While below I will make substantive claims 
about the distinctive norms that govern normative attitudes, their precise 
formulation and codifiability will not be at issue. Dennett’s interpretationism 
and the expressivist theory of normative belief developed below are 
compatible with a range of answers to these questions. So although at the end 
of the day these details will need to be ironed out, it is not necessary at this 
stage of our inquiry to settle these questions in advance. 
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Although we will return to this in more detail below, we can already begin 
to see why Dennett’s interpretationism is particularly amenable to an 
expressivist theory of normative belief. Interpretationism denies that beliefs 
are intrinsically or fundamentally representational, whatever exactly that might 
amount to. Rather, insofar as an agent represents the world in believing [p], 
she does so implicitly in virtue of her dispositional profile. This opens up the 
possibility that the dispositions involved in believing a normative proposition 
do not involve any implicit representation of one’s environment. Moreover, if 
we have in hand a notion of nonfactual belief content that can adequately 
characterise normative attitudes, then we can put this to work in individuating 
the relevant disposition that constitutes believing a normative proposition. 
This is because interpretationism is a non-reductive theory of intentionality. 
Recall that according to interpretationism, A believes [p] just in case A is best 
interpreted as believing [p]. Here, belief and belief contents figure in the right-
hand side of the analysis, meaning that propositions will play an explanatory 
role in characterising belief. 
In the next subsection, I will argue that the world-hyperplan model can be 
put to work within a Dennettian theory of interpretation to provide an 
expressivist theory of normative belief. However, it’s first worth highlighting 
that the modal conception of content provides the most natural picture of 
content for the kind of interpretationist view being offered here.3 To see why, 
consider again the simplest version of the modal conception: 
 
The possible worlds model of content. The content of a state of belief 
is representable as a set of possible worlds, intuitively the worlds “left 
open” by what is believed. Propositions are sets of possible worlds, and 
the propositions an agent believes are those true with respect to all of 
those worlds the state leaves open.  
 
Something very close to the possible worlds model of content is endorsed by 
Dennett (1987e; other dispositionalist views similar in spirit also endorse this 
model — see Lewis 1986; Stalnaker 1987). There are a number of reasons why 
this model fits well with Dennett’s interpretationism. Most of these reasons 
have already been touched upon in the previous chapter as general attractions 
of the possible worlds model, but it will be worthwhile seeing how these 
general attractions relate to interpretationism in particular.  
First, consider how interpretation is a holistic process in which the 
assignment of any particular belief is always dependent on an agent’s other 
 
3 Of course, this will not be true of other kinds of interpretationist views, such as 
Davidsonian views that give an essential place to language in interpretation.  
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beliefs. This feature of interpretation is nicely captured by the possible worlds 
model in how the model takes an agent’s total belief state to be primary, rather 
than individual beliefs. Second, it is an important part of Dennett’s view that 
we can take the intentional stance towards non-human agents. Because 
possible worlds propositions are unstructured, agents are not required to 
possess language or entertain structured thoughts in order to have beliefs. 
Third, interpretationism typically admits that there is often a certain amount 
of indeterminacy concerning whether an agent in fact believes some 
proposition. In the previous chapter, we saw that the possible worlds model 
captures this in several ways. One way was by positing fragmented belief 
states to agents. Another way was to characterise the domain of possible 
worlds as discrimination relative (Dennett 1987e: 207 explicitly endorses this 
view). Because agents with different discriminatory abilities will divide up 
possibilities in different ways, this can result in indeterminacy when an agent’s 
beliefs cut up reality less finely than the proposition under consideration. 
Plausibly, this will often be the case when attributing beliefs to non-linguistic 
animals. Fourth, and relatedly, Dennett (1987c: 48-9) stresses that we are 
intentional systems in virtue of our evolved nature. Discrimination relativity 
allows us to capture the developmental continuum from differentially 
responding to an environment to possessing the discriminative capacities 
characteristic of complex language use. 
Appreciating the way in which belief content is discrimination relative is 
central to understanding the sense in which beliefs are representational on the 
interpretationist view. When I believe [that Tibbles is on the mat], this 
proposition makes explicit what is represented by my belief state. However, in 
believing this proposition, I represent Tibbles being on the mat implicitly in 
virtue of my sensory and behavioural relation to my environment. Specifically, 
I respond rationally to the sensory information that indicates that there is a 
certain cat on the mat (given my history and other attitudes) and I behave in 
ways that would be rational given my belief about Tibbles (given my other 
attitudes). It is in virtue of these facts that it is rational to attribute to me a 
certain discriminatory ability, namely the ability to divide up a domain of 
possibilities into those in which Tibbles is on the mat and those in which 
Tibbles is not.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, discrimination relativity is significant 
because it allows the expressivist to argue that the particular discriminatory 
ability involved in believing a normative proposition consists in something 
other than an ability to discriminate between alternative factual possibilities. 
By drawing a comparison between normative judgments and plans, I 
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suggested that the discriminatory abilities involved in believing normative 
propositions might ground the following model of content: 
 
The world-hyperplan model of content. The content of a state of belief 
is representable as a set of <w, h> pairs, intuitively the <w, h> pairs “left 
open” by what is believed. Propositions are sets of <w, h> pairs, and the 
propositions an agent believes are those that hold with respect to all of 
those <w, h> pairs the state leaves open.  
 
If the possible worlds model provides the right model of content for Dennett’s 
interpretationism, then we might hope that the world-hyperplan model 
provides the right model of content for an interpretationist cum expressivist 
theory of normative belief. Our task will be to argue that the interpretation of 
agents with normative attitudes involves attributing discriminative abilities 
that are characterised by the world-hyperplan model. Moreover, we must do 
so in a way that is compatible with expressivism. If successful, then we will 
have adequately answered the foundational question with respect to the 
world-hyperplan model raised in the previous chapter.  
 
5.2.2 Nonfactual belief in interpretationism 
 
To recap, the view being offered is that beliefs are behavioural dispositions 
individuated by constitutive principles of rationality. What makes some 
attitude a belief and not another attitude is the particular principles by which 
it is constitutively governed and which supply the basis for interpretation. 
What makes it the case than an agent believes [p] rather than [q] is that her 
actions are best predicted by interpreting her as believing [p] rather than [q] 
under the assumption of rationality. As such, beliefs are not intrinsically 
representational. Rather, that one represents the world in believing [p] is a 
consequence of the predictions this interpretation affords. In the previous 
chapter, I examined a view according to which belief contents encode not only 
factual information about an agent’s environment but also nonfactual 
information of a directive nature. In this section, I argue that by incorporating 
this view of content within interpretationism, a case can be made for an 
expressivist theory of normative belief.  
The basic idea is this. Agents with normative attitudes require a richer 
interpretative framework than that provided by the possible worlds model of 
content. This fact is explained in terms of distinctive rational principles that 
respectively govern purely normative and purely factual beliefs. However, 
these differences notwithstanding, both kinds of attitude are governed by the 
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constitutive norms of belief tout court. Thus, on the interpretationist view, both 
attitudes are fundamentally beliefs. My argument for this view proceeds in two 
steps. First, I mobilise traditional arguments for expressivism to support the 
claim that normative and factual beliefs are respectively governed by 
distinctive rational norms. Among other things, these arguments explain why 
believing a normative proposition does not involve an implicit representation 
of how things are normatively. Second, I argue that normative judgments are 
fundamentally beliefs because they are subject to the constitutive norms of 
belief. As well as providing an expressivist theory of normative belief, this 
view has the interesting corollary that belief as such is nonrepresentational. 
While this might seem surprising, I argue that given interpretationism this is 




The first claim to defend is that the interpretation of normative agents (i.e. 
agents with normative attitudes) requires (at least) the richer framework of the 
world-hyperplan model of content as opposed to the possible worlds model. 
The justification for this claim must ultimately come from the constitutive 
principles of rationality governing our attitudes. I suggest two principles 
which taken together might provide this justification.  
The first principle comes from the debate about motivational internalism. 
Arguably, something like the following is true of first-person ought-beliefs (see 
Ridge 2015): 
 
Normative Internalism. Necessarily, for any fully rational agent A, if A 
believes [that A ought to F in C], then A will intend to F in C. 
  
Normative Internalism receives support from the observation that in a number 
of contexts, an agent’s believing [that she ought to F in C] is sufficient to 
explain her F-ing in C. For example, if I come to believe [that all things 
considered I ought to give more money to famine relief], and a UNICEF 
collector comes to my door to collect money, then one would expect me to give 
money (Smith 1994: 6). If I did not give money, then we would search for some 
countervailing factor, such as an overriding desire to hold onto my money, or 
my not having any money to give. But if I do give money, this seems perfectly 
intelligible even if I have no particular desire to give to the collector. However, 
if I had no particular desire to give to the collector, then my giving money 
requires some other explanation. If Normative Internalism is true, then my 
action can be explained by my judgment (and the intention it brings about). So 
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we might think of Normative Internalism as a norm of rationality that 
constitutively governs our attitudes. 
Some care here needs to be taken to explain what is meant by the claim that 
A’s believing [that she ought to F in C] is sufficient to explain her F-ing in C. 
For it cannot mean that an interpretation that assigned only this belief could 
explain A’s action. This is because interpretation is essentially holistic ¾ 
whether an agent possesses some attitude always depends on the totality of 
her beliefs and desires. Moreover, it is clear that in the UNICEF example we 
implicitly attribute many other beliefs and desires in order to make sense of 
my action (e.g. the belief [that the collector is from UNICEF], the desire [that if 
I give the collector money then this will contribute towards famine relief], and 
so on). So the notion of one’s normative belief “sufficiently explaining” one’s 
action needs some other explication. The suggestion being offered is that an 
explanation of an action typically requires not merely the presence of some 
related desires but an independent desire to do that thing (under some suitable 
description). Normative Internalism then claims that if an agent believes [that 
she ought to F in C], then, other things being equal, she will F in C regardless 
of whether she has an independent desire to F. 
Normative Internalism alone does not support expressivism because it 
leaves open the possibility that normative beliefs are both intrinsically 
motivating and representational. So we need a second principle to complete 
step one of the argument. Noncognitivists often appeal to internalism in 
conjunction with a Humean belief-desire psychology according to which 
beliefs are motivationally inert. If normative statements express beliefs as I am 
arguing here, then the Humean picture must be rejected as it stands. However, 
it is still possible to respect some of the intuitions motivating the picture within 
our interpretationist framework.  
Arguably, one idea driving the Humean view is that “cold representations” 
of the world just aren’t the kind of thing that alone could rationalise action. If 
an agent’s total belief state is given in terms of the set of world-hyperplan pairs 
it leaves open, we can pick out the purely factual or plan-invariant subset of 
beliefs as those beliefs where no h is ruled out. The suggestion is then that these 
beliefs are constitutively governed by the following principle: 
 
Representational Inertness. Necessarily, for any fully rational agent A, 
action F and set of purely factual propositions P, A’s believing P is not 
sufficient to explain A’s F-ing.  
 
(Where “sufficient to explain” is understood as above.) Arguably, 
Representational Inertness captures what motivates the Humean view of belief 
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once we drop the representationalist assumption that all beliefs represent 
reality. Importantly, the principle is compatible with the view that some beliefs 
are sufficient to explain actions. It is just that such beliefs cannot be purely 
factual.  
Thus, taken together, Representational Inertness and Normative 
Internalism support the claim that an agent’s normative beliefs must be 
something other than beliefs in purely factual propositions. Moreover, if we 
individuate beliefs using <w, h> contents, the link between an agent’s 
normative beliefs and her actions is reflected in what is prescribed by the set of 
hyperplans she accepts, which makes explicit what she accepts in virtue of her 
dispositional profile. While this provides us with a suitably nonfactualist view 
of normative belief, it’s important to see that this is not entailed by the world-
hyperplan model itself. As we saw in the previous chapter, the model is 
consistent with a realist view according to which w denotes reality stripped of 
its normative features and h denotes the norms prescribed by objective reasons 
(Sinnott-Armstrong 1993: 300f; Kalderon 2007: 73), as well certain relativist 
views (e.g. MacFarlane 2014). Instead, the nonfactuality of normative belief 
follows from the fact that the disposition individuated by world-hyperplan 
contents on this view contains no implicit representation of the agent’s 
environment, i.e. the world she inhabits. In other words, the psychological 
profile of accepting a normative proposition entails no ability to discriminate 
between normative ways the world might be and entails no sensitivity to 
normative reality. Moreover, if we did take this sort of directive disposition to 
contain an implicit representation of the agent’s environment, it would violate 
Representational Inertness.4  
What reason is there to accept Representational Inertness? One kind of 
consideration invoked by expressivists derives from Moore’s open question 
argument. The idea is that for any factual proposition that we might believe, 
there is always an “open” question of what to do about it, or more generally 
what normative significance to give it. For any belief about how the world is, 
"[e]ven if that belief were settled, there would still be issues of what importance 
to give it, what to do, and all the rest. For we have no conception of a 'truth 
condition' or fact of which mere apprehension by itself determines practical 
 
4 This last claim is complicated by the fact that one might interpret ‘purely factual 
propositions’ in the realist-friendly way suggested in the text so that it is compatible with 
Representational Inertness. Three things can be said in response. First, although such a 
view might be possible, I think that it is undermotivated given the dispositional profile of 
normative beliefs on this picture. Second, the expressivist arguments for Representational 
Inertness discussed below constitute arguments against this view. Third, insofar as 
expressivists think there are general reasons to be sceptical of descriptivist views, these 
arguments provide indirect support for the expressivist interpretation of ‘purely factual’.  
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issues. For any fact, there is a question of what to do about it." (Blackburn 1998: 
70; see also Darwall, Gibbard and Railton 1992: 116ff) However, one might 
wonder if this is just a restatement of Representational Inertness rather than an 
argument for it. So the expressivist needs to find some non-question begging 
way to establish the thesis.  
That said, if the principle is a constitutive norm of belief, one might wonder 
what sort of argument would establish this. Compare: what sort of argument 
would establish that the principle of instrumental rationality was a constitutive 
norm of belief? One might think that the dialectical burden here is negative in 
the sense that the defender of Representational Inertness would need to show 
that putative explanations of an agent’s actions in terms of purely factual 
beliefs alone are in fact irrational or unintelligible. So the kind of argument the 
expressivist gives might depend on the nature of facts purportedly believed in 
normative belief. It would be beyond the scope of the scope of this chapter to 
survey the arguments, but see Horgan and Timmons (1992) for argument that 
natural facts cannot play this role and Dreier (2015a; 2015b) for argument that 
non-natural facts cannot play this role. 
Expressivists might also appeal to facts about disagreement to motivate the 
appeal to nonfactual contents. The problem arises in cases of fundamental 
disagreement where two individuals have a different conception of the subject 
matter in question and systematically respond to different features of reality 
(Björnsson 2017: 277). For instance, consider Hare’s (1952: 148) example of the 
Missionary and the Cannibals. In Hare’s example, the Missionary learns that 
the Cannibals have a term similar to ‘good’ in that it is a general adjective of 
commendation. However, whereas the Missionary applies the term to people 
who are meek and gentle, the Cannibals apply it to people who collect a large 
number of scalps. In such a case, it seems plausible that the two parties have a 
different conception of the subject matter of what is good. However, it also 
seems plausible that the two parties are in disagreement. This seems to stand 
in contrast to purely factual disagreement. In the purely factual case, when two 
parties have a radically different conception of the subject matter or are 
systematically responding to different features of reality, we interpret their 
respective beliefs to be about different things, and so not in disagreement. 
Arguably, therefore, we cannot capture fundamental normative disagreement 
in terms of two parties disagreeing over some purely factual proposition. Thus, 
if the disagreement is a disagreement in belief, then this supports the claim that 
normative beliefs are individuated by nonfactual contents (Field 2018: 15 
makes a similar argument). 
Again, this is not the place to settle this debate. My aim is rather to show 
that arguments traditionally used to support the claim that normative attitudes 
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are noncognitive can be used to support the claim that they are beliefs with 
nonfactual content, in the sense spelled out above. Given that expressivists 
hold something like Normative Internalism and Representational Inertness 
anyway, proceeding this way should look attractive to expressivists. This 
concludes the first step of the argument, which was to defend the claim that 
the interpretation of normative attitudes requires world-hyperplan contents in 
virtue of the distinctive norms of rationality that govern normative and factual 




Given that I have argued that factual and normative beliefs are constitutively 
governed by different norms, it might seem natural to conclude that factual 
and normative beliefs are fundamentally distinct kinds of attitude. I want to 
resist this thought. In the remainder of this section, I argue that both kinds of 
attitude are fundamentally beliefs because they are both governed by the 
constitutive norms of belief tout court, and so are fundamentally beliefs 
according to interpretationism. 
First, both normative and factual beliefs are governed by the same norms of 
theoretical rationality, which apply exclusively to beliefs. For example, the 
theory of interpretation involves the assumption that agents more or less 
follow certain rules of logic and reasoning (Dennett 1971: 95). These rules apply 
to an agent’s beliefs. Thus, we predict that an agent will acquire new beliefs 
and eschew old ones through inference and reasoning, as well as eliminating 
inconsistencies in light of new evidence. Given that sets of <w, h> pairs follow 
the same logic as sets of worlds, all the same predictions can be made about 
how an agent will reason to and from beliefs with normative content. The non-
reductive nature of interpretationism is important here, because there is no 
requirement to explain intentional notions like inconsistency in content in 
more basic, non-intentional terms (for example, in terms of representational 
failure — we’ll return to this in the next section).  
Further, the holistic nature of belief explains how an agent can acquire 
normative beliefs in virtue of responding to features of reality without the need 
for explicit reasoning. For example, if belief acquisition is something that 
applies to total belief states, then an agent who (a) accepts hyperplans that rule 
out inflicting gratuitous pain and (b) perceives someone inflicting gratuitous 
pain can be predicted to (c) acquire the belief that that person’s actions are 
impermissible without the need for explicit reasoning. So the rules of 
interpretation pertaining to theoretical rationality apply just as much to beliefs 
with world-hyperplan contents as beliefs with possible worlds contents. Given 
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that normative agents are in fact disposed to act in these ways, this supports 
the claim that these attitudes are beliefs.  
Moving to the constitutive norms of practical rationality that govern beliefs, 
consider the principle of instrumental rationality: that rational agents act in 
ways that fulfil their desires given their beliefs. If ever there was a constitutive 
norm of belief, presumably this is it. It might appear less obvious that this 
principle applies to normative beliefs as well as factual beliefs. First, if we 
accept Normative Internalism, then the paradigm case of normative beliefs 
motivating actions will be directly rather than via their interactions with 
desires or other attitudes. However, it might also appear less obvious because 
the principle of instrumental rationality is often cashed out in metaphysically 
robust terms. For example, desire satisfaction is often cashed out in terms the 
factual content of the desire being realised, where realisation is a 
metaphysically substantive notion. However, given the non-reductive 
ambitions of interpretationism, there is no requirement to reduce intentional 
notions to metaphysical ones. So we can still talk about an agent’s desires being 
“realised” even if these desires involve nonfactual content.  
For example, suppose Alex believes that tax avoidance is wrong. Other 
things being equal, it follows from Normative Internalism that we should 
predict that Alex will pay his taxes in full. However, suppose that things are 
not equal. Suppose that Alex has a strong desire to earn as much money as 
possible, and this desire leads him to avoid paying his taxes in full whenever 
the opportunity arises. After some soul searching, however, Alex comes to 
form an overwhelming desire to avoid wrongdoing. The next day it’s time for 
Alex to complete his tax returns. What will he do? It would be reasonable to 
expect that Alex will pay his taxes in full, as we know he believes that doing so 
will be a way of “bringing it about” that he avoids wrongdoing, where the 
content of his desire is specified in terms of set of worlds in which he acts in 
ways required by the hyperplans left open by first order normative inquiry. So 
Alex’s belief that tax avoidance is wrong is subject to the principle of 
instrumental rationality in much the same way as any of his purely factual 
beliefs are. (Ridge [2018: 10, 18] makes a similar point that so long as 
expressivists can appeal to normative propositions, they can capture these 
kinds of explanations.)  
In sum, I have argued that our normative and factual beliefs are both subject 
to the same constitutive norms of belief tout court. It follows given 
interpretationism that both attitudes are fundamentally beliefs. I have also 
argued that the additional constitutive norms of normative and factual belief 
in particular explain how an agent’s normative beliefs cannot be interpreted in 
terms of factual contents alone. The resulting picture is a robust theory of belief 
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according to which some but not all beliefs are representational. In contrast to 
expressivist theories that only allow for a deflationary or quasi-realist 
conception of normative beliefs, the view being offered here allows for a theory 
of normative belief in the full-blooded sense of the term that is compatible with 
expressivism. Further, if some beliefs are nonrepresentational, it follows that 
belief as such is nonrepresentational. This might sound alarming to many. 
However, if we accept the interpretationist picture, I think this is less 
surprising than it might seem. If beliefs are fundamentally dispositions, then 
the sense in which our beliefs are representational is already derivative. And 
once we attend to the sorts of dispositions characteristic of normative belief, 
and we see that it is not at all obvious that such a disposition implicitly 
represents the world, we are further loosened from the grip of the 
representationalist picture. 
As I have indicated at various points, there are many explanatory burdens 
that one would need to take on to fully defend the sort of view outlined here. 
But these are burdens that already exist for any interpretationist theory and 
any expressivist theory. So if my arguments are correct, then the view outlined 
above is at least as good as rival expressivist theories that claim that normative 
and factual beliefs are fundamentally different kinds of attitudes. In the next 




Most contemporary expressivists accept that normative statements express 
normative beliefs. This is typically embraced in the quasi-realist spirit of 
accommodating the realist-sounding features of normative discourse within an 
expressivist framework (e.g. Blackburn 1993). While such expressivists accept 
normative belief-talk “at the end of the day”, the challenge for them is to earn 
their right to normative belief-talk given a noncognitivist account of normative 
thought according to which normative judgments are fundamentally desire-
like attitudes rather than beliefs. This differs from the proposal set out above. 
The traditional approach is to start with the thesis that factual and normative 
beliefs are fundamentally different kinds of attitudes, and then go on to explain 
how both can be properly thought of under the title of ‘belief’. My approach is 
to start with the thesis that factual and normative beliefs are fundamentally the 
same kind of attitude (i.e. belief), and then go on to explain how this is 
compatible with an expressivist account of normative thought. Thus, the order 
of explanation is reversed.  
Call these respective approaches bifurcated attitude expressivism and unified 
attitude expressivism. Given that both approaches aim to accommodate 
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normative belief, it is natural to ask which approach is comparatively more 
attractive. In this section, I argue that unified attitude expressivism has four 
important benefits: (i) it is more theoretically parsimonious; (ii) it coheres with 
an independently plausible philosophy of mind; (iii) it is better placed to 
explain mixed attitudes; and (iv) it is better placed to explain inconsistency. 
These last two benefits answer two of the problems raised in the previous 
chapter for expressivist theories that accept the world-hyperplan model of 
content. Comparing the two approaches will also clarify some of the 
commitments of the unified approach. Not only this, however, but it will 
exhibit certain resources available to expressivists that embrace a robust theory 
of normative belief that are otherwise not available. As such, these 





Unified attitude expressivism is simpler than bifurcated attitude expressivism 
in that the former only postulates the existence of a single attitude type where 
the latter postulates the existence of two or more attitude types. Consider the 
two attitudes denoted by ‘the belief that grass is green’ and ‘the belief that 
murder is wrong’. According to unified attitude expressivism, these are two 
instances of a single attitude type that are distinguished by their contents. 
According to bifurcated attitude expressivism, these are distinct kinds of 
attitude. Whereas the former is a belief, the latter is some distinct kind of 
nonrepresentational attitude. While the bifurcated approach as such is 
compatible with a number of ways of cashing out this distinction, it is typically 
explained in terms whether the attitude has a representational or 
nonrepresentational characteristic functional role, where factual beliefs have the 
former and normative beliefs have the latter. 
If normative and factual beliefs are fundamentally distinct kinds of attitude, 
it is likely that attitude types will multiply further. Indeed, it has been argued 
that certain versions of expressivism imply an infinite hierarchy of such 
attitudes (Schroeder 2008: 49ff; though see Shiller 2016 for an argument that 
this implication is unproblematic). This will be (at least) to account for mixed 
attitudes, such as that picked out by “the belief that grass is green or murder is 
wrong”. Given the normative component, this attitude cannot be 
fundamentally representational in nature. Given the representational 
component, it cannot be fundamentally directive in nature. So it seems that we 
need to introduce some third kind of attitude to account for mixed thoughts. 
Perhaps this might be something like Blackburn’s (1988) notion of being tied to 
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a tree. However, given that this attitude is not fundamentally representational 
or directive, yet is somehow made up of components that are both, we need 
some characterisation that explains this attitude. 
While simplicity may not count for too much on its own, it is worth 
emphasising that bifurcated attitude expressivism posits differences where it 
appears that there are none. This is because we use all the same locutions to 
talk about normative beliefs as we do other kinds of beliefs. From a pre-
theoretical perspective, normative beliefs seem to be just one among many 
other kinds of beliefs. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, normative 
beliefs have all the same properties that are central to other kinds of beliefs, 
such as their inferential and inconsistency properties, as well as a number of 
phenomenological properties (Horgan and Timmons 2006). Given that we 
seem to have a unified explanandum, we should expect a unified explanans. 
But this is exactly what bifurcated attitude expressivism denies. Thus, 
simplicity here is not just a theoretical virtue in and of itself, but seemingly 
demanded by the very facts we are attempting to explain (though see Ridge 
2009 for an attempt to meet this objection head on). 
This point is strengthened when we observe that expressivists not only owe 
us an account of normative and mixed beliefs, but of other types of normative 
attitude, such as desires, hopes, doubts, presuppositions, etc. This is known as 
the many attitudes problem (Rosen 1998: 393ff; Schroeder 2010: 83f). If the 
expressivist explains normative belief as distinct from factual belief, then it 
would seem that she would have to provide piecemeal explanations of all other 
normative propositional attitudes as well. By contrast, unified attitude 
expressivism provides a unified account not only of belief but of propositional 
attitudes more generally, and so no such problem arises.  
 
5.3.2 Theoretical consonance 
 
As developed above, unified attitude expressivism coheres well with an 
independently plausible philosophy of mind. This is for the simple reason that 
we began by adopting an interpretationist framework and then developed an 
expressivist theory within that framework. By contrast, metaethical debates 
about the nature of normative judgment tend to remain neutral about the exact 
nature of belief and the mind more generally. While this is fine as far as it goes, 
we should expect our theories in each domain to converge given the overlap in 
subject matter. Moreover, I think that the discussion above shows that 
separation of the subject matter can obscure some of the theoretical possibilities 
available in metaethics. 
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Further, consider an analogy with the relation between metaethics and the 
philosophy of language. Traditionally, expressivists have rejected truth-
conditional semantics for normative language. This means having to construct 
an alternative semantic theory from the ground up. A number of philosophers 
complain that given the orthodoxy and general utility of truth-conditional 
semantics, it is a large cost for expressivists to abandon this general framework 
for considerations local to metaethics. Indeed, a number of philosophers now 
argue for reconciliation between expressivism and truth-conditional semantics 
(e.g. Ridge 2014; Chrisman 2016; Köhler 2018).  
Arguably, bifurcated attitude expressivism faces an analogous problem in 
that it must construct an alternative philosophy of mind from the ground up 
(at least for expressivists who claim that normative judgments are a sui generis 
kind of attitude). Moreover, it must do so for reasons local to metaethics. While 
this objection is in no way decisive, it seems good methodological practice to 
integrate our best theories from different domains where we can. And this is 
exactly what unified attitude expressivism aims to do. 
 
5.3.3 Mixed attitudes and the disjunction problem 
 
The previous considerations put forward in favour of unified attitude 
expressivism concern its more general theoretical virtues. However, bifurcated 
attitude expressivism faces a number of challenges that unified attitude 
expressivism is better placed to solve or perhaps avoid. To be clear from the 
outset, I am not claiming that unified attitude expressivism faces none of the 
problems faced by bifurcated attitude expressivism, or that it faces no 
challenges explaining mixed attitudes and inconsistency. Rather, the claim is 
that the unified approach is better placed to solve or avoid these problems. The 
first problem I will examine is the problem of mixed disjunctions and mixed 
attitudes more generally. 
The mixed attitudes problem refers to the problem of explaining the nature 
of attitudes that involve both normative and non-normative content, such as 
the belief [that stealing is wrong or it never causes pain]. According to 
bifurcated attitude expressivism, to believe [that stealing never causes pain] is 
to be in a state with a representational functional role which aims to track the 
world, and to believe [that stealing is wrong] is to be in a state with a conative 
functional role which aims to guide action. If these are fundamentally distinct 
state types, what type of state is the mixed belief?  
As we saw in the previous chapter, a natural suggestion is that mixed beliefs 
are combinations of purely normative and purely factual beliefs. However, we 
also saw that this views fails to explain mixed disjunctions. Because it is 
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possible to believe a disjunction without believing either disjunct, the belief 
[that stealing is wrong or it never causes pain] cannot be captured by any 
combination of purely normative and purely factual beliefs (Schroeder 2015: 
12ff; see also Charlow 2015: 10ff; Starr 2016: 373f). There is then some pressure 
to explain the disjunctive state as some kind of inferential commitment 
(Blackburn 1988; Chrisman 2016: 178ff). However, we are now owed an 
account of this third type of state and how it relates to atomic factual and 
normative beliefs. 
By contrast, there is no special account needed for mixed beliefs if we adopt 
unified attitude expressivism. On the version I have outlined above, mixed 
beliefs are just beliefs with world-hyperplan contents. The nature of such 
beliefs is explained in terms of the conditions under which the theory of 
interpretation says it is correct to attribute beliefs with this kind of content. And 
this will be explained fundamentally in terms of an agent’s overall 
dispositional profile, where the attribution of a logically complex belief will 
involve (inter alia) dispositions to reason in certain ways, broadly construed. 
However exactly this explanation goes, it is not fundamentally different in kind 
to explanations involving purely factual or purely normative beliefs.  
So an agent A will believe a mixed disjunction [p or q] without believing [p] 
or believing [q] when the best interpretation of A’s actions assigns only the first 
belief and not the other two. Here is one such possible situation: A is not 
disposed to act as if she believes [p] and she is not disposed to act if she believes 
[q], but A is disposed to form the belief [p] upon learning [not-q] and to form 
the belief [q] upon learning [not-p]. If we could only interpret A’s beliefs using 
the unstructured set <W, H> compatible with her beliefs, then assigning to A 
the belief [p or q] without assigning either [p] or [q] would not be an intelligible 
predictive stance that we could take towards A. This stance is made intelligible, 
however, if we adopt an interpretative framework that employs sets of <w, h> 
pairs. Moreover, because to believe [p or q] without believing [p] or believing 
[q] just is to be predictable in this sort of way according to interpretationism, 
there is no further question about what this belief must be like in order to have 
these properties.5 
It’s worth stressing the role of the holistic aspect of belief in this response to 
the disjunction problem. Recall that one of Schroeder’s (2015: 21) worries about 
solving the disjunction problem with the world-hyperplan model of content 
was that we have no grip on the functional role of a state that discriminates 
between arbitrary sets of world-hyperplan pairs. However, this objection 
 
5 There may be a further question about the sub-personal mechanisms in virtue of which 
human beings are intentional agents. But this is an empirical question to be answered by 
the cognitive sciences. See Hornsby (2000) for discussion. 
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presupposes that beliefs are individuated atomistically. Specifically, that they 
are individuated by their canonical functional role. By contrast, the 
interpretationist view individuates individual beliefs holistically relative to an 
agent’s total belief (and desire) state, which is primary, where this latter 
assignment is governed by the totality of constitutive norms of rationality 
contained within the theory of interpretation. Thus, the “richer and more 
powerful characterisation” of belief provided by the interpretationist view 
comes not from the richer functional role of individual beliefs but from the 
holistic interpretative nexus by which we predict normative agents. Moreover, 
not only does the world-hyperplan model allow us to make the predictions we 
need of normative agents, it makes their actions intelligible in terms of the 
distinctive rational principles that govern these predictions. So there is 
something right to the suggestion that logically complex beliefs are 
characterised by their inferential commitments. But that is because all beliefs 
are characterised by their inferential commitments according to 
interpretationism, though of course not exclusively. 
 
5.3.4 The inconsistency problem 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, expressivists notoriously have a difficult 
time explaining how it is that normative beliefs can stand in the right sort of 
inconsistency relations with other beliefs (see, for example, Wright 1988; 
Unwin 2001; Schroeder 2008). Introducing nonfactual contents within the 
modal conception of content allowed the expressivist to define two beliefs as 
being inconsistent when the intersection of their contents is empty. This is fine 
as far as it goes, but the problem for this view is that it doesn’t tell us why those 
beliefs are inconsistent (Starr 2016: 368f; Willer 2016: 197ff). Simply assigning 
formally inconsistent contents is not sufficient to explain why any two states 
are inconsistent in the right sense. After all, my desire that I eat cake and my 
desire that I not eat cake take inconsistent propositions as their contents; 
however, these attitudes are not inconsistent in the relevant sense. In short, we 
need some explanation of why beliefs with contradictory contents are 
inconsistent. 
Assuming bifurcated attitude expressivism, a natural answer would be to 
look to the characteristic functional roles of each attitude type and explain how 
their constitutive functions are frustrated when an agent believes contents with 
empty overlap. In the descriptive case, we might say that beliefs with empty 
intersection necessarily fail to represent the world as being some way. This is 
because there is no way the world can be such that the contents of both beliefs 
are true. Thus, descriptive inconsistency engenders a failure of the 
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representational function of factual judgments to track the way reality is. In the 
normative case, if we assume that normative judgments are kinds of planning 
states, we might say that beliefs with empty intersection necessarily fail to 
prescribe a coherent contingency plan. This is because there is no way of acting 
such that both plans can be realised. Thus, normative inconsistency engenders 
a failure of the practical function of normative judgments to settle the thing to 
do. 
There are a number of problems with this approach, however. First, one 
might worry whether the sort of practical inconsistency appealed to by the 
expressivist is of the right kind to ground logical inconsistency. If I plan to eat 
cake and to not eat cake, I presumably have an incoherent plan, but this does 
not obviously make me logically inconsistent. However, where [p] is a 
normative proposition, it is surely logically inconsistent to believe both [p] and 
[not-p]. Second, even assuming a suitable sense of practical inconsistency is 
specified, we again have distinct explanations for what appears to be a unified 
phenomenon. This approach therefore fails to respect the unity requirement. 
Inconsistency in belief appears to be of the same kind regardless of whether 
the beliefs are normative or factual. So given bifurcated attitude expressivism, 
we have a bifurcated explanation for a seemingly unified explanandum. 
Moreover, combinations of normative, factual, and mixed beliefs can be 
logically inconsistent. It is difficult to see how this could be true if normative 
and factual inconsistency were different in kind.  
By contrast, because unified attitude expressivism counts all beliefs as 
instances of a single kind of attitude, inconsistency is explained as the same 
across normative, factual, and mixed contexts. Given our interpretationist 
theory of belief, what exactly is this explanation? The first thing to note is that 
given the theory’s non-reductive commitments, we should not expect 
inconsistency in belief to reduce to some non-intentional notion, such as some 
kind of functional failure. Thus, trivially, to believe just is to believe as true, 
and believing inconsistent propositions necessarily results in believing a 
falsehood. If we suppose that the theory of interpretation contains or entails 
some epistemic truth norm for believing only what is true, then inconsistent 
beliefs will violate this principle. 
Further, consider that interpretation is based on how an agent acts, where 
the attitudes ascribed to the agent provide explanatory reasons that make her 
actions intelligible. If beliefs are constitutively governed by rational principles, 
this suggests another way of thinking about what is wrong with believing 
inconsistent claims. Specifically, we ask what would be wrong with a fully 
rational agent who believes inconsistent claims. If we think of believing 
propositions in terms of ruling out sets of world-hyperplan pairs, then to 
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believe inconsistent propositions is to rule out all doxastic possibilities. Which 
is to say the agent has no beliefs which could serve as reasons for action. 
Interpretation simply breaks down. Importantly, this explanation of what is 
wrong with believing inconsistent propositions applies equally to normative, 
factual, and mixed beliefs. As less than fully rational agents with limited and 
fragmented cognitive powers, we find that sometimes it is intelligible to assign 
inconsistent beliefs to an agent. But this requires us to invoke the idea of 
fragmented belief systems or some other notion that can explain this. And if an 
agent fails to exhibit some degree of stability and consistency, then they will 
fail to be interpretable.  
To sum up, as well as being more complex and less integrated into existing 
theories of mind, bifurcated attitude expressivism has a difficult time 
explaining mixed attitudes and inconsistency in belief. Because unified attitude 
expressivism provides unified explanations of these phenomena, I have argued 
that it is better equipped to explain these features of belief. No doubt much 
more needs to be said on behalf of unified attitude expressivism in order to 
fully explain these features of belief. But these are substantive matters that any 
theory of belief needs to explain. Seeing as whatever explanations 
interpretationism gives for these phenomena must be grounded in facts that 
do not fundamentally appeal to representational notions, I see no reason, at 
least from the outset, that they cannot be applied to beliefs with nonfactual 
contents. 
 
5.4 Are attitude attributions normative? 
 
The theory of belief on offer is meant to provide an account of what it is to have 
normative beliefs. The theory is expressivist insofar as the view respects the 
two core theses set out in Chapter 1. Namely, that normative thought is 
fundamentally (a) nonrepresentational and (b) practical. Typically, the 
nonrepresentational thesis is motivated both by psychological claims about the 
nature of normative thought (as offered here) as well as metaphysical claims 
about the nature of reality. Specifically, the nonrepresentational thesis is 
motivated in part by the claim that normative properties, relations, facts, etc., 
do not exist in any robust sense. Because there are no such things according to 
expressivists, they cannot play an explanatory role in their theory of normative 
thought. 
Now for the problem. Interpretationism explains beliefs in terms of the 
rational norms that constitutively govern our attitude attributions. However, 
many philosophers think that the ‘ought’-claims provided by these rational 
norms are themselves normative. It would therefore seem to follow that the 
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explanations offered by interpretationism are normative explanations. But this 
looks to be in tension with expressivism’s metaphysical thesis. If there are no 
normative properties, relations, or states of affairs, then how is it that we can 
explain the nature of propositional attitudes using normative vocabulary? In 
this section, I examine two ways of responding to this problem. The first 
approach is to accept the normativity of rationality but maintain its 
compatibility with interpretative expressivism. The second is to reject the 
normativity of rationality. This is a huge topic and what I have to say here will 
inevitably be far from conclusive. But I think the objection is important enough 
to merit some indication of how it should be answered.  
 
5.4.1 Constitutive rationality as normative 
 
Suppose that the rational norms formulated in the theory of interpretation are 
genuinely normative. Why might this be incompatible with expressivism? 
First, note that the problem is not simply that an explanation of normative 
thought that employs normative notions is somehow circular. By comparison, 
an explanation of thoughts involving logical notions need not refrain from 
using logical notions (Wedgwood 2007: 21; Chrisman 2016: 204f). Second, note 
that invoking normative notions to explain normative thought is not 
incompatible with the nonrepresentational thesis as such. This is because even 
assuming our theory of belief invokes normative notions, it does not explain 
normative beliefs in terms of their being about the existence and distribution of 
normative properties, relations, or facts.  
Rather, the tension arises from expressivism’s ontological commitments. 
Roughly, expressivists maintain that what (robustly) exists is that which is 
described by the natural sciences. The general viewpoint is nicely summed up 
by Blackburn (1998: 48f): 
 
To be a naturalist is to see human beings as frail complexes of perishable tissue, 
and so part of the natural order. It is thus to refuse unexplained appeals to 
mind or spirit, and unexplained appeals to knowledge of a Platonic order of 
Forms or Norms; it is above all to refuse any appeal to a supernatural order. 
[…] [T]he problem is finding room for ethics, or placing ethics within the 
disenchanted, non-ethical order which we inhabit, and of which we are a part.  
 
Blackburn also accepts an interpretationist approach to explaining the mental 
(though he denies that normative commitments are beliefs) and claims that 
given this approach, “mental states turn out to get their identity from a 
network of normative considerations.” (1998: 54) The worry for such a view is 
that the “network of normative considerations” that explains normative 
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attitudes looks no different from an “unexplained appeal” to an “order of 
norms”. And this is incompatible with expressivism’s naturalist 
commitments.6  
One might respond to this worry by challenging the implicit assumption 
that the expressivist theory of thought in question is itself descriptive. That is, 
one might reject the assumption that the normative vocabulary employed 
within the expressivist theory refers to anything normative. Instead, one might 
provide suitably nondescriptive interpretations of these notions as they are 
used within the expressivist theory. This would amount to providing a 
nondescriptivist meta-theory of the expressivist theory of thought. This strategy 
is pursued by Gibbard (2012), who first explains meaning in terms of inferential 
and evidential ought-claims, and then explains ought-claims in terms of 
planning states. More generally, this view is compatible with naturalism 
because it does not refer to anything distinctively normative. 
However, if our expressivist theory of thought is to explain our use of 
normative vocabulary in general, then it had better also explain our use of 
normative vocabulary within the meta-theory. Otherwise, we would not have 
a fully general theory of normative discourse. In this way, we can say that such 
a theory must be uroborosian, in the sense that it must be able to explain itself. 
Moreover, if our theory was not uroborosian, then appealing to a 
nondescriptivist meta-theory would do no more than move the bump under 
the carpet, as the original problem would simply reappear at the level of the 
meta-theory. So in order for interpretative expressivism to make good on this 
suggestion, one would need to successfully apply its analysis of ought-claims 
to the ought-claims made within the theory of interpretation. As a first 
approximation, one would need show that the claim [that an agent believes p 
iff she behaves as if she rationally ought to believe p] can be characterised in 
terms of the set of <w, h> pairs at which the agent behaves at w as if she believes 
what is rationally required by h in w. I think this suggestion has some initial 
plausibility and I would welcome any developments of the view that proceeds 
this way. But I do have a number of reservations, some of which I will elaborate 
in more detail in the next subsection.  
First, it is not obvious that accepting interpretationism consists in having 
any directive dispositions of the kind relevant to normative thought. However, 
this is what the uroborosian view predicts. Second, the uroborosian view 
 
6 In a critical discussion of Blackburn (1998), Dreier (2002) explores this issue in detail, 
arguing that Blackburn is committed to some kind of vicious regress or circularity. 
However, for the reasons given in this subsection, I think that the real worry is not 




entails that whether some assignment of attitudes is correct will depend on 
which first-order normative view is correct. Given nonfactualism about 
normativity, it follows that there is no worldly fact of the matter concerning 
whether I believe some proposition or not. One might worry whether this is 
really plausible. Moreover, as we saw above it is denied by interpretationists 
like Dennett. Third, it also follows that any social science that employs 
propositional attitude psychology is not purely descriptive, which might be a 
cost depending on one’s views of such disciplines. Fourth, the uroborosian 
view entails the possibility of radical disagreement over what attitudes to 
ascribe to people in cases where two parties hold fundamentally opposed 
normative principles of rationality. However, this seems less plausible in the 
case of attitudes than in ordinary normative disagreement. Fifth, it seems 
possible to judge that it would be rational for A to believe [p] without judging 
that A has any normative reason to believe [p], which seems to be ruled out if 
attitude attributions are normative. While these reasons against this approach 
might not be decisive, I think they are jointly sufficient to look for an 
alternative.  
Could one maintain a descriptivist meta-theory of interpretative 
expressivism while accepting the normativity of attitude attributions? 
Blackburn seems to think so: “I think of myself only as describing: what 
attitudes are, what desires are, what normativity is, by placing them in some 
satisfactory relationship with their empirical manifestations. For that 
enterprise to succeed, I still do not think it matters too much if the trail of the 
normative serpent lies over everything.” (2002a: 166) Given Blackburn’s 
avowed naturalism, this might seem puzzling. However, it seems to me that 
Blackburn’s response trades on an equivocation of the word ‘normative’. For 
we can distinguish a narrower sense of ‘normative’ that is the concern of 
metaethics from a broader sense of ‘normative’ that applies to anything that is 
in some way governed by norms or standards. For instance, chess is an 
example of a practice that is constitutively norm-governed and so ‘normative’ 
in the broader sense. However, these norms are not plausibly normative in the 
narrower sense. Of course, if we are playing chess, then we probably will have 
reasons to follow these rules. But our reasons for following these rules will not 
come from the norms of chess, but from some other source, such as the 
enjoyment of playing chess or our desire to do so.  
The comparison is worth making because Blackburn (2002a: 165) appeals to 
chess as another example of a constitutively norm-governed activity that is 
describable from a naturalistic standpoint. However, if attitudes are 
constitutively normative only in this sense, then it not obvious that 
interpretationism employs any normative notions in the narrower sense that 
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expressivists aim to explain. This is further supported by Blackburn’s claim 
that interpretationist claims about (say) what one ought to do if one believes 
some proposition are “statements about what you would expect from an agent. 
[…] [T]he ‘ought’ here speaks not of duties and values, but just about what you 
would expect.” (1998: 56) More generally, it is implausible that all uses of 
‘ought’ are normative in the narrow sense (see Chrisman 2016: 26ff and 
passim). So I think that Blackburn’s response is better seen as rejecting the 
normativity (narrowly construed) of rationality.  
 
5.4.2 Constitutive rationality as descriptive 
 
Suppose that the rational norms formulated in the theory of interpretation are 
not normative. On this supposition, no tension arises between rationality and 
naturalism, and there is no requirement to provide a nondescriptive meta-
theory of the expressivist theory of normative thought. This is not to deny that 
interpretation is constitutively norm-governed. But it is to deny that these 
norms are normative in the robust sense that is the interest of metaethics. What 
reason is there to accept this view? I have already mentioned a number of 
reasons against the normativity of rationality in the previous subsection, but it 
will be worth exploring some of them in a little more depth. This is because I 
want to argue that rejecting the normativity of rationality is the better response 
to the initial worry because it is independently plausible that rationality is not 
normative.  
It seems plausible that normative discourse is distinguished from other 
domains of discourse in terms of the distinctive practical role that it plays 
within our lives. Such a view is available to expressivists and descriptivists 
alike. I haven’t said too much about the precise nature of this role, but it seems 
plausible that it has something to do with motivating actions and coordinating 
attitudes in thinking how to live. In accepting normative principles, we are 
disposed to be governed and guided in the ways recommended by those 
principles. In evaluating whether rationality is normative, one question we can 
therefore ask is whether accepting claims about what one rationally ought to 
do, think, and feel plays this role in our lives.  
To be clear, the question is not whether these rational principles play a 
governing role in how we interpret others, for that is precisely what they do. 
Rather, the question is whether the rational principles by which we interpret 
others are ones that we accept in normative deliberation and discussion. By 
comparison, it might be correct to say that our thoughts and actions are 
governed by the principles of geometry insofar as we use those principles to 
guide our geometrical practice, but it does not follow that the principles of 
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geometry are normative in the relevant sense. For the purposes of our 
discussion, it is also important to frame this question in terms of the role of 
rational principles in our lives because it is coherent to maintain that (i) 
constitutive rationality is not normative but (ii) the correct first-order 
normative theory coincides with the principles of rationality (Ridge 2014: 231). 
What needs to be shown, then, is whether the principles of rationality as we 
employ them in interpretation are normative. 
I think that there are a number of considerations that support a negative 
answer to this question. First, if the rational principles governing interpretation 
were normative, then it would follow that only agents with normative attitudes 
would be capable of attributing propositional attitudes. However, this seems 
implausible. For example, it is surely possible that some alien species similar 
to human beings could lack normative attitudes but nonetheless have beliefs 
and the capacity to attribute beliefs to others. Closer to home, some empirical 
studies to suggest that non-human animals possess some degree of a theory of 
mind (for discussion see Povinelli & Vonk 2004), but it seems implausible that 
all these animals have normative attitudes. Further, empirical studies show 
that typical human beings develop a theory of mind between the ages of 3 and 
4 years old (e.g. Wimmer & Perner 1983), but it is not at all obvious that this 
coincides with the development of normative attitudes, though admittedly this 
is somewhat speculative. In short, the normativity of rationality places strong 
constraints on the kind of creatures that can interpret others, which arguably 
conflicts with empirical evidence 
Second, there are a number of cases in which our judgments about what is 
rational and our judgments about what normative reasons we have seem to 
come apart. Recall, for instance, Normative Internalism, which roughly stated 
that one (rationally) ought to intend to F if one believes [that one (normatively) 
ought to F]. While this might be plausible as a norm of rationality governing 
normative belief, it is not plausible that believing [that one ought to F] gives 
one a normative reason (to intend) to F. Otherwise, this would lead to 
unacceptable “bootstrapping” where we can generate normative reasons 
simply by adopting or forming certain attitudes. (Moreover, as Kolodny [2005] 
argues, the norm of Normative Internalism in particular cannot be saved from 
bootstrapping objections by narrow-scope interpretations.) Importantly, the 
divergence here is not simply between our judgments about what we rationally 
ought to do and our judgments about what we all-things-considered ought to 
do. This alone would not be sufficient to support the claim that rationality is 
not normative because it might be that the reasons provided by rationality are 
outweighed by the other reasons we have. Rather, the claim is that there are 
cases where we may judge that it is rational to F without judging that there is 
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any (pro tanto) normative reason to F. But this possibility is ruled out if 
judgments of rationality are normative. 
Third, even if one denies the normativity of rationality, one should not have 
to deny that ‘(ir)rational’ does have normative uses and that we sometimes 
have normative reasons to do what we rationally ought. To explain these cases 
in a way that is compatible with denying the normativity of rationality, we can 
divide them into two groups. First, there are cases where we do have normative 
reasons to follow the norms of rationality but where the source of normativity 
resides elsewhere. Second, there are cases where we do not have any normative 
reason to follow the norms of norms of rationality but where we can explain 
the appearance of there being such a reason.  
As an example of the first kind, consider an agent A who flouts the principle 
of instrumental rationality. In such a case, it would be natural to point out to A 
that she is acting irrationally by failing to adopt the necessary means to her 
ends while still maintaining those ends. Moreover, it would be natural to offer 
this as a criticism and correspondingly advise that she should alter either her 
ends or intentions. However, criticising and advising in this way seem to be 
distinctively normative: “Criticizing someone involves more than the 
judgement that the criticized person has violated some standard; it also 
involves the judgement that the standard is authoritative for her. And […] this 
means that the person has decisive reasons to conform to this standard.” 
(Kiesewetter 2017: 25) This observation leads philosophers like Kiesewetter to 
the conclusion that rationality is normative. 
However, assuming that A has a normative reason not to violate the 
principle of instrumental rationality, I think that this is more plausibly 
explained by factors other than the normativity of rationality. For example, it 
is plausible that the fulfilment of at least some desires or desire-like attitudes 
has prudential value. This obviously follows from a desire-satisfaction theory 
of well-being, but it is also plausible given a perfectionist or objective list theory 
of well-being (Dorsey 2018: 1904). In such cases, acting in accordance with the 
principle of instrumental rationality will instrumentally bring about or 
constitutively realise this prudential value. (Because the descriptive and 
normative uses of ‘irrational’ sometimes coincide in this way, Ridge [2014: 238] 
suggests that this provides some explanation of how ‘irrational’ could 
semantically shift from a descriptive to a normative meaning.) On the highly 
plausible assumption that facts about well-being generate normative reasons 
(see Fletcher 2019), we can explain A’s reasons without appealing to the 
normativity of rationality. Moreover, it seems to me that well-being is a more 
plausible source of reasons in this case. After all, why should I care about the 
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principle of rationality itself, independently of how it relates to my interests or 
ends?  
Furthermore, in cases where the satisfaction of some desire is not 
prudentially good, we can still explain why agents will in general be motivated 
to act according to the principle of instrumental rationality. First, this might be 
because when an agent desires something, she typically apprehends that thing 
as good, which is to say that it presents itself as normatively significant.7 
Relatedly, Kolodny (2005: 577ff) proposes that the apparent normativity of 
rationality can be explained in terms of the “transparency” of the rational 
ought from the first-person standpoint. For example, consider a case in which 
someone does not believe the logical consequence [q] of her belief [p]. By 
calling her irrational, we make a descriptive claim about her psychology 
violating a certain standard. However, if we make this claim to this person, we 
effectively say the following: “From your point of view, you ought to believe 
[q]”. This constitutes advice insofar as it draws the agent’s attention to some 
substantive reason which the agent already takes herself to have for her belief 
[p]. So from the agent’s own perspective, the rational ‘ought’ is “transparent” 
because it provides no additional reason to her existing substantive reason to 
believe [p] and hence also its logical consequence [q]. 
Thus, quite independently of considerations particular to expressivism, 
there are a number of reasons for thinking that the rationality involved in 
attitude attribution is not normative. I therefore submit that denying the 
normativity of rationality is the best way for interpretative expressivism to 
avoid the objection. However, if rationality is normative, then interpretative 
expressivism can also accommodate this insofar as it can adequately apply its 
theory to itself. As I mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, this is a 
huge issue that would require a thesis of its own to come to any definite 
conclusions. But I hope to have at least shown that there are a number of 
considerations in favour of a descriptive view of rationality. If correct, this 
shows that interpretative expressivism does not use normative notions to 
explain normative belief. Therefore, there is no circularity objection, no 
requirement for the theory to reflexively explain itself, and no requirement to 





7 I understand this claim as a platitude to be accommodated by expressivism rather 





I have argued that expressivists can and should maintain that normative 
statements express normative beliefs. I argued that interpretationism provides 
an attractive framework in which to give content to this claim. If successful, the 
interpretationist view provides a straightforward explanation of logically 
complex normative thought, mixed thoughts, and inconsistency — all of which 
expressivists traditionally struggle to explain. Given that I have made use of 
an off the shelf notion of normative content and propositional attitudes, one 
might wonder why expressivists have not already considered this approach. A 
tentative diagnosis is that those engaged in metaethical debates have assumed 
that any theoretically robust notion of belief must be representational and that 
any other notion of belief must be deflationary and non-explanatory. I hope to 
have shown that it is open to expressivists to develop a suitably 
nonrepresentational theory of belief and other propositional attitudes. 
However, I have not claimed that interpretationism is the only framework in 
which nonfactual contents can be put to work in developing an expressivist-
friendly theory of belief. So the interpretationist approach must ultimately be 










In this concluding chapter, I first summarise the main conclusions of the 
previous chapters and recap my main argument for the theory of normative 
belief proposed in the previous chapter (section 6.1). Next, in order to provide 
some illumination through contrast, I critically examine a rival expressivist 
theory of normative belief and belief content due to Mark Schroeder (section 
6.2). Finally, I examine some of the wider implications of the main conclusions 
of the previous chapters (section 6.3). 
 
6.1 Summary of main conclusions 
 
Expressivists have traditionally eschewed normative propositions in their 
theories of thought and discourse. At the beginning of this thesis, I argued that 
expressivists can and should develop a theory of normative propositions to 
inform their theory of normative thought and discourse. By doing so, 
expressivists can use normative propositions to characterise and explain a 
number of features of normative thought and discourse that are otherwise 
difficult to explain. While I think that the possibility of such a view is 
significantly underappreciated, I have not focused too much on arguments for 
the general proposal, which in any case is not entirely new (see Schroeder 2013, 
2015; Ridge 2014: 124ff, 2018: 10). Instead, I have tried to advance the debate by 
examining in detail some of the main contenders for an expressivist theory of 
normative propositions. Rather than building new theories from the ground 
up, my approach throughout has been to examine existing frameworks for 
theorising about content and to see what can be achieved by rejecting the 
representationalist assumptions presupposed by adherents of those 
frameworks. 
The first framework I examined was that of cognitive act theories of 
propositions. According to cognitive act theories, propositions are types of 
cognitive acts. Specifically, propositions are those cognitive act types tokened 
in all cognitive acts with the same content, where ‘the same content’ is fleshed 
out non-circularly (e.g. in terms of representation). I took this approach as my 
starting point for two reasons. First, the basic idea looks particularly amenable 
 
 148 
to expressivism because expressivists already accept normative cognitive act 
types in their theoretical ontology. Second, one of the few existing expressivist 
theories of normative propositions employs this framework, namely Michael 
Ridge’s ecumenical expressivist theory of normative propositions. 
I argued in Chapter 2, however, that Ridge’s theory failed to provide any 
principled account of the identity conditions for normative propositions. I 
suggested that this resulted from Ridge’s failure to respect what I called the 
unity requirement, which states that expressivists should provide a unified 
explanation of that in virtue of which our attitudes have the content that they 
have. This requirement was motivated by reflecting on how Scott Soames’ 
theory of propositions, which Ridge took as a starting point, explained identity 
conditions in terms of the purely representational properties of concrete cognitive 
acts. Rather than accepting Soames’ starting point and trying to extend the 
theory, I argued that an expressivist cognitive act theory should explain 
content in terms of a more general nonrepresentational notion that applies to 
both normative and representational attitudes. In a constructive spirit, I 
sketched a theory of propositions as acts of conceptual categorisation 
individuated by the conceptual roles of the constituent concepts. While I did 
not endorse this account, I highlighted the fact that many expressivists are 
independently sympathetic to conceptual role approaches to content. Because 
of this, I suggested that it might provide an attractive picture for many 
expressivists. 
However, we saw that the fate of this picture was ultimately dependent on 
the availability of a conceptual role account of normative content compatible 
with expressivism. For this reason, in Chapter 3 I examined conceptual role 
expressivism more generally. My first task was to provide a general 
characterisation of the view that unites its otherwise disparate instances. To 
this end, I provided three core commitments to explaining normative concepts, 
which taken in conjunction constitute conceptual role expressivism in its most 
general form. My second task was to raise a general challenge that would apply 
to any version of this view. This was the challenge of explaining defective 
concepts. More specifically, the challenge was to explain why normative 
conceptual roles as conceived by expressivism ground meaningful content, 
whereas conceptual roles for candidate concepts like HIYO do not, despite also 
respecting the three core commitments of conceptual role expressivism.  
I argued that extant versions of conceptual role expressivism lacked the 
resources to adequately answer the challenge. I argued that this was because 
each theory embraced some kind of deflationism about propositional content. 
Because deflationary notions cannot play an explanatory role, this leaves all 
the explanatory work to the conceptual role component of the theory of 
 
 149 
content. Traditionally, however, conceptual role theories also assign an 
explanatory role to the contents determined by conceptual roles. This 
suggested that expressivists attracted to some sort of conceptual role account 
of content need some substantive conception of normative propositions to play 
an explanatory role in their overall theory of thought and discourse. However, 
this could not be provided by the cognitive act theory alone, as the properties 
of the relevant acts were themselves explained in terms of conceptual roles. I 
then tentatively suggested that something like Allan Gibbard’s notion of 
planning contents might play this role, leaving a full discussion of this view for 
the next chapter. 
In Chapter 4 I took a broader look at planning contents. First, I located 
planning contents within a more general view that I called the modal 
conception of content, which explained content in terms of possibilities. 
Although this is standardly associated with a possible worlds view of 
propositions, I argued that the basic idea is more general and encompasses 
other views of propositions. Moreover, I argued that there is no in principle 
reason why the modal view cannot explain nonfactual contents in terms of 
possibilities. Although there are a number of different ways of modelling 
nonfactual content within this framework, I found it most useful to work with 
the Gibbardian idea that propositions be modelled as sets of world-hyperplan 
pairs, where a hyperplan specifics a maximally coherent contingency plan.  
I argued that although the world-hyperplan model provides an attractive 
framework for thinking about normative propositions for expressivists, it faces 
‘the foundational question’ of grounding the model in a satisfactory 
foundational philosophy of mind. I argued that failing to do this left the world-
hyperplan model at best incomplete and at worst non-expressivist. I examined 
one such attempt to answer the foundational question due to Seth Yalcin but 
argued that it failed. My diagnosis of this failure was that it postulated a 
problematic bifurcation between our representational and normative beliefs. 
What expressivists therefore need, I proposed, is a general theory of belief 
according to which representational and normative beliefs are fundamentally 
the same kind of attitude. While I arrived at this conclusion by reflecting on the 
failure of Yalcin’s theory, I think it is exactly what we should expect of an 
expressivist theory of normative thought that embraces normative 
propositions within the framework of propositional attitude psychology. 
Building on this discussion, in Chapter 5 I tried to answer the foundational 
question by providing an expressivist cum interpretationist theory of belief 
and propositional attitudes. According to this view, beliefs are dispositions 
individuated by principles of constitutive rationality, which provide the basis 
for interpretation. I argued that in order to interpret agents with normative 
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attitudes, we require (at least) something like the world-hyperplan model of 
content. Further, I argued that our normative attitudes are best interpreted by 
assigning nonfactual rather than factual contents to normative commitments 
and that this explains why normative commitments are nonrepresentational. 
However, because normative commitments are governed by the constitutive 
norms of belief, I argued that the theory explains why normative commitments 
are fundamentally beliefs and not some other kind of attitude. I then compared 
the view with versions of expressivism that deny that representational and 
normative beliefs are fundamentally the same kind of attitude. I argued that 
the former possessed a number of benefits over the latter. Because of this, I 
believe that interpretative expressivism has a claim to the title of the best hope 
for an expressivist theory of belief with normative propositional content.  
Although I have argued that the interpretationist approach to belief 
combined with the modal conception of content provides the best package for 
an expressivist theory of propositions and normative belief, the aim of this 
thesis has just as much been to shed light on competing approaches and 
explore their limitations. To be clear, although I think that the worries for the 
competing views raised along the way should be taken seriously, I do not 
doubt that those sympathetic to the frameworks I have rejected will have 
avenues of response that I have not anticipated here. So long as my criticisms 
will have furthered our understanding of what questions these theories need 
to answer and what desiderata they need to meet, then the inquiry will have 
succeeded.  
 
6.2 Schroeder’s theory of normative propositions 
 
One of the few philosophers to have explicitly argued that expressivists should 
embrace normative propositions is Mark Schroeder. The framing and 
motivations of this thesis owe much to Schroeder’s work (see in particular 
Schroeder 2013, 2015). I discussed some of his arguments for the claim that 
expressivists should embrace normative propositions in Chapter 1 and we 
returned to some of these arguments in later chapters. But I haven’t said 
anything about Schroeder’s positive proposals for how expressivists should go 
about embracing normative propositions. Schroeder proposes both a general 
framework for a nondescriptivist theory of belief and propositions, as well as 
a theory within that framework. In this section, I examine both of these 
proposals. 
As one of the few existing nondescriptivist theories of propositions 
designed to be suitable for an expressivist theory of normative thought and 
discourse, Schroeder’s theory is worth examining in its own right. However, it 
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is also a competitor to the interpretative expressivist view developed in this 
thesis. It therefore remains to be seen which theory expressivists should prefer. 
Here, I will argue that the interpretative expressivist view is preferable by 
raising some worries about Schroeder’s theory. Before proceeding, it is worth 
highlighting that Schroeder’s view is meant to provide a framework for 
nondescriptive propositions more generally, not normative propositions 
specifically. However, I will focus only on the view as it applies to metaethical 
expressivism. 
 
6.2.1 The general framework 
 
After outlining a number of problems that expressivist accounts face that arise 
from rejecting normative propositions, Schroeder (2013: 85) proposes that we 
distinguish between two theoretical roles that propositions have traditionally 
been posited to play. The first role is that of being the objects of attitudes and 
the primary bearers of truth and falsity. The second role is that of carving up 
the world, where propositions correspond to distinctions in reality. If we 
assume a representationalist picture of propositional attitudes and truth, it is 
easy to conflate these two roles, or at least to think that each role is filled by the 
same class of entities. However, Schroeder argues that nondescriptivists 
should reject this assumption. Instead, they should assume that there are two 
distinct classes of entities corresponding to each role. Moreover, not only are 
these two classes distinct, but they are classes of “two different sorts of thing” 
(2013: 88). Schroeder calls the entities that play the first role propositions and the 
entities that play the second role representational contents.  
Given the assumption that propositions are a different sort of thing to 
representational contents, we are led to ask the following question. If belief is 
a relation to a proposition, but representational beliefs also carve up the world, 
what must representational belief be like such that it is also a relation to a 
representational content? Schroeder’s answer is to introduce a structural 
constraint on representational belief to guarantee that it consists in a relation 
to a proposition and a distinct relation to a representational content, depending 
on how you “carve up” the belief state. Diagrammatically, Schroeder (2013: 89) 





So in the nondescriptive case, belief is simply a relation to a proposition. But in 
the descriptive case we can carve up belief in two ways. Specifically, it can be 
carved up as a relation A(_) to a proposition B(C) or it can be carved up as a 
relation A(B(_)) to a representational content C. (This isn’t quite right, because 
as we saw in Chapter 1, beliefs are relations between subjects or agents and 
contents, so we would need to include another variable within the scope of the 
belief relation to range over subjects. I will omit this, however, for ease of 
exposition.) 
To make the basic idea more concrete, Schroeder (2013: 89) offers a 
comparison to a more familiar kind of state that structurally resembles belief 
in the descriptive case. He asks us to consider the state of being about to go to 
Paris. What exactly does this state consist in? Well, on one way of carving up 
the state, it consists in an agent standing in a relation to an act type. Specifically, 
the relation of being about to and the act type of going to Paris. But on another 
way of carving up the state, it consists in an agent standing in a different 
relation to a place. Specifically, the relation of being about to go to and the city 
Paris. So we see that the single state of being about to go to Paris consists in two 
distinct relations to two distinct objects. Moreover, this example seems to 
exhibit the same abstract structure of the descriptive case in the diagram above. 
In the present case, ‘A(_)’ denotes being about to, ‘B(_)’ denotes going to, ‘A(B(_)’ 
denotes being about to go to, and ‘C’ denotes Paris. So we see that there is nothing 
inherently problematic or unusual with understanding a state as having this 
sort of structure. 
Granting Schroeder’s analysis of the state of being about to go to Paris, what 
should we make of the analysis as it applies to belief? Although Schroeder 
(2013: 92) expresses more confidence in his general framework than in his own 
development of it, I think the framework is pitched at too abstract a level to 
assess it with much confidence either way. One reason that it is difficult to 
assess is that before we have said anything about what kind of relation belief 
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is and what kind of entities propositions are, we haven’t done anything to 
explain or justify the claim that the ‘nondescriptive case’ is genuinely 
nondescriptive. As we have seen a number of times throughout this thesis, it is 
not enough to simply postulate a difference in kind between normative and 
descriptive propositions to justify a nondescriptive construal of normative 
thought. We need to actually explain why normative thought is 
nondescriptive. In the absence of any concrete implementation of the 
framework, we have no way of evaluating whether the theory is genuinely 
nondescriptive. 
Nevertheless, I think there are some things that can be said against 
Schroeder’s framework at an abstract level. The first thing to note is that 
although I follow Schroeder in distinguishing the theoretical roles of 
propositions and representational contents, I have not assumed that each role 
is filled by a different kind of entity. Whereas Schroeder wants to “avoid the 
conclusion that propositions are representational contents” (2013: 88), I only 
want to avoid the conclusion that all propositions are representational contents. 
This is because I see no reason to rule out views according to which some 
propositions are representational contents, as long as some others are not. Or, 
at least, that some are not purely representational contents, if we want to 
include a theory like Ridge’s. This is perfectly compatible with the view that 
the object-of-attitudes role is distinct from the marking-distinctions-in-reality 
role. It is just that while the occupiers of the first role are given by the class of 
propositions, the occupiers of the second role are given by a proper subset of 
that class. So it’s not obvious that respecting the distinction between these two 
roles requires accepting Schroeder’s framework, though it is one way of 
respecting the distinction. 
However, not only is Schroeder’s framework not required to respect the 
distinction, but arguably the alternative is preferable. One reason is that the 
alternative is simpler and more parsimonious. Whereas Schroeder’s 
framework postulates two distinct relations involved in representational belief 
and two distinct objects of representational belief, the view that 
representational contents are a kind of proposition postulates only one object 
and correspondingly one relation. Moreover, the view is simpler without the 
loss of explanatory power. We can see this by asking whether the simpler view 
is any less well placed to explain the four points that Schroeder takes his 
framework to be able to explain (2013: 89f). 
First, assuming the simpler view, we can straightforwardly explain how 
representational beliefs consist in relations both to propositions and 
representational contents; this is because representational contents just are 
propositions on this view. Second, we can straightforwardly explain why it is 
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easy to overlook the fact that not all beliefs consist in relations to 
representational contents; this is because the paradigm cases of belief consist 
in relations to representational contents. Third, we can straightforwardly 
explain nonrepresentational beliefs; this is because not all propositions are 
representational contents. Finally, we can straightforwardly explain how the 
view generalises to other attitudes; this is because we can simply change the 
relevant relation to the same propositions, whether they are representational 
or not. So by adopting a simpler framework, we do not lose any explanatory 
power.  
In addition, recall that, according to Schroeder’s account, representational 
propositions necessarily consist in some binary relation between something 
and a representational content. This is designed to make the necessary 
distinctions between representational and nonrepresentational beliefs. 
However, this places a fairly strong constraint on the kind of entity a 
representational proposition can be. For example, it seems to rule out the 
possibility of an unstructured view of representational propositions. Perhaps 
there are good reasons for ruling out such a view, but it shouldn’t be ruled out 
simply by the framework for distinguishing representational and non-
representational propositions. Moreover, when the constraint is taken in 
conjunction with the other constraints already in play for any theory of 
propositions, this strengthens the constraint considerably. For example, recall 
that propositions must have the right sort of logical properties, broadly 
construed, to be able to stand in entailment and inconsistency relations with 
other propositions. The class of candidates for entities that meet both kinds of 
constraint is not likely to be very large. At the very least, this class will be 
considerably smaller than the class of candidates available to nondescriptivists 
who reject this constraint. 
To be clear, I don’t take these considerations to be compelling against any 
particular instance of the framework. But I do think that these considerations 
give us reason to doubt that an expressivist theory of propositions must 
employ this framework. Ultimately, however, the framework will have to be 
assessed on the merits of its implementation. I will therefore now examine 
Schroeder’s implementation of the framework. 
 
6.2.2 Biforcated attitudes semantics  
 
Schroeder develops a nondescriptivist theory of propositions based on his 
biforcated attitude semantics, developed in his book Being For (2008). In its 
original context, biforcated attitude semantics is presented as a theory in 
natural language semantics to rival truth-conditional and propositional 
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approaches. However, Schroeder (2013) goes on to use this theory as the basis 
for his expressivist theory of belief and normative propositions. My focus here 
will be solely on the latter use. 
An attractive feature of Schroeder’s view is that he simultaneously provides 
a nondescriptivist theory of belief and propositions, rather than providing a 
nondescriptivist theory of propositions and then trying to find a suitable 
psychological story to ground this theory. It therefore faces no ‘foundational 
question’ (see Chapter 4) and no awkward questions about how realists can 
apparently say all the same things about normative concepts other than that 
they are also representational (see Chapter 3). In explaining Schroeder’s view, 
it will be helpful to start with his account of belief and then proceed to his 
account of propositions. 
The basic attitude Schroeder postulates to play the role of belief is the 
attitude of being for. We can say that a subject has the attitude of being for when 
she is for something. As a first approximation, what one is for is a certain kind 
of property. So being for is a relation that holds between subjects and 
properties. More specifically, when one is for something, then other things 
being equal, one does that thing (2008: 84). So the class of properties that being 
for relates subjects to is the class of possible act types, broadly construed. We 
can then define being for as the state “whose functional role is to lead one to 
acquire that property [one is for], other things being equal” (2013: 92). 
(Although Schroeder claims that this definition is not essential to his theory, 
for the sake of concreteness I will assume this definition throughout.) If 
believing some proposition consists in being for some property, then at a first 
pass we can say that propositions are the properties that one is for when one 
believes that proposition. If the relevant class of properties are act types, then 
identifying the proposition [p] will involve specifying what an agent is 
typically motivated to do when she believes [p]. 
This general account of belief is perfectly suited for an expressivist theory of 
normative belief. Recall that expressivists think that normative thought is 
essentially directive or action-guiding. If believing consists in being for, then it 
turns out that all beliefs are essentially directive or action-guiding. The 
directive nature of normative belief is then just a particular instance of the 
directive nature of belief in general. Further, we can suppose that the sense in 
which beliefs are ‘directive’ is broad is enough capture an agent’s being for 
having certain attitudes as well as performing certain actions. So if we suppose, 
as the expressivist might well do, that normative expressions like ‘wrong’ 
express noncognitive attitudes like disapproval, we can incorporate this idea 
into Schroeder’s theory by analysing the belief [that murder is wrong] as 
consisting in being for disapproving of murder. Thus if believing just is being for, 
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then the proposition [that murder is wrong] just is the property of 
disapproving of murder. In terms of the diagram, we can now say that the 
relation A is that of being for, and the proposition D is the act type that one is 
for when one believes D. 
With the nondescriptive case explained, we now need to explain the 
descriptive case. If believing is being for, and being for involves being 
motivated to do something, broadly construed, what kind of things are we 
motivated to do when we believe representational propositions? That is, if 
propositions are akin to “sets of instructions about what to do” (Schroeder 
2015: 17), what kind of instructions are encoded by representational 
propositions? Given the constraints of the general framework, they must be 
instructions that relate to representational contents. Schroeder suggests that we 
understand these instructions in terms of the state of proceeding as if, which 
relates agents to representational contents. In terms of the diagram, this 
relation is denoted by ‘B’. Believing a representational proposition therefore 
consists in being for proceeding as if p, where ‘p’ denotes a representational 
content. Thus, for instance, believing [that the cat is on the mat] consists in being 
for proceeding as if the cat is on the mat, where ‘the cat is on the mat’ denotes a 
representational content. It will not matter too much what kind of entity we 
take representational contents to be, but Schroeder (2013: 94n) suggests that we 
can think of representational contents in terms of orthodox conceptions of 
propositions, for example sets of possible worlds or Russellian propositions. 
What is it, then, to proceed as if p and to be for proceeding as if p? Schroeder 
provides the following answer: “to proceed as if p is to take p as settled in 
deciding what to do. Assuming that being for has the motivational property 
that someone who is for a will tend to do a, other things being equal, it follows 
that someone who believes that p will tend to proceed as if p, other things being 
equal. That is, she will tend to treat p as settled in deciding what to do.” 
(Schroeder 2008: 93f; see also Schroeder 2013: 94) The basic idea is that this 
notion captures Ramsey’s metaphor that (representational) belief is the map by 
which we steer our way through the world. And at a descriptive level, 
Schroeder’s suggestion does seem plausible. When I believe [that my desk is 
wooden], other things being equal I do proceed as if my desk is wooden, in 
that I take this fact as settled in deciding to place my coffee cup on my desk, to 
keep it away from fire, and so on. So if believing just is being for, then the 
proposition [that my desk is wooden] is the property of proceeding as if my 
desk is wooden. This illustrates the basic idea of Schroeder’s theory.  
(However, this is in fact an oversimplification. For in order to adequately 
explain negated beliefs, we need the objects of beliefs not simply to be 
 
 157 
properties, but to be pairs of properties. To see why we, consider the 
representational belief [p]. Given our initial analysis, this belief consists in: 
 
(1) being for pai p. 
 
As Schroeder (2008: 64) notes, the most natural interpretation of truth-
functional logical connectives on this picture is to consider them as operating 
on the properties that are the contents of beliefs. Although this seems to predict 
the right results in the nondescriptive case, it raises a problem in the  
descriptive case. On the natural interpretation of ‘not’, our simple analysis 
predicts that the belief [not-p] consists in: 
 
(2) being for not pai p. 
 
This is because the if negation operates on the object of belief, then it will negate 
the property pai p, which gives us not pai p. However, this seems to give us the 
wrong prediction, because intuitively we should expect the belief [not-p] to 
consist in: 
 
(3) being for pai not-p. 
 
Because (2) and (3) are not equivalent, the theory seems to over-generate belief 
states (Schroeder 2008: 96). To solve this problem, Schroeder proposes that we 
understand belief as relating agents to pairs of properties, where one property 
entails the other. Thus, the belief [p] consists not in (1) but in: 
 
(4) <being for(pai p), being for(¬pai ¬p)> 
 
Truth-functional logical connectives are then interpreted as operating on the 
pair of properties. The belief [not-p] is then analysed as consisting in: 
 
(5) <being for(¬¬pai ¬p), being for(¬pai p)> 
= <being for(pai¬p), being for(¬pai p)> 
 
(Schroeder orders the pairs such that the strongest property always comes 
first.) While this might look somewhat more complex, it is not obviously 
significantly stronger than the initial analysis. This is because it is plausible that 
it is inconsistent to proceed as if p and to proceed as if not-p. So on the simple 
analysis, being for proceeding as if p already commits one to being for not 
proceeding as if not-p (Schroeder 2008: 98). In any case, although this is an 
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important feature of the theory, it will not be too important for the ensuing 
discussion, so I will stick to the simpler analysis for ease of exposition.) 
Schroeder’s theory of belief and propositions has a number of virtues. First, 
it provides a principled account of the distinction between representational 
and nonrepresentational propositions within a more general theory of belief 
and propositions. It therefore answers the foundational question and respects 
the unity requirement. Second, it is highly plausible that it is inconsistent to be 
for inconsistent properties. The theory therefore well placed to explain why it 
is inconsistent to believe inconsistent propositions. Third, given the functional 
characterisation of being for, we can explain inconsistency in belief in terms of 
its necessarily frustrating its constitutive function. Moreover, given the account 
of representational belief, we can still explain how inconsistency in 
representational beliefs is also a kind of representational failure. In the 
previous chapters, we examined a number of different approaches that 
struggled to meet one or more of these desiderata. So Schroeder’s theory is in 
many ways attractive. However, in the next subsection, I will raise some 
worries about the theory. 
 
6.2.3 Some objections to Schroeder’s theory 
 
My main objection to Schroeder’s theory concerns the notion of proceeding as if. 
This notion plays a vital role for Schroeder in distinguishing those beliefs 
which are representational from those which are not. However, it’s unclear to 
me that proceeding as if can in fact play this role. In its most basic form, the 
problem is that the act or activity of proceeding as if seems to be just as present 
in the nondescriptive case as in the descriptive case. If I believe [that my desk 
is wooden], then a plausible description of my state is that I am for proceeding 
as if my desk is wooden. However, it is no less plausible to describe my belief 
[that murder is wrong] in terms of my being for proceeding as if murder is 
wrong. After all, other things being equal, if I have this belief, then I will take 
the wrongness of murder as settled in deciding what to do. So intuitively the 
notion of proceeding as if fails to distinguish between representational and 
nonrepresentational beliefs. 
One response to this objection would be to point out that ‘proceeding as if’ 
is defined as a relation between (a) states of being for and (b) representational 
contents. If we reject the existence of normative representational contents, then 
there is nothing that can fill the second argument place of proceeding as if in 
the normative case. So because ‘murder is wrong’ expresses only a proposition 
and no representational content, and because by definition proceeding as if is 
a relation between states of being for and representational contents, and not 
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between states of being for and propositions, there is no possible state of being 
for proceeding as if murder is wrong. 
However, although it is possible to define ‘proceeding as if’ in this way, the 
stipulation that it applies only to representational contents is not grounded in 
the functional characterisation of the attitude. If we take ‘proceeding as if’ as 
“a shorthand for the general relation of taking something as settled in one’s 
deliberative activity” (Schroeder 2013: 94), then it is clear that the notion 
applies to propositions, even nonrepresentational propositions, because it is 
clear that I can take the proposition [that murder is wrong] as settled in my 
deliberative activity. Perhaps one could amend the functional characterisation 
to range over representational contents explicitly, so that ‘proceeding as if’ is 
shorthand for the relation of taking representational contents as settled in one’s 
deliberative activity. However, it is unclear that we have any grasp of this 
functional role over and above that of the more general functional role. 
Moreover, to echo a criticism of Schroeder’s in a different context, explicitly 
ranging over representational contents in this way looks more like a criterion 
that the functional role of proceeding as if must meet rather than an 
explanation of what this functional role is actually like such that it only ranges 
over representational contents. So we have not yet been given any 
psychological distinction to go along with our distinction between <pai p> and 
<pai [that p]>. 
Indeed, insofar as ‘proceeding as if’ has its home in deliberative activity, 
then even in the descriptive case it seems more plausible within Schroeder’s 
framework that proceeding as if is a relation to propositions and not 
representational contents. For deliberative activity will constitutively involve 
propositional acts and attitudes, and so the most natural way of characterising 
this activity will appeal to the propositional contents of those acts and 
attitudes, including in the descriptive case. Moreover, it would be strange if 
the same activity of proceeding as if took a different object in the descriptive 
case, even though the same kind of object (propositions) is also available. 
However, this might suggest another response to the objection, and one that 
Schroeder seems to endorse in a slightly different context. While Schroeder 
explains representational belief in terms of proceeding as if, he is also aware 
that it is perfectly acceptable to describe normative beliefs in terms of 
proceeding as if (2008: 155). If this is right, then how should we explain the 
difference between the descriptive and nondescriptive case? Schroeder 
suggests that we explain the difference in terms of what proceeding as if 
consists in in each case. Thus, an expressivist might claim that while it is correct 
to describe the belief [that murder is wrong] as being for proceeding as if 
murder is wrong, proceeding as if murder is wrong just is disapproving of 
 
 160 
murder. By comparison, while it is also correct to describe the belief [that my 
desk is wooden] as being for proceeding as if my desk is wooden, proceeding 
as if my desk is wooden just is proceeding as if a certain representational 
content is true.1  
However, this response faces the same objection as before. The problem is 
that we do not have any account of what it is to proceed as if some 
representational content is true. For again, insofar as we understand what it is 
to proceed as if, it applies to propositions and not representational contents. 
Further, if we assumed that the very same relation applied to both propositions 
and representational contents, then arguably this would over-generate beliefs. 
This is because for every representational state picked out by the expression 
‘being for proceeding as if p’, ‘p’ would be ambiguous between denoting a 
proposition and a representational content. Given Schroeder’s assumption that 
these are two distinct kinds of entity, it follows that there are two states of belief 
where intuitively it seems that there is only one. This is because beliefs are 
individuated by their contents, and so if descriptive beliefs consist in being for 
proceeding as if p, we can differentiate between two states of being for 
depending on how we disambiguate ‘p’.  
I haven’t said anything here that rules out the possibility of providing a 
characterisation of ‘proceeding as if’ that applies only to representational 
contents. However, for the reasons set out above, this relation is not “the 
general relation of taking something as settled in one’s deliberative activity.” 
Instead, it will be some distinct relation, call it pai*. Perhaps one could then say 
that in the descriptive case, the property <pai [that p]> just is <pai* p>. However, 
this cannot be right for the simple reason that by hypothesis, propositions and 
representational contents are distinct kinds of entity. Therefore it is not 
possible that [p] = p. Because relations are partly individuated by their relata, 
it is therefore not possible that <pai [p]> just is <pai* p>.  
Another objection concerns the plausibility of generalising Schroeder’s 
theory to other propositional attitudes. Schroeder (2013: 90) rightly claims that 
any implementation of his general framework will have the right sort of 
structure to explain other propositional attitudes. In terms of the above 
diagram, it is simply a matter of replacing the belief relation A with other 
relevant relations, such as the desire relation. Importantly, because A is the 
same in both the descriptive and non-descriptive case, this allows us to have a 
 
1 Schroeder’s discussion of this issue occurs prior to his endorsement of a separation of the 
roles of propositions and representational contents, so this isn’t exactly what he says. But 
I take it that this is what the original suggestion would amount to within the new 
framework. His explanation of what makes proceeding as if p descriptive is if “it is possible 
to understand what it would be for it to be the case that P” (2008: 156). 
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uniform treatment of attitudes across both cases. However, while this is a 
virtue of the general framework, it is not obvious how to implement it within 
the biforcated attitude theory. 
Consider, for instance, an ordinary desire, such as the desire to go for a walk. 
If desires have propositions as their objects, we might suppose that the relevant 
content of this desire is the proposition [that I am walking]. Given that this is a 
descriptive proposition, according to Schroeder’s theory this proposition will 
be the property of proceeding as if I am walking. So what relation do we bear 
to this property in desiring to go for a walk? Note that standard analyses of 
desires will not apply here. For example, if propositions are centred worlds, it 
is natural to understand the functional role of desire in terms of an agent being 
motivated to acquire the property that is the object of the desire. But if we 
accept Schroeder’s theory of propositions, this relation more or less just is the 
belief relation. So it’s not entirely clear to me what relation could play the desire 
role on Schroeder’s picture given his account of propositions. 
Further, it’s worth stressing the dialectical burden that this places on 
Schroeder’s theory. By providing a unified framework for descriptive and 
nondescriptive belief, Schroeder’s theory avoids having to provide 
unacceptably ad hoc analyses of nondescriptive desires, hopes, doubts, and so 
on. However, if believing is being for and propositions are sets of instructions 
about what to do, then it’s hard to see how to generalise the theory to other 
propositional attitudes. It seems that we are going to require a new analysis of 
each attitude kind to explain how that attitude consists in standing in a relation 
to a set of instructions about what to do, even in the descriptive case. By 
comparison, the interpretationist view set out in the previous chapter retains a 
fairly conventional view about the desire relation, so long as we can make sense 
of the notion of bringing it about that some proposition is true non-reductively, so 
that it can apply to nonrepresentational propositions as well as 
representational propositions. 
To sum up, although Schroeder’s theory has a number of virtues, I think that 
the above objections give us sufficient reason to doubt its success. Although I 
haven’t said anything to rule out this theory entirely, I hope to have shown that 
as it currently stands, it does not succeed in its primary task, which is to explain 
the difference between representational and nonrepresentational belief. I 
therefore conclude that the theory is not preferable to the interpretationist view 




6.3 Theoretical implications and directions for future 
study 
 
In the final section of this chapter, I want to discuss some of the wider 
theoretical implications of the conclusions reached in this thesis, together with 
further avenues of research. Perhaps most obvious is the implications for 
debates about expressivism within metaethics. Expressivism has often been 
characterised as the denial that there are such things as normative beliefs 
together with the denial that there are such things as normative propositions 
(except in a deflationary sense). Opponents of expressivism often take issue 
with these denials and argue that expressivism has serious shortcomings 
because of them. Clearly, however, if the interpretative expressivist view 
sketched in the previous chapter is correct, then expressivism has no such 
shortcomings. Or at least, if it does, it can no longer be explained simply in 
terms of its rejection of normative belief and propositions. As I have 
highlighted, it would be fair to point out that the modal conception of content 
as well as interpretationism have problems of their own, and these will no 
doubt be inherited by the interpretative expressivist view of normative belief. 
However, this would be true of any theory of belief and any theory of 
propositions that expressivists might utilise, so the charge is dialectically 
ineffective — though of course these problems will have to be addressed at the 
end of the day. 
Another implication is that it upsets many of the standard taxonomies so 
dear to metaethicists (see, for example, Miller 2013: 8; Kalderon 2007: 140; Parfit 
2017: 56). For it is no longer open to define the opposition between 
expressivism and descriptivism as a difference between whether normative 
statements express normative propositions or beliefs. Moreover, the discussion 
of this thesis shows that the taxonomies employed within metaethics are not as 
theoretically neutral as they are often assumed to be. This is because they are 
not free of presuppositions regarding the nature of belief, propositions, and so 
on. Although such taxonomies can be a pedagogically helpful heuristic, I think 
this shows that it is a mistake to insist that all metaethical theories fit neatly 
within a commonly shared taxonomy. While at the end of the day any theory 
will have to be compared with any other, there is no reason to insist that 
everyone comes to the table with the same starting assumptions. Moreover, 
there is no reason why we should not view the background assumptions as 
part of the overall package to be assessed. To do otherwise obscures the 
theoretical possibilities available within metaethics. 
Looking beyond metaethics, the discussion has wider implications for the 
philosophy of mind and language as well as for metaphysics. For instance, if 
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something like interpretative expressivism is along the right lines, this would 
undermine a commonly accepted picture of the nature of meaning and 
intentionality. Specifically, it would undermine the picture of meaning and 
intentionality as essentially representational. Further, if certain domains of 
discourse are nonrepresentational, this raises the further question about 
whether providing a metaphysics for that domain as traditionally conceived is 
a legitimate enterprise. This is because given a nonrepresentational construal 
of some domain of discourse, there is no feature of reality that that discourse is 
about.2 Looking forward, this naturally raises questions about whether the 
expressivist view of normativity can be generalised to other domains that lend 
themselves to an expressivist analysis. I have already noted that the modal 
view of content has also been employed to provide nonfactualist 
characterisations of mathematical thought, know how, and epistemic 
modality. So I think there is some license for optimism that the view of belief 
will generalise to other domains, though ultimately this remains to be seen. 
While I have argued that the interpretative expressivist view is the most 
promising approach for an expressivist theory of belief, I have not fully 
defended this view. If one were to fully defend the view, one would need to do 
two things. First, one would need to provide a defence of interpretationism. 
Second, one would need to provide a defence of the particular principles of 
rationality that explained why normative beliefs have nonfactual propositions 
as their contents. Although these tasks would be crucial to establishing the 
interpretative expressivist view, each task would deserve a thesis of its own, 
and so I have not made any claim to have conclusively established these 
positions. However, for what it is worth, I do believe that interpretationism 
provides one of the most promising approaches for explaining propositional 
attitudes and folk psychology. And the kind of arguments I appealed to in 
motivating the relevant principles of constitutive rationality are just the kind 
of arguments expressivists employ anyway, so I think expressivists should feel 
comfortable in their ability to defend these principles. 
I also mentioned at the end of Chapter 5 that while I take interpretationism 
to be independently plausible and particularly amenable to expressivism, I 
have said nothing to rule out other foundational theories of belief as providing 
suitable frameworks for expressivists. Perhaps another plausible candidate 
would be that of analytic or ‘common-sense’ functionalism (Lewis 1999; 
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2007). Analytic functionalism is in many ways 
similar to the interpretationist view I have adopted. Both claim that the mental 
is constitutively rational and both accept a holistic approach to belief 
 
2 Though see Dreier (2015c) for an argument that quasi-realist expressivism does not 
successfully deflate all metaphysical questions about normativity. 
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attribution. The analytic functionalist makes the further claim that we can 
(approximately) reduce mental properties to physical properties (i.e. brain 
states) by providing a Ramsey sentence of the folk psychological 
characterisation of an agent’s attitudes. Another possibility would be to 
develop a dispositionalist account that does not rely on principles of rationality 
to individuate beliefs. For example, Schwitzgebel (2002) suggests that a belief’s 
dispositional profile might include phenomenal dispositions. Perhaps 
normative beliefs can then be characterised by some kind of affective or 
sentimental disposition. A further possibility would be to adopt a 
psychofunctionalist view that embraces the representational theory of mind. 
The expressivist would then need to provide a suitably nondescriptivist 
psychosemantics for normative language (Horwich [2010] can be read way; 
Gibbard [2012] arguably provides a different kind of sententialist theory of 
belief). No doubt there are other possibilities, all of which I welcome.  
However, I think that interpretative expressivist view provides a promising, 
novel, and interesting framework for thinking about normative belief and 
belief in general. It provides new resources for bringing to fruition some of the 
suggestive but sketchy ideas of the new proponents of the Gibbardian 
approach to content. Moreover, as well as furthering the expressivist research 
programme, it also provides the grounds for a reimagining of 
interpretationism in a number of ways. One way in which it does so is by 
providing a new way of thinking about pragmatist views that take all belief-
talk to be nonrepresentational. Moreover, by emphasising the role that 
propositions play within interpretationism, the inquiry suggests a tighter 
integration of interpretationism with the modal view of content. More 
generally, it calls for a greater appreciation of the explanatory role of 
propositions within interpretationism, including the variety of views that 
might follow depending on one’s choice of propositions within the theory. So 
as well as being an attractive view in and of itself, it suggests a number of 
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